The Islamic Republic of Iran faces unprecedented challenges that have intensified speculation about the regime’s long-term viability. After four decades in power, the confluence of chronic economic mismanagement, international isolation, and mounting domestic discontent has created what many observers describe as a perfect storm of pressures. The return of the “maximum pressure” campaign by the administration of President Donald J. Trump, which the United States first implemented during Trump’s first term following the withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action nuclear deal, significantly exacerbated Iran’s economic challenges by targeting critical sectors, including oil exports, banking, and international trade. Though designed to force Iran back to the negotiating table, these sanctions have instead accelerated Iran’s economic decline while reinforcing the regime’s siege mentality. In March, Trump claimed to have sent a letter to Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei regarding potential negotiations. In response, while not directly acknowledging Trump’s overture, Khamenei delivered a speech condemning what he called “bully governments” that “insist on negotiations” while harboring intentions “not to find a solution” but rather “to dictate their own will on Iran.”

Iran is facing an escalating economic crisis. Inflation has remained persistently high, reaching over 35% in recent years, while the Iranian rial has constantly lost value against the dollar. Iranians have been seeking to hedge their savings against the risk of currency devaluation by buying dollars and other currencies, gold, or cryptocurrencies. Youth unemployment hovers near 30%, fueling widespread disillusionment among Iran’s predominantly young population. The economic decline has triggered recurring protests since the 2017-18 demonstrations, with each new wave growing more explicitly anti-regime in character.

While the regime has demonstrated remarkable resilience through previous crises, the convergence of internal dysfunction and external pressure raises fundamental questions about whether the Islamic Republic’s traditional survival strategies remain viable in the face of mounting challenges. Following 40 years of economic inefficiency and systemic corruption, the Islamic Republic’s legitimacy has eroded significantly among Iran’s population inside the country and in the diaspora. This is renewing speculation regarding whether the regime’s downfall may be possible. If so, what might be the timeline, and how might a transition come to pass?

Potential Pathways to Political Transformation in Iran

As Iran grapples with multifaceted challenges, four distinct scenarios for political transformation have emerged in analytical discussions of the country’s future.

Scenario 1: Internal Transition Following Leadership Change

The first pathway could be a managed transition from within the system, potentially catalyzed by the eventual death of Khamenei, who is now in his mid-80s. In this scenario, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps would likely emerge as the decisive power broker, leveraging its extensive economic holdings and security apparatus to shape succession. Rather than serving as genuine systemic reform, this scenario would be a superficial rebranding of the regime that preserves its fundamental power structures. It could be combined with a change in ideological orientation that would give Iranians some degree of social freedom, for example, in respect to the compulsory hijab and consumption of alcohol. The IRGC’s growing entrenchment in Iran’s economy and political system positions it uniquely to orchestrate such a transition, potentially adopting selective economic reforms while maintaining authoritarian control. This scenario represents a metamorphosis more than a revolution, with the regime changing its external appearance, while its internal organs remain essentially unchanged.

Scenario 2: External Armed Resistance

The second pathway could be an external armed struggle leading to regime change. The Mujahedeen-e Khalq, which remains the most organized Iranian armed opposition group in the diaspora, has spent decades building international support networks. Recently, the organization has gained traction among certain U.S. political circles, securing endorsements from 166 members of Congress for the MEK’s “roadmap for the process of change in Iran, based on the demands of the protesters in nationwide demonstrations in Iran, … providing concrete and feasible steps for regime change by the people of Iran and democratic process for transferring power to the people.” The MEK appears to have drawn inspiration from groups such as Hayat Tahrir al-Sham in Syria, studying how armed opposition can evolve and gain international legitimacy. However, this pathway faces significant obstacles, including the MEK’s controversial history, limited domestic support within Iran, and the formidable capabilities of the regime’s security forces. The prospect of armed struggle also raises serious concerns about potential civil conflict and regional destabilization.

Scenario 3: Monarchist Restoration

The third scenario could be the return of the exiled crown prince, Reza Pahlavi, and the restoration of some form of constitutional monarchy. Pahlavi has maintained visibility in the Iranian diaspora and international media, positioning himself as a unifying figure who could oversee a transition to democracy. This pathway draws on nostalgia for pre-revolutionary Iran among certain segments of the population and diaspora communities, particularly those who associate the Pahlavi era with economic prosperity and cultural openness. Pahlavi has gotten support from Republications within the United States and was invited to speak at the February Conservative Political Action Conference, however he canceled citing “unanticipated family commitments.” Meanwhile, European institutions have shown reluctance to engage with him – for example the Germany government had Pahlavi uninvited from the Munich Security Conference.

Advocates of this scenario suggest that a restored monarchy could serve as a stabilizing institution during a complex transition period. However, this approach faces challenges, including generational shifts within Iran, where many Iranians have no living memory of monarchical rule, and questions about how such a restoration could practically occur given the entrenched nature of the current regime’s power structures.

