UAE Security Forum 2022
Expanding Regional Partnerships for Security and Prosperity
Conference Report
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• Providing expert analysis and thoughtful debate on the economic, energy, environmental, security, social, cultural, and political dimensions of the Gulf Arab states as well as their relations with the United States and other countries.

• Informing a global audience of policymakers, legislators, businesspeople, academics, media, youth, and others as the foundation for strategic decisions regarding this important region.

• Employing multiple avenues to inform public understanding of the importance of the relationship between the United States and the Gulf Arab states.

• Encouraging strong academic coverage by developing scholars who concentrate on the study of the region.

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About This Report

This report is based on the discussions during the annual UAE Security Forum, held on November 17, 2022 in Abu Dhabi, with the theme “Expanding Regional Partnerships for Security and Prosperity.” This report was prepared by Saskia van Genugten, an associate director in the Abu Dhabi office of MacroScope Strategies (M2S).

For more information and videos from the forum, please visit www.uaesf.org.
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Foreword

It gives me great pleasure to present to you the final report of the UAE Security Forum 2022 “Expanding Regional Partnerships for Security and Prosperity,” held on November 17, 2022, in Abu Dhabi. With tensions heightened over the war in Ukraine, and its ripple effects felt across the region and more broadly, critical questions around security abound. But the concept of security is complex – which is increasingly clear as the world grapples with the remnants of a pandemic and the effects of climate change. What does security really mean, how can it be achieved, and how can effective security partnerships be built?

Security is largely about perception – people feeling secure. In recent years, various developments have affected the Gulf states’ perceptions about the reliability of the United States as a security partner. However, while there is a perception that the United States has disengaged and is withdrawing from the Gulf, actions speak louder than words. The Gulf region remains critically important to the United States, just as the United States remains the preeminent security partner for Gulf Arab countries, despite their focus on strategic diversification. Gulf maritime security is key. The U.S. maritime presence in the Gulf remains unrivaled, and its security engagement with key friends and allies in the region and beyond is increasing. After a long debate over the U.S. force posture in the Gulf, it is becoming clearer that the United States will maintain its basic security architecture in the region. The Abraham Accords have opened the door to new collaborations, especially on security, and Washington is forging a network of expanding regional partnerships.

Since the forum’s launch in 2016, AGSIW has played a vital role in bringing together academics, policymakers, and practitioners to find creative solutions to some of the most pressing common challenges for the United States and its regional partners. We will use the findings in this report to guide our own work in this field and inform regional governments and the private sector.

I would like to thank our supporters and partners who make the work of AGSIW possible. I hope you find this report informative and useful, and I look forward to the next iteration of the UAE Security Forum in 2023.

Ambassador Douglas A. Silliman
President, Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington
Executive Summary

On November 17, 2022, the Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington held its annual UAE Security Forum, with the theme “Expanding Regional Partnerships for Security and Prosperity.” Held at New York University Abu Dhabi, the event gathered top experts from the United States and the Gulf region. Discussions focused on issues currently affecting relations between the United States and the Gulf Arab states, including diverging threat perceptions, maritime security, and the forging of new economic and security partnerships.

Relations between the United States and the Gulf Arab states are adjusting to a new set of realities. On the economic front, these include a United States that is no longer dependent on Middle East oil and Gulf Arab states that themselves are building post-oil economies, with an overall drive by both toward more self-sufficiency. Geopolitically, the United States has identified China as its prime competitor, while Gulf Arab states are increasingly unwilling to pick a side as the United States competes with China and Russia. Instead, they are pursuing strategies geared toward maximizing their own interests by diversifying partnerships. Regarding security, the militaries of the United States and the Gulf Arab countries may be ill equipped to deal with a new reality of decentralized warfare and the use of cheap precision weaponry, such as drones, as Russia is currently experiencing in Ukraine.

These new realities are matched with changes in respective threat perceptions, with transformations in relative power balances – regionally and globally – and with adjustments in security strategies. While still mostly aligned, threat perceptions of the United States and Gulf Arab partners are diverging. Among other things, there is a disconnect on the line between terrorism and radicalization as well as on tackling the growing problem of nonstate actors. A third important element remains divergence regarding the desired outcome of negotiations with Iran. These have often become too technical with the United States predominantly focused on managing enrichment capabilities rather than creating a framework to generate confidence that other concerns, including proxy groups, the proliferation of weapons in the region, and, ultimately, political ambitions, are being addressed.

