Since the Taliban’s swift takeover of Afghanistan’s capital Kabul and major urban centers more than a year ago, Gulf states have approached developments in Afghanistan cautiously, but keeping in view regional geopolitical realities, they have kept channels of communication open with the Taliban regime.

Qatar, which on the request of the U.S. government agreed to host a Taliban representative office in Doha and thereby became the fulcrum of engagement and, later, negotiations between the Taliban and the United States, seemed likely to hold the most influence of the Gulf states with the new rulers in Kabul. Developments after the fall of Kabul did indicate this trend as Qatari interlocuters were instrumental in the evacuation of more than 43,000 people from Afghanistan while also coordinating with the Taliban and keeping the Kabul airport open. The United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia did participate in the airlift operations, but they didn’t have the same trusted channels of communication with the Taliban. Abu Dhabi’s move to grant humanitarian asylum to the renegade Afghan president, Ashraf Ghani, was not exactly a fig leaf toward the Taliban. Riyadh was also cautious in engaging with the new government and, alongside its key regional ally Pakistan, stressed the need for an inclusive government in the country and the preservation of the rights of women.

Despite these developments, Qatar has not been able to fully solidify its political linkages cultivated over the years with various Taliban leaders. In part, this is because the current Taliban regime is working to balance various regional stakeholders against each other (Pakistan and India are another example) to get the best deals for itself. This policy goes hand in hand with another key agenda item espoused by the Taliban government, protecting “the sovereignty of Afghanistan.” Both factors have been at play during negotiations between the Taliban and various regional stakeholders for the administration of Afghanistan’s airports.

The smooth operation of Afghanistan’s several airports has been considered vital by the international community to guarantee a functioning international humanitarian aid bridge to Afghanistan. The Taliban government had been in talks with Turkey initially for the operation of the Kabul airport. Later, Qatar also joined Turkey in these negotiations. However, deadlock persisted between the two sides. A key point of contention had been the Turkish insistence on the creation of special security zones to be administered solely by Turkish military contractors where the entry of Afghan officials would have been prohibited. This clearly would have compromised Afghanistan’s sovereignty as envisaged by the Taliban. The other offer on the table was from the Abu Dhabi-based firm GAAC Solutions, which had been granted a $47 million contract in 2020 by Afghanistan’s republican government to run the country’s airports. For the Taliban, cutting a deal with this Abu Dhabi firm was politically cost effective at home, since it met Taliban sovereignty concerns, but it also balanced regional stakeholders and improved the regime’s ties with the UAE.

The airport contract, combined with the Taliban’s move to ban girls from attending secondary schools and universities against the advice of Qatari interlocuters, has considerably damaged the Taliban’s relationship with Qatar. Qatari authorities seemingly see less value in keeping up with their engagement with the Taliban owing to the power changes within the movement. It appears that the Taliban’s ideologically rigid Shura Council, headed by their spiritual leader Mullah Haibatullah Akhundzada, is asserting itself over the more pragmatic elements of the group, particularly those who were involved in the Doha negotiations and with whom Qatar had cultivated influence over the years. As this Doha group is currently unable to go against the directives of Mullah Haibatullah, who is based in Kandahar, Qatar’s political capital is on the wane.

This downturn in Taliban-Qatari ties has indirectly contributed to an increase in engagement between the Taliban and the UAE, suggesting the UAE may become the new regional interlocutor with the Taliban. This was indicated by the first official visit of the Taliban’s acting defense minister, Mullah Yaqoob (also the son of former Taliban Supreme Leader Mullah Omar), and Anas Haqqani (the younger brother of the Taliban’s interior minister, Sirajuddin Haqqani) to Abu Dhabi in December 2022.

The visit of this high ranking Afghan delegation holds significant symbolism as at one time Mullah Omar was among the most sought-after men in the world and Sirajuddin Haqqani still has a U.S. government bounty on his head. In the past, the UAE had been a strong supporter of the Afghan republic, and its troops were deployed in Afghanistan, mainly to train Afghan troops. But the UAE found itself directly in the crosshairs of the Taliban as Abu Dhabi’s ambassador to Afghanistan died from wounds sustained in an alleged Taliban attack in 2017 that also killed five other Emirati diplomats. The attack drew strong condemnation from the Emirati government, although the Taliban never publicly accepted responsibility for the bombing. However, the UAE, partially owing to its pragmatic foreign policy and also in a bid to retain its political relevance vis-a-vis the Afghan conflict, continued its engagement with various stakeholders and hosted a round of negotiations between the Taliban and the United States. And, as the Taliban took control of the country, the initial statements from Emirati authorities expressed goodwill for the new rulers of the country.

Thereby, the current UAE engagement with the Taliban shouldn’t be considered an anomaly. The UAE seems to want to keep channels of communication open with the Taliban and cultivate its influence, particularly with the young and emerging members in the movement who have taken a more moderate tone on social issues than their older and more rigid peers. Since Mullah Yaqoob and the Haqqani faction within the Taliban are largely responsible for security in the war-torn country, outside engagement with them reflects an Emirati interests-based calculus. From the Taliban perspective, trust building with Emirati authorities will further pave the way for the Taliban to be treated not just as de facto but as de jure rulers of the country, as political recognition ultimately remains the top goal of this regime. Additionally, it can convince Afghan businessmen and members of the diaspora residing in the UAE to return and invest in Afghanistan. An estimated 150,000 Afghan citizens live in the UAE, and more than 500 Afghan businessmen have invested a total $4 billion in the UAE. Luring some of these wealthy Afghans to invest back into Afghanistan seems like a key purpose of the visit and meetings held by Mullah Yaqoob and Anas Haqqani with Afghan diaspora members.

The engagement between the UAE and the Taliban seems to be driven by pragmatism on both sides, but there is also a willingness among the Emiratis to test the waters with various officials in the Taliban movement while leveraging the economic value of Afghan expatriates residing in the UAE. The Emirati authorities indeed are mindful that this point of leverage is unique to them, and probably no longer shared by their Qatari counterparts, making the Emiratis particularly politically relevant with any ruler in Afghanistan.