From time to time, events – both domestic and international – converge to serve as a reminder that Yemen’s war continues to be a source of considerable suffering for the Yemeni people as well as a persistent cause of instability in the region. This appears to be one such moment, as the ongoing conflict in Yemen finds its way inching toward the center of important debates: in the United States, as part of the domestic political discussion on the nature of the U.S. relationship with Saudi Arabia, and the balance between the executive and legislative branches of government; and internationally, as a focal point of Washington’s campaign to portray Iran as a rogue actor menacing regional peace and security.
Domestically, congressional resistance to an effort by the administration of President Donald J. Trump to bypass legislative review of arms sales to long-time U.S. regional allies Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates has focused sharply on Washington’s support for the ongoing military involvement of both countries in Yemen. In response to the administration’s assertion that arms sales valued at over $8 billion were necessary to counter a growing threat posed by Iran in the region, Representative Tom Malinowski (D-NJ), said: “The administration has presented us no evidence that the Gulf countries face any substantially new threat from Iran that would justify declaring an emergency, or that these weapons, which the Saudis need to keep bombing Yemen, would even be useful if such a threat arose.”
On June 20, the Senate voted in bipartisan fashion to block the contested arms sale. While the House of Representatives is expected to follow suit, Trump has said that he will veto the legislation, and it seems unlikely that the architects of the effort can muster the 67 votes needed to override a veto. In some respects, this current legislative scenario echoes the last attempt by the Senate to end U.S. military support for the war in Yemen, which was framed in a resolution invoking the War Powers Resolution of 1973 that would have required congressional authorization for such support to continue. That effort failed when the Senate voted 53-45 on May 2 to override the president’s veto, well short of the requisite two-thirds majority.
But it is the relationship between Iran and Houthi rebel forces in Yemen that a Saudi-led coalition has been struggling to defeat since March 2015 that has suddenly thrust the conflict back into the international spotlight. While the extent of influence exercised by Tehran over the Houthi rebels has long been a subject of debate, the timing of a recent uptick in Houthi attacks against targets in Saudi Arabia, as well as an attack on a U.S. MQ-9 drone that was reportedly shot down while flying in Yemeni airspace – which coincided with what Washington alleges were Iranian attacks against oil tankers in the Gulf – has led Secretary of State Mike Pompeo to charge that the Houthis are an “Iran-supported force increasingly contributing to the Iranian efforts to destabilize the Arabian Peninsula.”
This view is frequently invoked as justification for the Trump administration’s effort to use a loophole in the Arms Export Control Act to deliver more than $8 billion worth of weapons to overseas partners, principally Saudi Arabia and the UAE, the neighboring states most deeply invested in the Yemen war. Appearing before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on June 12, Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs R. Clarke Cooper claimed that “these sales and the associated emergency certification are intended to address the military need of our partners in the face of an urgent regional threat posed by Iran.”
Saudi Arabia has relied heavily on U.S.-made precision guided munitions for airstrikes against Houthi rebel positions and infrastructure. According to the Yemen Data Project, civilian casualties in Yemen resulting from coalition airstrikes increased in May for the fifth consecutive month, reaching the highest number since October 2018. The Yemen Data Project’s most conservative estimate of coalition airstrikes since the war began is approaching 20,000. According to the International Organization for Migration, over 255,000 people have been displaced in the six months since the Stockholm Agreement was signed.
Houthi spokesmen have consistently said that as long as coalition airstrikes continue inside Yemen, they will launch attacks against civilian targets inside Saudi Arabia. The most dramatic of these was June 12, when a cruise missile struck the airport in Abha, in southwestern Saudi Arabia. Twenty-six civilians were reported injured in that attack. And there have been a flurry of drone and missile attacks targeting southern regions of Saudi Arabia in the days since, including a Houthi missile attack on a desalination plant near Jizan that reportedly caused no damage. The Houthis also employed drones in May to attack two Saudi oil pumping stations. These attacks and the June 6 missile strike on the U.S. drone over Yemen both point to greater proficiency on the part of the Houthis with various weapons systems. “An improvement over previous Houthi capability” is how a spokesman for U.S. Central Command described the June 6 attack, which the administration contends is further evidence of Iranian support for the rebel forces. The issue was addressed at a June 11 briefing hosted by Al-Monitor, during which Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Kathryn Wheelbarger referred to “Houthi co-production of weapons” with Iran as a recent development with the potential to shift momentum on the ground in Yemen. Still, she noted, it is the Pentagon’s view that while the introduction of more sophisticated, indigenously produced weapons may provide the Houthis with greater influence from time to time, it does not translate into dominance over the battle space.
Nevertheless, it has been noteworthy that, in the weeks since the long-delayed redeployment of Houthi forces from three Red Sea ports, including Hodeidah, was finally implemented, the rebels have made some significant gains on the ground against coalition forces and their Yemeni allies, particularly in areas of central Yemen not considered to be Houthi strongholds. Yemeni political analyst Ateq Garallah asserted that “militarily, the Houthis have been winning on the battlefield since the beginning of 2019, benefitting from the truce imposed by the Stockholm Agreement on Hodeidah.” A crucial victory over restive tribes in the Hajour district of Hajjah governorate in the northwest corner of Yemen, which Garallah says “aimed to secure the Houthi homeland,” was followed by rapid advances in Dalea, Ibb, and Bayda governorates in central Yemen, which were meant to “strengthen the Houthis influence and draw a border with the pro-Emirati STC [Southern Transition Council],” a Southern separatist organization that has received support from the UAE.
Given the continued hostilities, it doesn’t appear as though a return of international attention to the fate of Yemen is going to have any material impact on the conduct of the war. This is largely because, even now, the conflict is viewed through the prism of other issues – battles between the executive and legislative branches of the U.S. government, or disputes between the United States and Iran – rather than as a political and humanitarian calamity in its own right, with home-grown causes that, ultimately, are going to require home-grown remedies.