Also affecting U.S.-Gulf Arab relations are perceptions around the reliability of the United States as a security partner. The debate over the U.S. force posture, the emphasis on the United States’ “pivot to Asia,” and the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan have triggered uncertainty. Nonetheless, the Gulf region remains of strategic importance to the United States, which looks set to maintain its basic security architecture in the region. And regarding Gulf maritime security, the United States remains unrivaled and is building effective partnerships with regional allies. Still, the uncertainty generated has had consequences. First, it has led to an expectations gap, manifested in a demand for clearer U.S. commitments. Second, at least indirectly, the uncertainty has led to the Gulf Arab states pursuing a broad strategy of diversification.

The coronavirus pandemic has intensified the thinking that multiple partnerships make for greater security, and new partnerships are increasingly being established. Most prominent are those related to the 2020 Abraham Accords and the Gulf Arab states’ opening to Israel. While these new partnerships present opportunities for regional cooperation, they will need to be continuously managed in a way that all sides benefit, while ensuring that collaborations on paper actually materialize.
Key Findings and Recommendations

• The discussions over the United States’ regional force posture, as well as the withdrawal from Afghanistan, triggered debates around the reliability of the United States as a security partner for the Gulf Arab states. While U.S. efforts and the buildup of effective partnerships in the maritime domain illustrate continued U.S. capabilities and commitment, ensuring and convincing partners of this commitment is key to rebuilding confidence.

• A divergence in threat perceptions between the United States and the Gulf Arab states is impacting collaborations on various fronts, including counterterrorism, containing Iran, and dealing with threats from nonstate actors. At the moment, there are no clear tools to address such issues of divergence, and creating better understanding of each other’s underlying positions and interests could help find common ground.

• The uncertainty of recent years has morphed into an expectations gap in which Gulf Arab states are eager to get more explicit security guarantees from the United States, while still maintaining policies of strategic diversification. The U.S. administration should work with its Gulf partners to find ways to close this expectations gap.

• There is no serious competitor to U.S. naval supremacy in the Gulf, and the building of partnerships is positive and effective.

• Negotiations around the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action nuclear deal with Iran should reflect the desired outcomes. The JCPOA was initially meant to be the “floor” not the “ceiling” for a broader framework taking into account not just the technicalities around containing enrichment but other important concerns, including the proliferation of arms and drones, the use of proxies, and, ultimately, political ambitions.

• The United States is recalibrating its worldview toward one in which China is its prime strategic competitor. The Gulf Arab states, however, believe they serve a bridge function and want to retain positive relations with the United States but also with China and Russia. Instead of pressuring Gulf Arab states to take a side, partners should find a way that allows both sides to pursue their own interests as much as possible, while appreciating limits on the other side’s freedom of action.

• Increased regional cooperation and economic integration are positive developments. The Abraham Accords are the flagship for this renewed regional dynamic, and all sides, where necessary aided by the United States, should continue their efforts in making the partnerships successful. This includes living up to paper commitments as well as pushing collaborations in new fields, including, for example, in academia.

• In the newly unfolding geopolitical order, the Gulf Arab states are well positioned geographically and with regard to resources. At the same time, the current political dynamic in the United States and President Joseph R. Biden Jr.’s ability to work with Democrats in the center can form an empowered base for positive cooperation between the United States and the Gulf Arab states.
Introduction

On November 17, 2022, the Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington held its annual UAE Security Forum, at New York University Abu Dhabi, with the theme “Expanding Regional Partnerships for Security and Prosperity.” The event brought together top experts from the United States and the Gulf Arab states to discuss security-related developments in the region. As AGSIW’s president, Ambassador Douglas A. Silliman, pointed out in his opening remarks, the purpose of the annual forum is to explore some basic questions around security, discuss what “security” actually means for the Gulf region, and look at the ways security is achieved.

Relations between the United States and the Gulf Arab states are adjusting to a new set of realities. These new realities are matched with changes in respective threat perceptions, transformations in relative power balances – regionally and globally – and adjustments in security strategies. Both sides will need to reidentify the implicit bargain underpinning the relationship. This used to be captured in the “oil for security” framework. But as the United States is no longer dependent on Middle East oil and Gulf Arab states are building post-oil economies and pursuing strategic diversification, this foundation has become unsteady.

