As tensions rise in the Gulf following attacks in Saudi Arabia, Iran has announced it will hold combined naval exercises with Russia and China. The announcement is the latest move by Tehran as it tries to resist pressure from the United States, denies any involvement in the September 14 attacks on Saudi oil facilities, and maintains it will be the party that will guarantee security in the Strait of Hormuz. The exercise will be held outside of the Gulf in international waters, likely in the Gulf of Oman and Indian Ocean, and be the first of its kind among Russia, China, and Iran.
Tehran seems to be positioning itself to better resist Washington’s continued “maximum pressure” campaign. In addition to economic sanctions and diplomatic pressure, the United States is assembling a coalition to conduct naval operations in the Gulf and is deploying new air defense systems to Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have joined the U.S.-led International Maritime Security Construct, which includes Bahrain, the United Kingdom, and Australia. In response, Tehran is searching for allies of its own.
Iran likely seeks to bolster its regional strength and deepen military and diplomatic relations by carrying out military exercises near contested waters with two of the United States’ other named rivals. Bilateral Iranian military collaboration with Russia and China has been continuous over previous decades, however it is less a cooperative strategic partnership than a quid pro quo relationship among states with differing goals in the region. Rather than a major change for the Gulf, this recent announcement is likely a continuation of existing military ties and a gradual escalation by Iran.
Arms Sales and Exercises
Recent decades of relations among Iran, China, and Russia have been a story of arms sales and nuclear development. Moscow has sold weapons systems to Tehran since the 1990s, including tanks, missiles, fighter planes, and air defense systems. Russia also helped Iran develop its nuclear facility at Bushehr and played a key role in negotiations over the Iran nuclear agreement, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. China has supplied weapons to Iran since the Iran-Iraq War. According to the CIA, in 1985, China agreed to provide around $1 billion in missiles and small arms to Iran, though these sales decreased throughout the 1990s and 2000s. In recent years, Beijing has re-emerged as a major arms dealer to Iran and other countries in the Middle East.
Iran has also conducted limited military exercises on a bilateral basis with Russia and China. Iran and Russia conducted naval drills in the Caspian Sea in 2015 and 2017, and plans have been announced for another exercise in 2019. Those previous drills only consisted of anti-piracy and search and rescue training as opposed to combat integration. In 2017, Iran and China conducted a joint naval exercise near the Strait of Hormuz when two Chinese destroyers visited Bander Abbas. The Chinese and Iranian navies first carried out exercises in Iranian waters in 2014 focusing on basic search and rescue and anti-piracy training. China has also sought increased cooperation with the Iranian air force. Outside the Gulf, Moscow and Beijing have an extensive history of military exercises and naval cooperation, though three-way training with Iran appears new.
New Goals for a Changing Gulf
Each country has different goals for military cooperation in the Gulf, as exemplified by public statements from each government. While Iranian statements on previous exercises emphasized “solidarity” between countries to build strength as tensions increased with the United States, Chinese comments tempered expectations by asserting “mutual understanding.” Tehran may hope future exercises lead to deeper partnerships, but so far Moscow has been silent on the issue and Beijing stated the exercises are part of “regular cooperation” with its international counterparts.
Russia views its military cooperation with Iran as a means to continue asserting its importance in the Middle East and further split Washington from its European partners. Moscow’s transactional dealings in Libya and coordination with both Iran and Israel in Syria showcase Russian flexibility in the region. China has made Iran a “comprehensive strategic partner,” on par with the UAE and Saudi Arabia, pursuing economic and security interests while balancing relations with conflicting parties. As tensions and a trade war escalate between China and the United States, maintaining access to Iranian oil would allow Beijing to avoid restrictions on its supplies that could come if the United States were to put pressure on its Gulf allies to reduce exports to China. China has no interest in reducing Iranian-U.S. competition in the Gulf since it further distracts the United States and pulls U.S. resources from China’s near waters allowing the People’s Liberation Army Navy greater freedom to advance its operations in the South and East China Seas.
Future Expectations
The recently announced naval exercises play a small role in China’s Middle Eastern strategy, but Beijing’s desire to remain disengaged from Middle Eastern conflict will likely soon be overcome by People’s Liberation Army Navy counterpiracy deployments, evacuations of Chinese citizens from Libya and Yemen, and Chinese port projects, all of which point toward increased Chinese naval activity in the Gulf.
At the level of Iranian-U.S. competition, the exercise announcement indicates a calculated, incremental step in escalation. The September 14 strikes targeted oil facilities and took no lives. The response was harsh words by Saudi Arabia at the United Nations, U.S. deployments to the Arabian Peninsula, and the expansion of the maritime coalition. This exercise announcement shows that Tehran is cautiously choosing its actions in its ongoing feud with Washington and Riyadh.
The impact of future trilateral exercises may be most deeply felt through changing relationships between Washington and its long-time partners. The United States is no longer the sole external power broker in the region, and most conflicts going forward will involve Russian and Chinese interests. China has deepened its ties to the UAE and Saudi Arabia, both traditional U.S. allies. Beijing aptly deals with rivals on both sides of the Gulf to its own economic benefit. Chinese-Saudi trade has grown rapidly in the past decades, and the Chinese practice of noninterference in domestic affairs often finds favor in regions like the Gulf. As long as China continues to engage with Saudi Arabia, its military cooperation with Iran will remain limited and narrow in scope.
