Results of the March 31 nationwide local elections in Turkey represent the first true defeat for President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) since its 2001 founding. Although the previous local elections, in 2019, were widely interpreted as a defeat for Erdogan, as the secular Republican People’s Party (CHP) opposition won five of Turkey’s six largest cities – including the two major prizes, Istanbul and national capital Ankara – AKP actually won the elections by most measures: provincial capital mayoralties, provincial assemblies, and village councils as well as overall mayoral vote totals. AKP even won majorities in the Istanbul and Ankara municipal councils in 2019, complicating life for the CHP mayors of those cities.

This time, however, CHP was the clear winner. Turkey’s most common measures of performance in local elections, held every five years, are provincial capitals won – there are 81 in all – and overall vote totals in mayoral elections. By that standard, CHP won hands down, with 35 provincial capital mayoralties and 37.7% of the vote; AKP won only 24 provincial capital mayoralties and 35.5% of the vote. The other 22 provincial capital mayoralties were won by smaller parties, including 10 by pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Democracy Party (DEM), eight by the ultranationalist Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) (Erdogan’s main coalition partner), and a surprising two by extreme Islamist Yeniden Refah Party (YRP). CHP increased its dominance of the big cities; the cities it won represent the overwhelming majority of Turkey’s population and gross domestic product production. AKP did, however, capture a slight majority of the subprovincial district mayoralties, mainly on the strength of its Central Anatolian strongholds.

The result marked the dramatic acceleration of a trend already underway in the 2019 elections. In that contest, AKP slipped from 48 provincial capital mayoralties captured in 2014 to 39. Thus, over the course of two sets of local elections, AKP has lost half its provincial mayoralties.

In fact, the vote caps a period of several years of a loosening AKP hold on the electorate. After winning a dominant majority in its first three parliamentary elections (2002, 2007, and 2011), it has failed to recapture that majority in three of the past four parliamentary elections and has become increasingly dependent on a difficult ultranationalist partner for its parliamentary majority. In 2023, Erdogan for the first time was forced to a second round before winning reelection as president; he has never received more than 52.6% in any of his three direct-vote presidential elections. And, in 2017, Erdogan won, by just a hair’s breadth, a referendum on vastly expanding the powers of the presidency; further, a controversy over the counting of ballots cast a cloud over that success. Thus, the March 31 opposition victory, although unprecedented and unexpected, was the culmination of years of gradually declining support for Erdogan and his weakened but still-formidable party.

AKP the Loser More Than CHP the Winner

For all of the fanfare over CHP’s triumph, AKP lost the elections more than CHP won them. No doubt the key factor in the CHP-AKP reversal of fortunes was voter anger over the economy, highlighted by galloping inflation (now at 68.5% officially and probably much higher) and the tumbling value of the lira, the Turkish currency, alongside an increasingly tight monetary policy. Turkey’s 16 million pensioners, more than one-quarter of the electorate, were particularly furious that their most recent cost of living adjustment was well below the rate of inflation, as Erdogan surprisingly held to an orthodox economic policy, instituted just after his 2023 reelection, rather than break the bank with handouts.

Additionally, turnout was the lowest for any parliamentary or local election since 2004, mainly, it appears, to the detriment of AKP. Fractionalization on the Islamist right reinforced AKP’s problems. Two extreme parties that backed Erdogan and allied with AKP in the 2023 presidential and parliamentary elections ran their own candidates this time, drawing votes from AKP candidates. One of them, YRP, actually won two mayoralties on its own and finished with the third-highest vote total nationally (6.2%), after CHP and AKP. If every vote that went to YRP or Huda-Par – the other extreme Islamist party that broke from its coalition with AKP – had gone to AKP instead, AKP would have won five additional provincial mayoralties, and CHP would have won two fewer.

