Accompanied by eight cabinet ministers, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan made a landmark visit to Baghdad on April 23, marking his first trip to the Iraqi capital in nearly 13 years. Erdogan’s meetings aimed at engaging all key stakeholders in Iraq. He held separate meetings with Iraqi President Abdul Latif Rashid, Prime Minister Mohammed al-Sudani, and Sunni leaders. Erdogan also made a stopover in Erbil, the capital of the autonomous Kurdistan region, to meet Kurdish leaders.
In their discussions, Ankara and Baghdad appear to have agreed to exclude contentious issues from their agenda to encourage progress on other topics. They did not bring up issues such as exports from the Kurdistan region’s oil fields and the $1.5 billion penalty imposed on Turkey by the International Chamber of Commerce in Paris for Turkey’s breach of the 1973 oil pipeline agreement regarding facilitating Kurdish oil exports from Kurdistan. Turkey and Iraq, therefore, were able to sign 26 memorandums of understanding, covering issues including water, security, the defense industry, trade, health care, communications, education, energy, and transportation.
The Development Road project, an ambitious nearly 800-mile integrated road and railway network, spanning from oil rich Basra all the way to the Turkish border, became the centerpiece of Erdogan’s diplomatic visit. The ceremony for signing the agreement was highly publicized and bolstered by delegates from Qatar and the United Arab Emirates. The two wealthy Gulf countries are expected to be major financial backers, potentially contributing to the staggering $20 billion fund earmarked for the project. The project, if completed, will also connect the Gulf Arab states through Iraq to Turkey and Europe.
The Development Road project is being heralded for its potential to make Iraq a central economic and transit hub. Sudani has described it as an “economic river that connects the East and the West” that will generate significant economic benefits for all involved. The project aims to help Iraq diversify its economy away from oil by creating 100,000 jobs in the initial stage and bringing billions in revenue for the state treasury from transit fees. It also promises to offer the shortest transit route for goods traveling between Asia and Europe that is up to 45% faster than the Cape of Good Hope route and 30% more efficient than the Suez Canal passage.
Turkish Motivations
Security
Erdogan’s visit followed a March 13 security-focused delegation including Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, Defense Minister Yasar Guler, and Ibrahim Kalin, the head of Turkey’s intelligence agency. The purpose was to lay the groundwork for a comprehensive Turkish military operation, penetrating 25 miles into Iraqi territory, to clear the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), particularly from the Mosul and Sinjar areas.
Turkish construction companies are expected to secure a significant portion of the contracts for the Development Road project in Iraq. Turkey contends that the PKK’s activities could undermine the project’s progress, asserting that security risks could prevent Turkish companies from operating safely. However, since 2003, the PKK has not launched attacks against the numerous Turkish firms and workers involved in constructing buildings, airports, and roads in the Kurdistan region. Nonetheless, the Baghdad government has taken steps to accommodate Ankara’s security demands. It has officially banned the PKK, and there are indications that the Turkish military will be granted permission to conduct cross-border operations within Iraqi territory in exchange for Turkey increasing water flows into Iraq, which is grappling with a severe water shortage. In the past, Ankara has mounted occasional border incursions targeting the PKK without obtaining Iraqi consent and prompting routine diplomatic protests from Baghdad.
Economic
The Development Road project offers substantial economic benefits for Turkey, both during its construction phase and afterward, when it is slated to serve as a key transit route, with Anatolia transformed into a pivotal commercial and transit center. It is expected to generate employment opportunities and facilitate the smooth transportation of Turkish goods to Gulf Arab countries. Additionally, it will provide a new route for Asian products to reach European markets.
Turkey also perceives the project as a strategic move to counter the U.S.-led India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor, which Ankara feels has marginalized Turkish interests. That sense of exclusion has prompted feelings of frustration and anger in Turkey with the United States, buttressed by the conviction that the corridor was deliberately designed to not just diminish Turkey’s regional economic and geopolitical influence but also as a Western scheme to undermine Erdogan’s political position. As a result, Turkish leaders view the Development Road project as a vital initiative to protect Turkey’s stature as a regional economic and geopolitical power.
Emirati and Qatari Motivations
The Middle East is undergoing a transformation in its maritime connectivity infrastructure, with Iraq, interestingly, at the forefront of this expansion. Iraq has embarked on the construction of the region’s largest port, the Al-Faw Grand Port project, which is a cornerstone of the Development Road. The Al-Faw Grand Port project is expected to significantly bolster Iraq’s maritime infrastructure, with the potential to handle around 99 million tons annually once fully operational. With plans to have 90 operational berths by 2025, the Iraqi port, if completed on schedule, would eclipse Dubai’s Jebel Ali Port, which currently has 67 berths.
