As tensions flared in the Middle East in the beginning of the year over the ongoing war in Gaza, India increased outreach across the region. In January, Indian External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar visited Tehran amid rising tensions between Israel and Iran as well as a brief military standoff between Iran and Pakistan. In February, Jaishankar met Saudi Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan on the sidelines of the Munich Security Conference, emphasizing India’s commitment to a two-state solution to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In February, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi inaugurated the first traditional, stone-built Hindu temple in Abu Dhabi and signed a bilateral investment treaty with the United Arab Emirates. Ahead of Modi’s stop in Doha during that trip, India extended a $78 billion liquefied natural gas agreement with Qatar. And on March 11, Indian National Security Advisor Ajit Doval visited Israel to discuss efforts to release hostages held in Gaza and deliver humanitarian aid.
Pursuing Strategic Autonomy
Since the onset of the Gaza war, India has reasserted its foreign policy strategy in the Middle East, characterized by its long-standing commitment to noninterference and neutrality, paired with a more recent policy emphasis promoting extensive engagement with a broad spectrum of partners. India’s strategic partnerships with key regional actors continue despite their internal rivalries, disputes, and conflicts. At a panel discussion with his U.S. and German counterparts in Munich in February, Jaishankar stressed the effectiveness of this “all alignment” policy, saying that “India is smart enough to have multiple options” with diverse actors in the Middle East and beyond.
This approach underscores India’s commitment to achieving strategic autonomy – the ability to pursue independent policies and actions while resisting external pressure. For example, taking a nuanced position on the Russia-Ukraine war, India defied heavy criticism for not backing Ukraine more strongly. Pushing back against the notion it was “sitting on the fence,” India argued it was entitled to its “own choices.” Similarly, regarding the Gaza war, India has attempted to balance its “interests and values,” reiterating “its long-standing and consistent” support for a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and calling for a “sustainable solution” to the Gaza war that provides immediate relief to Gazans while condemning Hamas’ October 7, 2023 attacks on Israel.
“Strategic Partnerships” Over Alliances in the Middle East
Rather than constricting alliances, India has built strategic partnerships with an array of regional actors, allowing it to maximize options for engagement and avoid dependence on any one state or bloc. Over the past decade, India has established strategic partnerships with Iran (2003), Oman (2008), Saudi Arabia (2010), the UAE (2017), and Israel (2017).
What were once primarily “buyer-seller” relationships, these ties have matured into robust and multifaceted regional partnerships. Yet India’s engagement with each country is tailored to meet “systemic and issue-specific” challenges and varies in size, scale, and scope. In an economically interdependent world in which economic power has to some extent gained primacy over traditional power politics, strategic partnerships do not require India to commit to support partners in international disputes or conflicts. In the Middle East, strategic partnerships offer India flexibility to continue economic and political cooperation with competing rivals including Iran as well as the Gulf Cooperation Council states and Israel, who continue to see Iran as their “common adversary,” despite the restoration of ties between Saudi Arabia and Iran in March 2023.
The GCC states comprise India’s largest trading bloc, with trade exceeding $180 billion during 2022-23. Notably, the UAE was India’s third-largest trading partner in 2023, and the two states signed a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement that came into force in May 2022. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia was India’s fourth-largest trading partner and the third-largest oil supplier in 2023, and the kingdom has also strengthened its long-standing and multifaceted defense cooperation with India, including joint military training exercises and technology transfers.
During Modi’s historic visit to Israel in July 2017, the first by an Indian prime minister, India elevated its ties to a strategic partnership, moving beyond the conventional defense and security relationship and expanding cooperation in the more specialized water and agriculture, waste water treatment, entrepreneurship, technology, and desalination sectors. Additionally, Israel is India’s fourth-largest supplier of military hardware, and India is the top buyer of Israeli arms. This partnership has continued despite the Gaza war.
At the same time, India is increasing ties with Iran. In January, India and Iran reached a “long-term cooperation framework” on the development of Chabahar port, which India aims to link to the long dormant but recently reactivated International North-South Transport Corridor to secure access to markets in Central Asia, Russia, and Europe through Iran. Following the reimposition of U.S. sanctions, India’s ties with Iran have broadened beyond energy security and are now focused on issues such as promoting stability and development in Afghanistan. For instance, since the Taliban returned to power in Afghanistan in August 2021, India sent an unprecedented 47,500 metric tons of wheat and provided essential medical and food assistance using land routes bordering Pakistan and the Chabahar Port in Iran.
Deepening Engagement Under Modi
Under Modi’s proactive “Link West” policy, India has invested enormous diplomatic capital and focus on the Middle East in the past decade. India’s Middle East relations have expanded beyond energy and economic ties to include political, security, and strategic dimensions. With a shared interest in regional stability, India, the UAE, and France held a large-scale air force exercise over the Arabian Sea in January. Moreover, the Indian navy is increasingly active in the western Indian Ocean, where it seeks to expand its role as a “net security provider,” projecting naval power, offering protection to commercial ships threatened by Houthi missile attacks, and serving as a key member in the U.S.-led Combined Maritime Forces headquartered in Bahrain.
In January, India and the UAE signed four agreements in areas including renewable energy and food processing that are reportedly connected to plans launched by the I2U2 grouping comprising India, the UAE, the United States, and Israel. Additionally, India’s Union Cabinet March 13 approved the intergovernmental framework agreement between India and the UAE to bolster ties under the proposed India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor, which would expand trade, energy, and digital connectivity. However, such plans face the risk of suspension following the outbreak of the Gaza war.
Regional Instability Fuels India’s Pursuit of Strategic Autonomy
In the emerging multipolar world, India’s pursuit of seemingly contradictory approaches and objectives in the Middle East is made possible by its “willingness to look beyond dogma and enter the real world of convergences,” Jaishankar argues. These convergences are shaping India’s strategic partnerships in the Middle East, transcending the geopolitical risks and divides enflamed by the Gaza war.
With the Middle East roiled by the Israel-Hamas war, India’s pursuit of strategic autonomy and dynamic strategic partnerships built upon shared interests remains an indispensable strategy ensuring India can navigate the complex geopolitical terrain of the region while safeguarding its national interests and maximizing opportunities for collaboration. Moving forward, skillful policymaking emphasizing noninterference, coupled with careful assessment of interests and risks, should aid India in preserving its neutrality. This approach will allow India to continue emphasizing the virtues of multipolarity and the avoidance of polarizing conflicts.