On the positive side of the ledger for CHP, its candidates were generally considered younger and more vigorous, reinforced by the high-profile candidacy of the dynamic incumbent mayor, Ekrem Imamoglu, in Istanbul, Turkey’s largest and most dynamic city. AKP candidates, by contrast, tended to be seen as lackluster, the well seemingly near dry after more than two decades of the party’s having held power.

Also working in CHP’s favor was the clever voting pattern of the Kurds, who seem to have voted for CHP candidates in large numbers in provinces where the candidates of the pro-Kurdish DEM stood no chance, while voting for DEM elsewhere, particularly in Kurdish-majority provinces.

DEM’s strategy helped CHP, but the pro-Kurdish party continues to confront problems with Turkish authorities. It is contesting near-miss losses in one provincial capital and several subprovincial districts mainly based on votes it claims were cast illegally by soldiers and policemen. However, mayors from pro-Kurdish parties generally face their biggest problems after taking office. Since 2016, the Erdogan government has regularly removed most of their elected mayors on alleged security grounds, accusing them of supporting terrorism, and replaced them with state-appointed “trustees.” In 2019, the state removed 48 of 65 elected provincial and district HDP (forerunner of DEM) mayors within six months of the elections. (DEM won back 37 of those 48 on March 31.) CHP and particularly Istanbul’s mayor, Imamoglu, have condemned this practice of unilaterally replacing elected local officials. Indirect DEM support for CHP candidates March 31 will do nothing to endear the party to Erdogan and his administration.

Erdogan Versus Imamoglu in ’28?

The headline individual winner was Imamoglu with his reelection as mayor of Istanbul. In what was expected to be a close race with the AKP candidate, Imamoglu swept to a big victory, 51.1% to 39.6%. Istanbul is not only Turkey’s largest and most economically vibrant city; it’s the city that catapulted Erdogan to national fame when he won the mayoralty in 1994 and the city he most craved to return to AKP’s column in the 2024 elections.

Because of his upset victory in 2019 and his strong reelection in 2024, Imamoglu has emerged as the face of CHP. Many observers see him as the favorite to be the CHP candidate for the upcoming 2028 presidential election.

In many respects, Imamoglu is the long-awaited dream candidate for CHP – not only secular and center-left (the norm in social democratic CHP) but comfortable in religious environments and with appeal to many Kurds, who once shunned CHP because of its historic Turkish nationalism. At 53, he is relatively young, smart, charismatic, and a good retail politician – sometimes seen (in a positive sense) as an Erdogan of the left.

Four years is a long time, however, and Imamoglu is not a sure-fire bet to be CHP’s candidate in 2028. For one, he is under judicial assault from the state – on trumped-up charges – and could be removed from office and banned from politics for up to five years. Also, other challengers could emerge. The highly popular CHP mayor of Ankara, Mansur Yavas, is such a figure, although he would be 73 in 2028, one year younger than Erdogan. Another is 49-year-old Ozgur Ozel, a parliamentarian who took over CHP in November with Imamoglu’s backing and can boast that, in less than five months at the helm, he led the Ataturk-founded CHP to its first nationwide victory since 1977.

Another Term for Erdogan?

Erdogan was wounded politically by these – and other recent – elections but far from mortally. He retains immense power as president. He is commander in chief of the military, and he will remain the dominant player in foreign policy and the international face of Turkey. Crucially, he has a firm grip on the judiciary, and when judges show independence not to Erdogan’s liking, he sometimes simply ignores the rulings or has them overturned by other courts, even if they formally lack the authority to do so.

Local elections differ from parliamentary and presidential elections in that they are widely seen as a judgment on the government, particularly its record on domestic governance. Foreign policy and national security issues have virtually no impact. Although AKP’s defeat is an embarrassment, it is not at all conclusive proof that Erdogan couldn’t win another presidential election, when a wider array of issues comes into play. Many people are salivating over the prospect of an Erdogan-Imamoglu heavyweight battle in the next presidential elections.