Relations between the United States and Gulf Arab states are becoming increasingly complex. The United States’ withdrawal from Afghanistan, growing focus on Asia, and limited and belated responses to attacks in the region have led to questions around the reliability of the United States as a security guarantor for the region. Several other factors are also feeding into this complexity. The coronavirus pandemic has left many people asking what “security” actually means, and, as a result, states are reconsidering strategic dependencies. They do so in terms of hard security but also regarding “soft” security, such as ensuring food security, supply chain security, and protection against the effects of climate change.

The forum considered different types of security-related developments in the United States and the Gulf and highlighted fundamental issues concerning U.S.-Gulf relations. Topics included diverging threat perceptions, stepping up maritime security, the building of new partnerships, and the United Arab Emirates’ efforts to not only seek diversification in its economic relations but also in its foreign and security policies.

Changing Threat Perceptions

A decade or two ago the security partnership between the United States and the Gulf Arab states was based on a few clear and well-demarcated threats. The director general of Dubai-based think tank b’huth, Mohammed Baharoon, examined how key elements of this initially shared threat perception have begun to diverge. First, the United States and the UAE used to align on fighting terrorism in the region and beyond. Increasingly, the focus has shifted toward fighting radicalization instead. This has led to different approaches, which often boil down to which groups should be labeled “terrorist” organizations. There is also divergence over the distinction between state versus nonstate actors and how to treat transnational groups.
third element of misalignment regards the expected outcome of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action nuclear deal with Iran.

Ambassador Frank G. Wisner, chair of the board of directors of AGSIW, concluded that on the JCPOA, for the United States the question is no longer about whether Iran has nuclear abilities but about how to manage its enrichment capability. As he saw it, the discussions around the JCPOA have become too technical. Initially, the outcome was supposed to be a framework for dealing with Iran, to bring Tehran back into the international community after a period of regional hostility. He mentioned that those involved in the negotiations should reflect on the idea that the JCPOA was intended to be the “floor” and not the “ceiling” of agreements. The goal was for it to serve as a basis for confidence building for a broader framework that would include discussions on other concerns, including the proliferation of arms and drones as well as underlying political ambitions.

While divergence of threat perceptions between the United States and the Gulf Arab states is real, AGSIW Senior Resident Scholar Hussein Ibish stressed that a lot of commonalities remain. Both the United States and the UAE care deeply about the threats posed by Iran, including the proliferation of armed groups in Lebanon, Iraq, and, especially, Yemen, the proliferation of precision-guided ballistic missiles, and the nuclear threat. When scrutinized from the sea, many shared concerns remain, including piracy, smuggling, sea mines, and, most importantly, Iran’s rapid growth in unmanned capabilities, such as drones, according to the commander of the U.S. Naval Forces Central Command, Vice Admiral Brad Cooper.

On top of these hard security threats, threats emanating from other sources have become more prominent. The risk of a new pandemic remains, and the consequences of climate change for the hydrocarbon rich region are continually more tangible. New threats might also be looming on the horizon. David B. Des Roches, an associate professor at the U.S. National Defense University, mentioned, for example, that the bulging Syrian narcotics industry could morph into a profound security issue for the Gulf.

Rethinking Strategies

In some ways, security is not really measurable or tangible: People feel secure when they think they are secure. In recent years, various developments have impacted the Gulf states’ perceptions around the reliability of the United States as a security partner. This uncertainty has led to an expectations gap, manifesting in a demand from Gulf partners for clearer U.S. commitments, sometimes to the level of desiring a commitment like that of NATO’s Article 5, which commits NATO members to consider an armed attack on any member of the alliance as an attack against all members, obligating them to take action.

Ambassador William Roebuck, executive vice president of AGSIW, noted that the uncertainty partly stems from U.S. distractions, such as the discussions around the U.S. force posture in the region and the U.S. electoral cycle. He indicated that the force posture debate has reached
a level of consensus now, determining that the Gulf remains of strategic importance to the United States. The United States will maintain its basic security architecture in the region, including a base in Bahrain, training and equipment activities in Saudi Arabia, and continued arms sales.

