This post is part of an AGSIW series on Saudi Vision 2030, a sweeping set of programs and reforms adopted by the Saudi government to be implemented by 2030.
Former Non-Resident Fellow
Fahad Nazer is a former non-resident fellow at the Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington as well as a political analyst with intelligence consultants JTG, Inc., where he focuses on political, social, and economic developments in Saudi Arabia. He also examines militant Islamist groups in the Arabian Peninsula, with a special focus on Saudi Arabia. Prior to this position, Nazer worked as a political analyst at the Embassy of Saudi Arabia in Washington, DC. His publications have appeared in Foreign Affairs, The New York Times, CNN, Foreign Policy, YaleGlobal Online, The National Interest, Al-Monitor, and The Kingdom: Saudi Arabia and the Challenge of the 21st Century (Columbia University Press, 2009).
Saudi Arabia has a long and mixed track record of involvement in Yemen’s numerous political conflicts, dating back to the early 1960s.
Media coverage of Saudi Arabia over the past year has largely focused on its new, more assertive foreign policy, as demonstrated by its military campaign in Yemen.
Much has been written and said in recent months about what some — myself included — have described as a “strain” in US-Saudi relations.
At a press conference in Riyadh on Jan. 3, the foreign minister of Saudi Arabia announced that Saudi Arabia was severing diplomatic relations with Iran.
In Riyadh, shortly after midnight on Dec. 14, Deputy Crown Prince and Defense Minister of Saudi Arabia Prince Mohammed bin Salman surprised the world when he held a press conference — his first — in which he announced the formation of a new Islamic military coalition against terrorism.
The September 11 collapse of a crane at the Grand Mosque in Mecca provided a grave metaphor for Saudi Arabia experts.