Most likely, that won’t happen. Erdogan has said he’s run his final election. That could be dismissed as so much blather, but, in fact, the constitutional rules of the game, coupled with current parliamentary arithmetic and political atmosphere, leave him little room to maneuver.

Since Turkey went to direct election of the president – based on a 2007 constitutional amendment, prior to which the president was elected by Parliament – the president has been limited to two terms. Erdogan, during his first term, surprisingly left that measure intact when he proposed a vast set of constitutional amendments to enhance presidential powers in 2017. He nevertheless argued that establishment of a new system, even under the framework of the old constitution, entitled him to a fresh two terms, and the opposition (oddly) did little to contest that argument. Now, as he serves his third term, by any measure he is legally in his “second” and final term.

The constitution does provide one avenue for a president in his final term to serve an additional term: If Parliament votes for early elections with a 60% majority, a president in his final term can run for an additional, and truly final, term. However, it is unlikely that Erdogan would be able to muster such a parliamentary majority. His AKP has 265 seats in the 600-seat Parliament. With his partners MHP and other smaller parties, he holds 319 seats, well short of the 360 seats he would need for 60%. Theoretically, he could woo the additional support from other right-wing parties currently in the opposition, but it seems unlikely, given their current strong opposition to him. The results of the March local elections, as well as the 2023 presidential elections, suggest that “Erdogan fatigue” has taken hold in the Turkish body politic; parties already ill-disposed toward Erdogan would likely be wary of hitching their wagons to him and gifting him eligibility for an additional term.

In addition, Erdogan is now 70 and has ruled Turkey for over two decades. His campaigning during the local elections was noticeably less spirited than in past campaigns. He may not welcome the prospect of yet another campaign. And, of course, based on the trend of recent Turkish elections, he would have to wonder if, in the event he did run, he could, in fact, win another term. It’s not impossible, but it seems like a steep uphill climb at this point.

Change of Subject

Erdogan will likely want to embark on initiatives that will relegate his local election defeat to the back pages of memory as soon as possible. The realm most susceptible to a quick change of subject is certainly foreign affairs. He is reportedly scheduled to visit the White House May 9 – a long-sought, first-ever invitation from President Joseph R. Biden Jr. and perhaps part of a deal by which Erdogan agreed to support ratification of Sweden’s NATO bid. That visit would be a reminder to Turks that Erdogan remains Turkey’s international face and key decision maker. No doubt other meetings with regional or international leaders will precede that encounter, possibly even including a frequently postponed visit by Russian President Vladimir Putin.

A more dramatic action in the realm of foreign affairs is certainly also possible. Among the possibilities is significantly stepped-up military action against the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in Iraq; in March senior Iraqi and Turkish officials issued a joint statement suggesting cooperation in that regard. A cutback in trade with Israel is already in the works. (Islamist YRP attacked AKP not only for its economic failures but also for not being tough enough on Israel.) As Erdogan has recently tried to calm the waters with the United States, a major attack on the Syrian Democratic Forces in Syria and a major stirring up of tension in the Aegean is unlikely. Rapprochement efforts with Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates are likely to remain on course out of economic necessity, if for no other reason.

On the domestic front, Erdogan will continue to push for a new constitution, perhaps to extend his presidency. On that score, he would again encounter the problematic need for 60% of Parliament just to bring about a referendum of uncertain result. Speculation that Erdogan will seek a return to a parliamentary system to try to maintain his grip on power is probably far-fetched but cannot be entirely dismissed.

Erdogan will exploit his formal authorities to try to reinforce his leadership dominance in Turkey, but his power is no longer seen as unassailable, and he likely will not be able to mobilize his base as he once did. Moreover, he is likely increasingly to be seen as a lame duck, although many will continue to believe that he will find ways to hold onto his office. To have a chance to recoup his undefinable but very real losses, at a minimum he will have to put Turkey’s crippled economy back on its feet, and that, if it happens, will take time.