Ambassador Thomas Pickering, a member of AGSIW’s board of directors, added that the United States’ strategic realignment in favor or Asia should not be perceived as “zero-sum.” The United States remains highly dependent on the Middle East, and more attention dedicated to Asia does not mean less attention elsewhere. The United States, he emphasized, remains an international player. Wisner framed this continuing U.S. national interest in the Gulf region around three elements. First, a presence in the Middle East is needed for the preservation of power to influence international events. Second, the region remains of critical importance with regard to hydrocarbons: While the United States might not be a significant consumer of energy from the region, it still needs to ensure stability in the oil market and a smooth global economy. Third, the United States remains committed to the state of Israel, which demands a consistent approach toward the Arab region. Ibish added that there will be greater understanding of the tremendous leverage on China that can be generated by a significant U.S. presence around maritime chokepoints, such as the Suez Canal, Bab el-Mandeb, and Strait of Hormuz.

From a Gulf perspective, Baharoon reflected on how the UAE has been rethinking its own strategies. Reflecting on the perceived decrease in reliance on the United States as a security guarantor for the region, he stated that in that context, the UAE has three strategic options: first, the formation of new coalitions of the willing; second, a return and stepping up of deterrence, including nuclear deterrence; and last, a nonconflict approach that emphasizes de-escalation and cooperation within the region.

New Geopolitical Considerations

While panelists concluded that the United States is not withdrawing from its role as a global power, they did perceive the world to be at an inflection point. U.S. agency in the world and the United States’ responsibility for the world are no longer key geopolitical drivers. Instead, as one panelist put it, there are now lots of players at the table, but there is no head of the table, and the appropriate table manners have become a subject of discussion.

And while, as mentioned, the Middle East remains of strategic importance for the United States, dealing with China as the United States’ new principal competitor will be the overarching concern. Pickering and Wisner pointed out that, within the U.S. administration and the security establishment, there is broad consensus that China represents the key challenge for the rest of this century. At the same time, only very high-level consensus exists on how to deal with
China, which can be captured in a “3C” framework: The United States will “confront” China where and when it thinks it oversteps; it will “compete” vigorously with China, for example in the realm of technology, and it will find “cooperation” where possible.

Mina Al-Oraibi, editor in chief of The National, mentioned that the Gulf Arab states are currently unwilling to pick a side. The UAE, like other Gulf Arab states, is eager to keep good relations with both the United States and China. The same holds for relations with Russia – the UAE does not want to be pressured into choosing a side in the conflict in Ukraine. In the UAE’s view, the developments between Russia and Ukraine do not need to be regarded as a geopolitical inflection point. This is in contrast with how the United States views the conflict – the U.S. administration has prioritized Ukraine in its foreign policy agenda and mobilized massive amounts of resources. Reflecting on this, Wisner dismissed the idea that the United States is asking anyone to pick a side. However, in his view, given for example the food crisis related to the conflict, it should be in the interest of the Arab region to support an end to the conflict and seek areas of cooperative engagement.

**Military Security Challenges**

Des Roches provided his insights on the changes and challenges of the practical craft of military combat. As he saw it, the war in Ukraine is a demonstration of the evolving nature of warfare, pointing to a key distinction between a centralized and decentralized model. In the war, Russia represents a hypercentralized model, in which junior officers are not empowered. In contrast, Ukraine is deploying a more decentralized form of warfare, relying on a multinodal network and lines of command similar to an “Uber model.” This has resulted in rapid, decentralized decision making, as well as logistical lines and resources that can rapidly be shifted around. With the war unfolding, the Russians seem incapable of fighting this decentralized model.

The panelists concluded that most of the militaries in the Arab world, including the UAE, are similarly not set up for such multinodal combat. And while the United States has adopted the concept of network-centric warfare, its military doctrine remains relatively hierarchical in this sphere, as control over carrying out attacks often requires involvement at the senior level. Therefore, for the Gulf Arab states, simply adopting U.S. practices will bring no real solution. As Des Roches concluded, the U.S. military and the UAE military alike will need to undergo a fundamental shift in military culture toward a more decentralized model in which junior officers are much more empowered.

