Despite the current pause in fighting between Israel and Hamas in Gaza, two strategic implications have emerged in the Red Sea-Gulf region and are likely to loom larger if and when the fighting resumes. First, Houthi aerial and maritime attacks against Israeli targets have opened a “Red Sea front” that threatens Saudi Arabia’s national security as well as its efforts to make a peace agreement with the Houthis and extricate from the war in Yemen. If Houthi attacks were to escalate significantly, it could challenge Saudi Arabia’s economic diversification projects. Second, the surge in attacks against U.S. military facilities by pro-Iranian militias in Syria and especially Iraq – prompting two U.S airstrikes in the past week against Iranian-linked militia Kataib Hezbollah – sounds the alarm for the Gulf Arab states, some of which have been directly attacked by these Iraqi groups recently and are still objects of their violent propaganda.

In recent years, the Gulf Arab states and Israel have been facing similar threats from the same Iranian-allied armed actors in Yemen and Iraq. This is true for Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates in particular. And, given how Iranian-backed militias undermine regional stability, they pose a threat to Gulf Arab states’ interests regardless of their respective position vis-a-vis normalizing relations with Israel. In the case of the UAE, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia, official diplomatic normalization agreements or still-informal normalization processes could further expose Gulf Arab capitals to retaliation by pro-Iranian militias. This dynamic could help the United States organize and support defense cooperation and deterrence in the region. In the case of the Houthis, it could also lead to their redesignation by the United States as a foreign terrorist organization.

The Houthis and the “Red Sea Front” Toward Israel

On October 19, a U.S. Navy destroyer intercepted four cruise missiles and 15 drones off the coast of Yemen that were “potentially” headed toward Israel, according to the Department of Defense. Two drones caused explosions in the Egyptian Red Sea towns of Taba and Nuweiba near the Israeli border October 27, with debris injuring six people. Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs blamed Yemen’s Houthis for the attack, saying they did it “with the intention of harming Israel.” And October 31, Israel’s Arrow air defense system intercepted a long-range surface-to-surface missile fired from the Red Sea toward Israel, and Israeli fighter jets intercepted unspecified “aerial threats” outside the country, likely a Houthi cruise missile. More recently, the Houthis claimed responsibility for the hijacking of a commercial ship, with reported ownership links to an Israeli businessman. That attack came after Houthi leader Abdul Malik al-Houthi directly threatened freedom of navigation in the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb in retaliation against the conflict in Gaza, threatening Israeli ships.

Trying to deter further attacks from Yemen, since early November Israel has strengthened its maritime defense posture in the Red Sea through the deployment of missile boats near the Red Sea city of Eilat. However, on November 9 Israel’s Arrow air defense system intercepted a surface-to-surface missile seemingly launched from Yemen heading for Eilat. A similar episode occurred again November 14.

Since at least 2019, Israel has stepped up its military and intelligence focus on Yemen due to the Houthis’ rhetoric against Israel and Jewish people and Iran’s increased military support for the group. In January 2021, the Israel Defense Forces deployed Iron Dome and Patriot air defense systems to Eilat, “amid threats of suicide drones and cruise missile attacks” from the Houthis, according to Israeli media reports.

The Sea and the Border: Saudi Arabia’s National Security Threats

Since Saudi Arabia borders the Red Sea, the Houthis’ attacks toward Israel pose some degree of threat to Saudi Arabia’s national security. They also could have implications for talks between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis for a Saudi withdrawal from Yemen and an end of hostilities between these two sides. As the Israel-Hamas conflict erupted, the Houthis put the Saudis in their sights with negative statements and propaganda because of negotiations among Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the United States on an agreement to normalize diplomatic relations (Riyadh has temporarily frozen negotiations). On October 31, Houthi military spokesperson Brigadier General Yahya Sare claimed responsibility for three attacks against Israel, saying they were aimed at supporting Palestinians in response to the “brutal Israeli-American aggression” in Gaza amid the “weakness of the official Arab regime and the collusion of some with the Israeli enemy.” In an October 17 statement, Mohammed al-Houthi, a powerful member of the Supreme Political Council, the Houthi-dominated body that governs Northern Yemen, denounced Saudi Arabia for ignoring calls to allow the passage of Yemeni fighters to Gaza.

Amid these developments, violence has also resurfaced along the Yemeni-Saudi border. For the first time since a six-month truce was brokered in April 2022, clashes have occurred along the border. Four Saudi soldiers were killed by Houthi attacks in late October, following a similar Houthi border attack in late September that killed five Bahraini soldiers.