Scenario 4: The “Trump-Putin” Nuclear Accord

A fourth pathway centers on the possibility of a new nuclear agreement. The deal would have to be fundamentally different from the 2015 JCPOA that Trump denounced as “the worst deal in history.” In his second term, Trump appears eager to demonstrate his self-proclaimed deal-making prowess on the international stage. This scenario envisions a nuclear agreement facilitated through an unexpected channel: Russian President Vladimir Putin serving as an intermediary between Washington and Tehran.

From the Israeli perspective, this would present both opportunities and significant risks. While any constraint on Iran’s nuclear program aligns with Israel’s security interests, the involvement of Putin, with his own regional ambitions, introduces complex strategic calculations. Israeli security officials also remain deeply skeptical of any arrangement that might offer Iran economic relief without addressing what they view as foundational issues absent from the JCPOA: Iran’s ballistic missile program, regional proxy activities, and sunset clauses on nuclear restrictions.

A “Trump deal” would likely demand more expansive concessions from Iran, including limitations on ballistic missile development and reduced support for regional militant groups. Iran’s proxies enable Iran to project asymmetric power and engage in gray zone activities across borders that destabilize the region to advance Tehran’s regional ambitions. Despite the weakened state of Iran’s proxy network, following Israeli military operations as well as the fall of the regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria, Iran’s proxy militias remain a security concern.

For Israel, the risks of this scenario also include being sidelined in negotiations managed through the Moscow channel, where Putin could overlook Israel’s concerns, and the legitimization of a weakened but stabilized Iranian regime. The prospect of sanctions relief improving Iran’s economic position without fundamentally altering its regional behavior is also one of Israel’s major concerns.

Between Ideology and Pragmatism: Iran’s Strategic Crossroads

Trump will likely demand Tehran make sweeping concessions on Iran’s nuclear program, ballistic missiles, and regional activities – continuing the “maximum pressure” strategy that seeks fundamental changes to Iran’s security policies. This presents Iran’s leaders with a profound dilemma: Either engage with demands they view as threatening their sovereignty and security doctrine or maintain defiance and risk continued international isolation and economic hardship. Iran faces unprecedented economic pressure, with currency devaluation accelerating the socioeconomic crisis into what might become a ticking bomb. The regime’s inability to stabilize the rial has undermined public confidence, while Trump’s “maximum pressure” has limited oil exports and Tehran’s access to back channels of the international financial system. Simultaneously, Iran’s regional proxy network, long a cornerstone of its defense doctrine, is at its weakest point in decades. With diminished financial resources, Tehran struggles to maintain support for these groups at previous levels, reducing its strategic leverage across the region.

This convergence of economic vulnerability and diminished regional influence might theoretically push Iran toward pragmatic engagement with Trump’s proposal. However, the ideological foundations of the Islamic Republic and Khamenei’s personal anti-American stance make such a pivot extraordinarily difficult. For the supreme leader, the regional proxy network represents not merely a strategic asset but a fundamental manifestation of the revolution’s ideological commitment to “resistance.” Abandoning this approach would require a profound reconceptualization of regime identity that goes beyond simple transactional diplomacy. The question facing Tehran is whether economic survival might ultimately necessitate ideological compromise, a question that divides Iran’s political establishment and one that will likely define the regime’s trajectory in the coming years.

Khamenei’s stated refusal to negotiate with the United States presents a significant obstacle. Additionally, Vice President of Strategic Affairs Mohammad Javad Zarif, long associated with diplomatic engagement with the West when he served as foreign minister, submitted his resignation in early March, under pressure from hard-liners. Zarif’s apparent resignation, though still awaiting official confirmation, comes amid economic turmoil and regional setbacks, suggesting intensifying internal power struggles and potentially signaling a fracturing of the regime’s diplomatic coherence at a critical juncture.

The success of a Russia-brokered deal hinges on whether Putin can convince Khamenei that limited nuclear concessions would yield economic benefits sufficient to stabilize the regime while preserving its core ideological positions. For Trump, who criticized the JCPOA for not being comprehensive enough, a “better deal” facilitated by Putin could provide a political win without appearing to contradict his previous position.

Each of these scenarios presents distinct implications for Iran’s political trajectory, regional stability, and international relations. The likelihood of any particular outcome depends on complex interactions among internal pressures, international dynamics, and the regime’s adaptive capacities in the face of mounting challenges.

The United States and Western allies face a critical opportunity to influence Iran’s trajectory toward stability rather than regional chaos. However, they must carefully evaluate potential alternatives to the Islamic Republic. Supporting groups such as the MEK, whose rigid ideological foundations may prove even more problematic than those of the current regime, could lead to worse outcomes. Prioritizing democratic forces within Iran could help Western policymakers avoid empowering extremist alternatives that might simply replace one authoritarian system with another. Whether those forces are strong enough to represent or develop into a credible alternative to the regime remains an open question and beyond the scope of the four scenarios examined here. This moment requires strategic discernment to ensure any transition serves both Iranian aspirations for freedom and regional security interests.