The proliferation of cheap and precise weapons systems, including drones, is helping to accelerate this decentralized way of conducting warfare. On a related note, missile defense remains a huge concern for the Gulf region, and some panelists suggested that the additional
threat of drones may serve as an incentive for the region to prioritize ambitions toward integrated air and missile defense systems, something promoted by the United States for decades. A panelist suggested that the placement of new, Israeli, early warning radars in the UAE and Bahrain could potentially be a step in the direction of regional integration, but Baharoon noted that overall, there doesn't yet seem to be enough openness among different Gulf countries to this idea of increasing integration and interoperability. Acknowledging the threat from drones, he pointed to the fact that such drones are small and can simply be assembled inside a country, creating a defense requirement that is very different from missile defense, and requiring better ways to defend against nonstate actors. In his view, if that cannot be done, deterrence must be stepped up.

U.S. Supremacy at Sea Through Partnerships

Maritime security is a key aspect of security of the Gulf, and Gulf maritime security has particular importance globally. With regard to maritime security providers in the Gulf, the United States remains unrivaled, according to Cooper. The U.S. maritime presence, as well as the number of exercises conducted with regional partners, cannot be matched by any other power. In 2021, the United States conducted 30 exercises with regional partners, while China held one and Russia three. In 2022, the United States concluded around 70 exercises. In Cooper's view, while the perception somehow seems to be that the United States is less committed, at sea the United States is showing its commitment with actions instead of words.

The United States wants to continue leadership of maritime security in the region, and Cooper was optimistic about the growing security cooperation at sea. In his view, the region's trajectory of strengthening and expanding partnerships will increase its ability to deter as well as respond. The Abraham Accords, for example, enabled the first exercise in the Red Sea bringing together Bahrain, the UAE, and Israel. Additionally, the 2022 International Maritime Exercise, the Middle East region's largest maritime exercise and including the world's largest unmanned naval exercise, brought together more than 60 countries, with the UAE navy taking a leading role on one of the task forces. With ongoing threats to commercial shipping in the Suez Canal, Bab el-Mandeb, and Strait of Hormuz, such partnerships are increasingly important to maintain regional maritime security. Cooper suggested that the most important “ships” the United States has deployed are: relation“ships,” partner“ships,” and leader“ship,” combined with friend“ship.”

Cooper also expressed excitement about the journey of technological innovation the United States and its partners in the Gulf had embarked upon. Over a short period, the navies have been testing unmanned surface vehicles. He suggested, with this clear example of successful short-cycle innovation, the United States and its allies will be able to provide many extra sets
of eyes on the water, which is increasingly necessary with the growing number of incidents. The set objective is to, by summer 2023, have one hundred unmanned vessels patrolling the regional seas, of which 20% will be operated by the United States and 80% by regional allies. Artificial intelligence applications are being used to identify suspicious ships, and this shared innovation is expected to take today’s partnerships to the next level.

Prosperity and New Regional Partnerships

While many economies across the world are slowing sharply, many countries in the Gulf region are achieving accelerating growth. Scott Livermore, a chief economist at Oxford Economics Middle East, mentioned that the region is doing very well economically. Narayanappa Janardhan, a senior research fellow at the Anwar Gargash Diplomatic Academy, added that the UAE is successfully linking economic, energy, and security dimensions to advance four strategic pillars: regional stability, people, prosperity, and international responsibility. The UAE is taking a pragmatic approach, concluding comprehensive economic partnership agreements across the world and activating new “minilateral” regional partnerships. Most prominent are the partnerships concluded in the wake of the 2020 Abraham Accords, but those involved in the new “I2U2” grouping, linking Israel, India, the UAE, and the United States, are also important.

Roebuck pointed out that while the Abraham Accords are a positive development for the region, parties to the agreement will need to ensure that outcomes are beneficial for all sides. At the same time, it means accommodating those states that have not (yet) signed up to the Abraham Accords and which at their own pace will need to develop relations with Israel, as Israel has now obtained a formal and developing presence in the Arab world. Ksenia Svetlova, director of the Israel-Middle East Relations Program at the Mitvim Institute, discussed areas in which Israel-UAE agreements have already materialized but also pointed to various areas in need of reinvigoration. She noted that Israel is really becoming a partner in the region, and there has been exponential growth in travel, tourism, and trade between the two countries. At the same time, she emphasized the need to ensure that what has been put on paper in agreements will actually be implemented. She also advocated for academics from both sides to engage with each other on a more regular basis to create a hub for local talent.

