In early January, as the Houthis continued their attacks on commercial shipping in the Red Sea, the administration of President Joseph R. Biden Jr. found itself with a menu of five broad and largely unappetizing options in Yemen, ranging from the status quo of defend only all the way up to direct military strikes on Iran.
The Biden administration eventually settled on a “deter and degrade” approach, which, at least so far, has not resulted in a cessation of Houthi attacks. That approach, while not yet successful, was likely the least bad of the five available options. It also may prove to be an adaptable approach, something that can be modified into a winning strategy.
Five Options
The first option, and the one the United States had been pursuing for months, was the “defend only” option. In this scenario, the United States would continue to do what it had been doing for weeks: U.S. warships as part of Operation Prosperity Guardian would patrol the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, shooting down any incoming Houthi missile or drone attacks. The main problem with the defend only approach, of course, was that it simply wasn’t working. The United States was shooting down Houthi missiles and drones, but the Houthis were still attacking, and shipping companies were increasingly avoiding the Red Sea.
On January 3, the United States, along with several other countries, tried one last time, issuing what administration officials called a “final warning” to the Houthis to cease their attacks. Within hours the Houthis responded by launching a drone boat at U.S. forces in the Red Sea. The message was clear. If the United States did nothing but play defense in the Red Sea, the Houthi attacks would continue.
The second option, and the one the United States ultimately elected to pursue, was limited military strikes, or the “deter and degrade” approach. In this scenario, the United States and allies would carry out strikes against Houthi targets in Yemen, but these would be limited to missile and drone launching infrastructure and Houthi munition stores. The United States would not hit all Houthi targets, nor would it target Houthi leaders. The idea was, and in many ways still is, that the United States could degrade the Houthis’ capabilities to the point that the group can no longer threaten commercial shipping in the Red Sea. The United States was betting that it could inflict enough pain on the Houthis that the group would be compelled to cease its attacks. The problem with this approach is that it is unlikely to work, at least in its current form. The Houthis can’t be deterred, and it will be incredibly difficult to degrade them to the point they lack either the will or the capacity to attack ships in the Red Sea.
The third option that the United States considered in January was expansive military strikes, or the “deter, degrade, and destroy” approach. In this scenario, the United States would pummel the Houthis in Yemen, going after a wide range of military targets, including Houthi leadership in Yemen. Such an approach, however, would have limited future U.S. options and committed it to an open-ended conflict with the Houthis. By selecting a more limited strike package, the United States could hold this more expansive option in reserve should its initial approach fail. The more expansive strike package would also have run the risk – due to the possibility of Iranian casualties in Yemen – of sparking the sort of broader regional war between the United States and Iran that the Biden administration wanted to avoid.
The fourth option is what might be called the “defeat” approach. In this scenario, which several analysts have recommended, the United States would recognize that the Houthis are an enduring threat to U.S. interests in the region. As a result, the United States would not only strike the Houthis militarily but would actively work toward the group’s defeat, primarily by supporting the anti-Houthi coalition in Yemen’s civil war. There are several problems with this approach, however. First, there is no single anti-Houthi coalition. The anti-Houthi factions are split and have a history of fighting one another. Second, almost anyone in the anti-Houthi coalition that the United States might partner with has blood on their hands from years of fighting in Yemen and would raise serious human rights concerns as a U.S. partner. Third, and perhaps the most important drawback, this would commit the United States to a long and bloody guerilla war in Yemen with no guarantee of success. The United States would be a party to the Yemeni civil war.
The fifth option the United States had in January was to strike Iran directly. In this scenario, the United States would conclude that the Houthis are enabled by Iran and that, to deal with the problem of Houthi attacks in the Red Sea, it would need to go to the source of the problem: Iran. The problem with this approach is that it doesn’t merely risk a broader regional war with Iran and its proxies, but it initiates just such a conflict.
Modifying Option Two
None of these options were particularly attractive and many carried considerable risks of escalation. The Biden administration ultimately decided on option two, limited military strikes. This was less out of a sense that it would deliver the desired results – an end to attacks on commercial shipping in the Red Sea – and more because it fit three key criteria. First, it allowed the United States to act. Second, it preserved options for the future. Third, and perhaps most important, it was the least bad of all the options on the table.
After nearly two months of military strikes, it is clear that the deter and degrade approach is not working, at least not yet. That means the United States will need to adjust its approach to force the Houthis to cease attacks in the Red Sea. In modifying its approach, three things will be key: sustained military action, stopping Iranian weapons shipments, and holding Iran accountable for its actions.
First, the United States will need to sustain the type of limited military strikes it has carried out since January against Houthi targets in Yemen. On their own, these strikes are unlikely to end Houthi attacks, but in concert with the actions below they have a better chance of bringing about the desired result.
Second, the United States will need to stop Iranian weapons shipments into Yemen. If the United States cannot do this, it doesn’t matter how much it degrades Houthis capabilities, the group will be able to regenerate and resupply. But stopping weapons shipments is much easier said than done. Iran has been shipping weapons into Yemen for nearly a decade, some of which come into Yemen by sea and others which cross land borders and are then smuggled across the country to Houthi territory. The United States will need the assistance of allied navies, particularly from Europe, as well as regional countries such as Oman to dramatically reduce the flow of weapons.
Finally, and most important, the United States must be willing to hold Iranian targets at risk. For instance, in early February, the United States conducted a cyberattack against the Iranian ship Behshad, which is widely believed to be aiding the Houthis and providing them with targeting intelligence. Behshad retreated toward Djibouti following the cyberattack, and, for a few days, there was a drop in Houthi attacks in the Red Sea.
Iran is the only country with significant leverage and influence with the Houthis, and the only way to stop Houthi attacks in the Red Sea is to demonstrate to Iran that it will pay a price for aiding and assisting the Houthis. Already, U.S. action against Iranian proxies in Iraq and Syria has led to Iran reining in its affiliates. The United States can be creative, it doesn’t need to respond only with military actions, or even attacks directly on Iranian territory, but it does need to broaden its response to pressure Iran, which is enabling the Houthis.
