Since the Arab Spring uprisings that began at the end of 2010, Qatar has served as Hamas’ primary patron and Doha as the home away from home for most of the exiled Hamas Politburo leadership. For over a decade, Qatar underwrote the Gaza economy by providing monthly cash infusions in part to meet the payroll of most public employees in the Hamas-run de facto government and provided other social and humanitarian support – all with the approval of Hamas’ main antagonists, the Palestinian Authority, Egypt, Israel, and the United States. Somebody had to keep food on the table for the 2.1 million Palestinians in Gaza, and Qatar was willing to do it, which essentially relieved all other actors of that burden.

This bond became even closer after the sectarian schism in the Arab world precipitated by the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood during the Arab Spring, particularly regarding the Syrian civil war. The prominent role of the Muslim Brotherhood and other Sunni Islamists in the uprising against the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad made Hamas’ extensive presence in Damascus untenable and its political leaders decamped, primarily to Qatar, although some relocated to Turkey, Lebanon, and elsewhere. Over time, the exiled Politburo leaders lost control of the bulk of the organization to local political and paramilitary leaders in Gaza and became, in effect, the Hamas diplomatic wing, primarily useful for outreach to the rest of the world, securing Qatari, Turkish, and Iranian diplomatic, financial, and military support, and for leading the group’s public relations in Arabic-language media. They remain among Hamas’ best-known figures and have been a constant presence on television, especially Qatar’s own potent Al Jazeera Arabic news channel.

Qatar’s close ties with Hamas and the presence of its most well-known and traditional political leaders – such as Politburo chief Ismail Haniyeh, Khaled Meshaal, Moussa Abu Marzouk, and Fathi Hamad – in its capital gave Qatar a massive diplomatic opening in the hostage negotiations that followed the October 7 Hamas-led attack on southern Israel. Turkey appeared ambivalent and had less access to such senior figures, although Politburo Vice-Chairman Saleh al-Arouri tends to toggle between Ankara and Beirut. Egypt’s relationship with Hamas is largely antagonistic, although it has clear channels to the group’s leadership. But if Israel, through the United States, or even Washington itself, wanted to get a message to Hamas, some of its most prominent figures were right there in Doha and could be immediately reached by their Qatari patrons.

Indeed, while President Joseph R. Biden Jr. seems to have been the primary orchestrator of the large-scale hostage deal, Qatar was the nearly indispensable go-between. And because of the success of the agreement, which also resulted in nearly a week’s pause in fighting and some desperately needed humanitarian aid for Gaza’s civilians, Qatar was widely praised, including by the United States and Israel. By actively pursuing its role as a broker, Qatar was therefore able to parlay a possible vulnerability – its close ties to Hamas after the October 7 atrocities – into at least a temporary major asset and success. Going forward, however, the status of Qatar’s relationship with Hamas and its impact on Qatari diplomacy and international standing will depend greatly on Israel’s choices and Doha’s reactions.

Scenario One: Israel Unleashes Its Assassins

The Israeli government has vowed that it will hunt down and kill all senior Hamas leaders, specifically those in Qatar, Turkey, and Lebanon. Israel may or may not carry out these threats. It has already climbed down significantly from the original war aim that Hamas must be destroyed in its totality. This was obviously an impossible goal, since Hamas is a political brand and an idea rather than merely a list of individuals who could be killed and infrastructure and equipment that could be destroyed. So, since the offensive in Gaza began, Israel’s leadership has vacillated between repeating these unattainable maximalist goals and setting more modest, and potentially achievable, ones like rescuing the hostages or destroying Hamas’ ability to pose another October 7-style threat.

Israel has a long history of killing Palestinian leaders and cadres around the world to neutralize its enemies and, especially, to avenge specific attacks, such as the Black September attack on Israeli athletes and hostage taking at the 1972 Munich Olympics. This campaign even led to the killing of an innocent Moroccan waiter in Norway who was mistaken for a Black September member involved in the attack. More recently, Israel has also assassinated key Iranian nuclear scientists, among other perceived enemies. At least one of the Hamas leaders in Doha, Meshaal, was the subject of a failed Israeli assassination attempt in 1997, when Mossad agents posing as Canadian tourists poisoned him in Jordan. King Hussein informed Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu that he would scrap the Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty if Israel did not immediately provide the antidote to bring Meshaal out of a coma and save his life. The antidote came, and the peace treaty survived, as did Meshaal.

Additionally, in a relatively friendly Gulf Arab country, Mossad agents in 2010 assassinated Mahmoud al-Mabhouh, the logistics and weapons procurement chief of Hamas, at a posh hotel in Dubai. Israeli intelligence seemed shocked that Dubai police cracked the case within days and identified the killers, who were posing as visitors from European countries and Australia, prompting a diplomatic crisis for Israel with the countries subjected to identity theft in connection with the murder. The incident was extremely embarrassing for Israel, but it demonstrated a willingness to kill Hamas figures in Gulf countries, which Israel is threatening to do again, on a large scale, against far more prominent figures in Qatar.