Panelists identified significant untapped potential regarding regional integration. Ambassador C. David Welch, a member of AGSIW’s board of directors, noted the still marginal role of trade among the Gulf Cooperation Council countries as well as some elements of competition that might hamper such integration, including “vision competition” and regulatory competition, where the view is sometimes zero-sum. AGSIW Senior Resident Scholar Robert Mogielnicki mentioned the overlap of economic initiatives between Saudi Arabia and the UAE and the friction this could perhaps generate. Meanwhile, Livermore highlighted some obvious sectors for more cooperation among the Gulf Arab states, including new energy technologies (hydrogen and renewables, and the networks needed to market them), food security, and supply chain vulnerability. Positive outcomes in these areas could breed similar benefits elsewhere.
Conclusion

U.S.-Gulf relations are undergoing adjustments due to vast changes in the spheres of energy, local economies, geopolitics, and security. Despite some uncertainty regarding the U.S. commitment to the region, the United States is still regarded as the Gulf’s primary security provider. When examining the maritime domain, the United States remains the only global power capable of and willing to build serious and effective security partnerships with regional allies. At the same time, Gulf Arab states have started to pursue a more explicit strategy of diversification. While initially predominantly focused on economic diversification, this has broadened into seeking diversification of strategic partners internationally. The Abraham Accords and other “minilateral” regional partnerships, in addition to strengthened relations with China and Russia, are indicators of strategic diversification as well as the change involved with regional powers coming together as more equal partners to work toward increased prosperity and security.

In the newly unfolding geopolitical order, the Gulf Arab states are considered well positioned geographically and with regard to resources. The midterm elections gave President Joseph R. Biden Jr. a boost, which constitutes an incentive for positive cooperation between the United States and the Gulf Arab states and a strengthened base for Biden to carry out his vision for the region.
Regional Security Cooperation: Addressing Common Threats and Challenges

Speakers:

Mohammed Baharoon, Director General, b'huth
David B. Des Roches, Non-Resident Fellow, AGSIW; Associate Professor, Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies, National Defense University
Ambassador William Roebuck, Executive Vice President, AGSIW

Moderator:

Hussein Ibish, Senior Resident Scholar, AGSIW

The United States’ Place in the World: A Conversation on U.S. Foreign Policy

Speakers:

Ambassador Thomas Pickering, Member, Board of Directors, AGSIW
Ambassador Frank G. Wisner, Chair of the Board of Directors, AGSIW

Moderator:

Mina Al-Oraibi, Editor in Chief, The National

Keynote

Vice Admiral Brad Cooper, Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Central Command

Moderator:

Ambassador Douglas A. Silliman, President, AGSIW
Closer Economic Ties Toward Shared Prosperity

**Speakers:**

Narayanappa Janardhan, Non-Resident Fellow, AGSIW; Senior Research Fellow, Anwar Gargash Diplomatic Academy

Scott Livermore, Chief Economist, Oxford Economics Middle East

Ksenia Svetlova, Director of the Israel–Middle East Relations Program, Mitvim

Ambassador C. David Welch, Member of the Board of Directors, AGSIW

**Moderator:**

Robert Mogielnicki, Senior Resident Scholar, AGSIW
(Clockwise from top left) UAE Security Forum guests; From left: Hussein Ibish, Mohammed Baharoon, Ambassador William Roebuck, and David B. Des Roches; Members of the audience; From left: Robert Mogielnicki, Scott Livermore, Ksenia Svetlova, Narayanappa Janardhan, and Ambassador C. David Welch during the session “Closer Economic Ties Toward Shared Prosperity”; Guests register for the UAE Security Forum
(Clockwise from top left) Ambassador Douglas A. Silliman, left, and Vice Admiral Brad Cooper; From left: Hussein Ibish, Mohammed Baharoon, Ambassador William Roebuck, and David B. Des Roches; From left: Mina Al-Oraibi, Ambassador Frank G. Wisner, and Ambassador Thomas Pickering; From left: Ambassador Marc J. Sievers; Ambassador Douglas A. Silliman, Fatima Al Jaber, Ksenia Svetlova, Fatima Al-Shamsi, Ambassador Frank G. Wisner, Vice Admiral Brad Cooper, Ambassador Thomas Pickering, Ambassador William Roebuck; Narayanappa Janardhan, third from left, speaks during the session “Closer Economic Ties Toward Shared Prosperity”
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