Shared Threats From Iranian-Backed Militias in Iraq

Since Hamas’ heinous October 7 attack and the start of Israel’s devastating military operations in Gaza, pro-Iranian militias have struck U.S. bases in Iraq and Syria more than 60 times while also threatening to enter the conflict against Israel in the event of a wider escalation with Hezbollah in Lebanon.

In recent years, Gulf Arab states, especially Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, have been threatened and attacked by the Houthis and armed groups belonging to the Popular Mobilization Forces, an umbrella of Iranian-backed militias in Iraq. In some instances, these groups took credit for such attacks in ambiguous circumstances. For example, the September 2019 missile and drone attack against Saudi Aramco oil plants in Abqaiq and Khurais was claimed by the Houthis, but Saudi and U.S. investigators later assessed the sophisticated operation was “with very high probability” launched from a base in Iran close to the Iraqi border. In May 2019, Iraqi militias linked to Kataib Hezbollah, the PMF militia closest to Lebanese Hezbollah and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force, were reportedly behind a drone attack from Jurf al-Sakhr on two oil-pumping stations in Saudi Arabia. Alwiya Alwaad Al Haq, a likely shadow group close to Kataib Hezbollah exclusively used to threaten or take credit for attacks against Saudi Arabia and the UAE, claimed a failed drone attack against the royal palace in Riyadh, in January 2021, and a drone attack against the UAE, in early February 2022, which followed three Houthi attacks including one that occurred while Israeli President Isaac Herzog was visiting the country. In August 2022, another Iraqi militia linked to the Quds Force, Tashkil al-Waritheen, launched a failed attack against U.S. military facilities at the Ali al-Salem Air Base in Kuwait.

Iraqi militias and the Houthis have threatened oil companies in Saudi Arabia and the UAE, and Kataib Hezbollah launched a social media fundraising campaign in early 2022 to convince Iraqi youth to help the Houthis acquire drones to be used against the UAE.

U.S. Deterrence and Defense Integration With Gulf Partners

As the Middle East faces a continuing escalation risk due to the likely resumption in hostilities between Israel and Hamas, the United States and its Gulf allies have yet to find a shared political position on the crisis.

This comes as threats from Iranian-backed militias in the Gulf and the broader region continue, making U.S. security partners more heavily reliant on the U.S. security umbrella. For instance, after hundreds of Kataib Hezbollah members gathered October 20 at an Iraq-Jordan border crossing to protest Israel’s offensive in Gaza and Jordan’s 1994 peace agreement with Israel, Jordan asked the United States to strengthen the kingdom’s border defenses by deploying Patriot air defense systems to protect against “potential ballistic missile threats.” During Saudi Defense Minister Khalid bin Salman’s October 30 visit to the White House, National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan underlined the United States’ “commitment to support the defense of U.S. partners against threats from state and non-state actors, including those backed by Iran.”

The Israel-Hamas conflict will place demands on U.S.-Gulf defense cooperation and defense integration efforts in the Red Sea and broader Gulf region, especially if there is an expansion of the conflict. Air defense is a primary issue for U.S.-Gulf defense cooperation; U.S. air defense assets are also being deployed to protect and support Israel. While the U.S. destroyer intercepted missiles off the coast of Yemen, Saudi Arabia also reportedly intercepted a Houthi missile launched against Israel on October 19, with the wreckage falling inside the kingdom’s territory. In recent years, Gulf states have increased security ties and defense engagement with Israel. In 2021, the United States moved Israel under U.S. Central Command’s area of responsibility. In 2021-22, Israel joined two U.S.-led naval drills in the Middle Eastern waters with the Gulf Arab states. And after several Houthi missile and drone attacks against Abu Dhabi in early 2022, Israel supplied the UAE with air defense systems. The protection of shipping lanes is a priority for U.S.-Gulf defense cooperation, hence the reinforced presence of U.S. warships in the Red Sea. The United States and Gulf Arab states have joined air and maritime defense efforts, which helps protect not only their interests, but also Israeli targets and may be called upon more in efforts to contain the conflict.

For the Gulf states, especially Saudi Arabia, the most complex scenario in a regional war would be defending against Iranian-backed attacks while trying to strike a balance in the Israel-Hamas conflict and pursuing a sustainable political position vis-a-vis Palestinians and Arab audiences. Nonetheless, what’s even clearer after October 7 is that Saudi Arabia and Israel, despite their many differences, including the Saudi perspective on the Palestinian issue, share pressing threats and interests in the Middle East.