The UAE has been supportive of the Al-Faw Grand Port project, seeing it as a strategic opportunity rather than a potential competitor. The Al-Faw Grand Port, and Iraq in general, is filling in the missing piece of broader infrastructure required for Emirati companies to deliver goods to Turkey and potentially Europe more efficiently and cheaply.
In April, the Abu Dhabi Ports Group and the General Company for Ports of Iraq signed a deal to manage the Al-Faw Port and Economic Zone. This partnership aims to enhance the port with advanced management and operational systems, leveraging the UAE’s extensive expertise in maritime commerce. This development comes on the heels of the 2023 accord between Dubai Ports World and the Iraqi government that established a direct cargo line linking Jebel Ali Port with Iraq’s Umm Qasr Port, reducing transit times to a mere 36 hours in contrast to the cross-land transportation alternative that could span 14 days.
Qatar’s participation in the Development Road project is an integral component of Doha’s wider strategy to maintain its position as a leading gas producer and exporter. QatarEnergy holds a 25% stake in the TotalEnergies gas deal with Iraq, as part of the Gas Growth Integrated Project. The project aims not only to enable Iraq to meet its domestic gas requirements for electricity generation but also positions it as a potential gas exporter in the future, particularly to Turkey and possibly Europe. Doha and Ankara also explored the construction of a gas pipeline for export purposes in 2007, with one possible route passing through Iraq. Baghdad has also been considering the development of an undersea gas pipeline to lessen its reliance on Iranian gas. Therefore, as development progresses, the erstwhile gas pipeline network from Qatar traversing Iraq to Turkey and potentially extending to Europe could feasibly be revived.
Qatar has broader economic, geopolitical, and security interests in the project and particularly stands to gain from strengthening Turkey’s influence in Iraq. As a major financial backer of Turkey, Qatar is naturally motivated to ensure the success of such endeavors. Further, over the past two decades, Qatar and Turkey have largely aligned politically and ideologically, so an increased Turkish presence – political or economic – also serves Doha’s geopolitical interests and could enhance its regional standing.
Challenges Ahead
In addition to the huge financial challenges the Development Road project will have to contend with, the project is also likely to meet resistance from states that stand to become sidelined economically or perceive it as a strategic threat to their influence in Iraq and to their regional commercial position. The Kuwaiti Parliament has voiced significant concerns about the development, suspecting that Kuwait’s exclusion, despite being Iraq’s closest neighbor, was a politically motivated move to marginalize Kuwait’s economy. Kuwait’s Parliament has called on the Kuwaiti government to form a committee to investigate the reasons behind this and to uncover the factors delaying the completion of Kuwait’s Mubarak port, which competes with Iraq’s Al-Faw Port. Iraq’s Kurdistan region in the north has also been circumvented in the Development Road’s route, and Kurdish leaders feel the region was excluded from the project by design.
Iran stands to suffer considerable losses from the Development Road project, especially if the gas projects succeed, leading Baghdad to energy self-sufficiency, and enabling Iraqi or Qatari gas – or both – to access Turkish or European markets. This is significant because Turkey currently imports 17% of its gas from Iran for domestic consumption. Consequently, the success of the project could greatly amplify Ankara’s geopolitical influence at Tehran’s expense while significantly reducing Iraq’s and Turkey’s dependence on Iranian gas imports.
For this reason, it is not a surprise that Iranian-backed political factions in Iraq have predictably denounced the Development Road project. In late April, soon after Erdogan’s visit to Baghdad, a drone strike on the Khor Mor gas field, operated by the UAE’s Dana Gas, in the Kurdistan region, killed four Yemeni workers. Kurdish officials have previously blamed such attacks on pro-Iranian groups. The attack could have been meant as a warning to U.S. energy companies, as well as to Gulf states and Turkey, that any attempts to challenge Iran’s economic and gas dominance in Iraq and the broader region could be met with forceful retaliation.
If it can overcome the daunting costs and project management challenges, and avoid disruption from spoilers, the Development Road project and broader collaborative approach among Iraq, Gulf countries, and Turkey are poised to lay the foundation for enhanced regional connectivity, economic prosperity, and stability.
