The emir of Kuwait, Sabah al-Ahmed al-Sabah, on the invitation of President Xi Jinping, made an official state visit to the People’s Republic of China in July. The visit, which overlapped with the Eighth Ministerial Meeting of the China-Arab States Cooperation Forum, saw the conclusion of several memorandums and agreements aimed at strengthening Sino-Kuwaiti relations and elevating them to the status of a “strategic partnership” equivalent to that enjoyed by other Gulf Cooperation Council states. One area of joint cooperation long discussed in bilateral settings and forums revolves around the development of Kuwait’s five northern islands: Boubyan, Warbah, Failaka, Maskan, and Oaha. This longstanding megaproject, estimated to cost nearly $160 billion in total investments, would involve the establishment of an internationalized extrajudicial zone encompassing these islands, which would effectively transform them, in the words of one Kuwaiti official, into the “new Hong Kong of the Gulf.” Connected to the Kuwait 2035 national development strategy, the megaproject is expected to generate over 200,000 jobs and contribute to Kuwait’s reimagining as the region’s next major financial and tourist hub.

While the emir’s state visit was conventional in much of its substance and form, it generated an unexpectedly intense debate within Arab cyberspace, in part due to the circulation of what was subsequently revealed to be nothing more than a rumor. Spread initially through WhatsApp messenger groups and reproduced widely on Twitter, the substance of this rumor revolved around the signing of an Opium War-like treaty in which Beijing procured from Kuwait a 99-year lease for the islands of Boubyan and Failaka. In exchange, it was claimed that Beijing would invest $450 billion in the development of its newly gained extraterritorial concessions, inject a further $40 billion into Silk City, and give the Kuwaiti government yet another $50 billion deposit, which would remain in the latter’s safekeeping until the expiration of the agreement. The alleged agreement was framed as a strategic move on the part of the emirate to pre-empt possible invasion and rein in the ambitions of neighboring states.

Within Kuwait, the responses to this rumor have been generally positive and rooted in nationalist sentiment, focusing mostly on the expected dividends that could be accrued from concluding this deal. Some academic and political figures, for example, hailed the alleged agreement as a new iteration of the 1899 treaty with Great Britain, inaugurating a period of security and prosperity for the emirate with this era’s up and coming hegemon. These positive interpretations were echoed elsewhere in the Arab world. Several commentators from Jordan, Egypt, and Iraq saw this agreement as a “game-changer” in which Kuwait, learning from the lessons of the past (particularly those from the 1990 Iraqi invasion), was now inviting China into the Gulf as a defensive measure.

More partisan viewpoints have also been expressed, largely casting the news as evidence of growing differences between Kuwait and its traditional partners – the United States or GCC states such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Islamists celebrated the unsubstantiated reports of the signing of this treaty as a brilliant maneuver to pre-empt any moves to punish Kuwait, as has happened to Qatar. The London-based Rai Alyoum, run by the pro-Qatari Bari Atwan, described it as a “slap in the face of the U.S. and the countries of the West more generally.” The anti-Saudi Turkey-based Al-Sharq channel, run by the exiled Egyptian journalist Mutaz Matar, interpreted this as a Kuwaiti strike against the Saudi Neom project, suggesting moreover that Kuwait, Qatar, and Oman were forming, through their engagement with China, a united front against the Saudi-Emirati axis seeking to dominate the region. As this particular example shows, there is a growing tendency in the Arab media to treat the different GCC states’ interactions with China in zero-sum terms: The UAE’s recent reception of the Chinese president was framed, for example, as an attempt to outflank both Kuwait and Oman.

Indicative of how widespread and serious the implications of this debate have been is the reaction from the Saudi-aligned media. Several outlets, including Sabaq and Asharq Al-Awsat, quickly republished the official Kuwaiti denial of this rumor. More significantly, Abdulrahman al-Rashed, a media figure closely connected to the Saudi leadership, beyond tweeting on the issue (dismissing the notion that China would seek territory in unstable regions), dedicated an editorial to it, debunking the various claims and arguing that Kuwait’s engagement should be viewed as part of a wider “Going East” trend shared by all the GCC states.

There are two major takeaways from this debate on the fictional Chinese concession over the Kuwaiti islands. First, few if any of the commentators, including members of the general public and political analysts, have looked into the details of the agreements signed between China and Kuwait. The primary text for instance only briefly mentions Chinese government support for the development of “Silk City and the Five Islands” on the basis of a somewhat vague formula without citing any specific investment allocations. This particular language mirrors what has been said in the past, including during former Vice Premier Zhang Gaoli’s visit to Kuwait in August 2017. The half-trillion-dollar figure was probably a conflation of the numbers sometimes cited for the total amount of investment that would be set aside for projects under the umbrella of the Belt and Road Initiative. This misunderstanding could be attributed to the growing tendency of Kuwaiti (and Arab) officials and business elites to view the Belt and Road Initiative as a panacea to the various economic and developmental problems facing their countries. This general milieu has contributed less to the cultivation of greater scrutiny and analysis than to misplaced expectations and disinformation.

Second, the debate and the narratives generated around it convey less about China and expectations about its future role than they do about the current political moment in the region and the various ideological and political fault lines dividing it. The commentary from within Kuwait points to existing anxieties about the country’s future and its ability to fend off the demands of its northern – and southern – neighbors. Qatar-aligned or Islamist sources perceive in the move indicators of growing regionwide resistance to the Saudi-Emirati axis, with Kuwait “safeguarding” its autonomy and independent decision making in a manner evocative of Qatar. In the broader Arab commentary, the focus has been centered on the United States and administration of President Donald J. Trump, valorizing the move as a reflection of Kuwait’s natural solidarity with pan-Arab causes. Ironically, none of those who have participated in the debate – in support of or opposition to the alleged agreement – have raised the problem of Kuwait yielding its sovereignty to a foreign power in exchange for security. Perhaps that too is a reflection of the current political moment, one in which an agreement that doesn’t even exist manages to spark intense public debate.