At 7 p.m., local time, April 2, a United Nations-brokered countrywide cease-fire went into effect in Yemen. The cease-fire, or “truce” (meaning an informal halt in fighting) as the U.N. is calling it – perhaps signaling the agreement’s shaky foundations – began the first day of Ramadan and is scheduled to last for an initial period of two months.
Not surprisingly, there have already been scattered reports of violations, mostly in Marib, which has been the target of a long-running Houthi offensive. There will likely be more violations in the coming days. However, what matters is that the broader cease-fire holds, at least for a few weeks.
If the cease-fire holds, it can create space for future peace talks in two ways. First, and most obvious, would be for the domestic and foreign parties to the conflict to use it as a first step to craft a comprehensive peace. But that is unlikely. The second path would be a more modest reunifying of the anti-Houthi alliance, but even that would be difficult.
March 25 marked seven years since the start of the Saudi-led intervention in Yemen. One of the many reasons that the conflict has lasted so long is that the warring sides have treated the peace talks less as an opportunity to end the fighting than as a chance to gain an advantage on the ground.
In 2016, the last time there was a countrywide cease-fire and peace talks, Yemeni President Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi undermined the talks before they could begin by firing Vice President Khaled Bahah and replacing him with Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar. Hadi, who was worried that he might be replaced as president during the talks, used Ali Mohsen as protection, rightly guessing that the United States, European Union, and U.N. would rather let him remain in power than see Ali Mohsen, with his ties to jihadis, become president. Ali Mohsen was also a nonstarter for the Houthis, who blame him for much of the damage and destruction in the Saada wars from 2004-10. The result: Hadi kept his job and, predictably, the talks went nowhere.
In 2018, during the Stockholm talks, the Houthis used a rushed process and poorly worded agreements to their advantage. At the time, Saudi, Emirati, and pro-Hadi Yemeni forces were pressing in on the Houthis in Hodeidah, the group’s primary port. Martin Griffiths, then the U.N. special envoy for Yemen, seeking to avoid urban conflict within the city itself, and with strong U.S. and European support, convened Houthi and Hadi-government representatives in Stockholm. The parties settled on the Hodeidah Agreement, which called for a “mutual redeployment” and tasked “local security forces” with the responsibility of maintaining security for the city, however the agreement failed to define the makeup of those forces. This resulted in one group of Houthis handing control of the city over to another.
The current cease-fire, which includes a halting of all air and ground attacks in and from Yemen and the partial reopening of the airport in Sanaa, suffers from similar mistakes of analysis and flawed assumptions. For instance, the U.S. special envoy for Yemen, Timothy Lenderking, told Reuters that the cease-fire was, partly, a result of the Houthis setting aside the “notion of military victory.”
That seems, at best, overly optimistic diplomatic messaging. The Houthis have not put aside the idea of “military victory,” if for no other reason than they realize they can’t survive long term without Marib and its oil and gas resources. In many ways, this battle for Yemen’s limited resources helped spark the initial conflict when the Houthis realized that under Hadi’s 2014 federalism plan, which would have divided Yemen into six largely autonomous regions, they would be cut off from much of Yemen’s oil and gas revenue. The Houthis remember this, which is why they have been so focused on Marib in recent years.
Still, there are silver linings. For the first time, in a war in which all sides have maintained maximalist claims, there was some compromise. The Houthis wanted Sanaa’s airport opened unconditionally. They got twice weekly flights to Cairo and Amman and permission for fuel ships to enter Hodeidah. It’s not much, but it might be a start.
But even if the cease-fire collapses in the first week, it might have opened enough space for more modest achievements.
Saudi Arabia is currently hosting Gulf Cooperation Council talks on Yemen with a number of Yemeni parties. The GCC invited the Houthis, who proposed meeting outside of Saudi Arabia or the United Arab Emirates, the two countries directly involved in the war in Yemen. When Saudi Arabia refused to move the talks, the Houthis declined the invitation. Still, there is an opportunity for a breakthrough.
Over the past few years the anti-Houthi coalition has broken down into rival camps that, at times, have been more interested in fighting one another than in combating the Houthis. Patching over some of these differences would go a long way to reconstituting a common front.
Over the past few days, Yemenis have been eagerly speculating about such rivals meeting in Riyadh: Southern Transitional Council President Aidarous al-Zubaidi posed for a photo with Ahmad al-Eissi, a wealthy businessman and Hadi ally; and Hamid al-Ahmar and Tariq Saleh, who once fought a war against one another, greeted each other warmly.
Perhaps it only means what has always been true in Yemen: Getting people in a room to speak with one another isn’t the hard part. What’s challenging is getting them to agree and then implement that agreement.
An agreement is likely still a long way off in Yemen, but at least some of the parties are starting to talk, listen, and, ever so slowly, compromise.