If the Israelis decide to go ahead with this assassination campaign, in all likelihood Qatar would receive some sort of warning that would allow Doha an opportunity to move the targeted figures to another location. The Hamas Politburo and its aides could seek refuge in Syria once again, Lebanon, Iran, or farther afield in North Africa. Turkey does not appear eager to welcome any additional Hamas leaders beyond Arouri, who has apparently returned to Turkey in recent days, so that is a less likely destination. Israel could, alternatively, simply start killing these figures without warning, or Qatar might seek to protect rather than remove them. But, in both cases, this would prompt a serious crisis in what has generally been a relatively friendly, albeit distant, relationship between Israel and Qatar.

There are signs that the Hamas leaders in Gaza feel physically threatened and are taking steps to protect themselves. Some Hamas cadres in Qatar have reportedly already relocated to other countries, notably Algeria, and several key figures shut down their mobile phones. If Israel decides to once again turn to a campaign of international assassinations, Qatar will either have to change its policies toward Hamas, which it has thus far steadfastly refused to do, or risk igniting a major crisis with Israel, the United States, and even other Gulf Arab countries hostile to the Muslim Brotherhood and, therefore, Hamas.

Scenario Two: The Status Quo Persists

Because Qatar has proved useful, and that usefulness has hinged on the presence of exiled Hamas leaders in Doha, Israel might decide that the Politburo figures in exile were not direct authors of the October 7 attacks and therefore do not have to be killed, despite their strong support for the atrocities. Washington may pressure the Israelis not to spark an additional crisis with Qatar, which provides the U.S. military with crucial facilities. If Israel concludes that the organization is so crippled in Gaza that it is effectively rendered nonfunctional, with its local leadership almost entirely captured or killed, it may regard the Politburo figures in Qatar as relative nonentities, the diplomatic arm of a nonfunctional enemy and nonexistent threat. Under such circumstances, Israel might decide to leave well enough alone and allow these Hamas leaders to vent on television to no effect whatsoever. If the Hamas organization is regarded as sufficiently decimated in Gaza, Israel may well conclude it is simply not worth the trouble and the strategic, diplomatic, and political price of assassinating far-off and ineffective blowhards who constitute the remnants of a crushed enemy.

Scenario Three: Hamas 3.0 and Qatar as Gaza’s Fiduciary

The third, and most interesting, scenario that could develop from the current circumstances could emerge if, in order to craft a viable postconflict governance arrangement in Gaza, Israel decides to work with Qatar and the United States, among others, to use the Politburo leaders in Doha to secure Hamas buy-in for an alternative Palestinian leadership in Gaza. Unless Israel wants to reoccupy the urban centers of Gaza into the foreseeable future, which would be the only way of truly ensuring the elimination of Hamas’ direct or indirect involvement in governance there, it is going to have to allow the development of an alternative Palestinian leadership in Gaza. No matter what that looks like, if it is going to function effectively, there will need to be at least implicit Hamas buy-in to the new system. Otherwise, a bloodbath is likely, with Hamas-led Islamist insurgents attacking the new system, which they would cast as proxies for the Israeli occupation.

If the Gaza-based Hamas leadership is captured or eliminated, the former leaders in Qatar could be effectively restored to power within the organization. That might facilitate Qatar leading and funding stabilization and reconstruction in Gaza through an alternative Palestinian administration. Israel will almost certainly not accept the restoration of Hamas’ direct control of governance in Gaza. However, a situation could emerge in which an internationally recognized government could be established that runs ministries and administration in Gaza, with echoes of de facto power sharing in Lebanon or Iraq. Hamas leaders would be required to commit to abandoning the organization’s paramilitary activities but would almost certainly try to rebuild their militia and military capabilities covertly despite collective efforts to prevent this. Israel may determine this is the least bad of all terrible options under the developing realities.

If this third scenario emerges, Qatar would then be able to once again parlay its close relationship with Hamas into a major diplomatic and strategic victory. Otherwise, Doha risks a major confrontation with Israel and the United States unless it finally changes its policies toward Hamas and shows the Politburo and its aides the door. Qatar has already been footing the bill in Gaza and arguably has some responsibility for the disaster brought about by the October 7 attacks because of its long-standing support of Hamas. But in this third scenario, all could be forgiven if Israel is willing to allow Qatar to leverage its relationship with these formerly powerful Hamas figures who could once again assume leadership of a supposedly chastened and reformed party to help empower new Palestinian leadership in Gaza.

Israel has not shown any willingness to accept such an arrangement yet. But it also has no viable day-after plan, and even Netanyahu must realize that a prolonged reoccupation of Gaza’s urban centers is precisely what Hamas was hoping to provoke through the October 7 attack. Hamas obviously wants to launch a long-term insurgency against Israeli troops in Gaza in order to claim primacy of the Palestinian national movement on the basis that it, alone, is battling occupation forces daily for control over Palestinian land in Gaza. This could provide a striking contrast with the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank, with its security cooperation with Israel, and Palestine Liberation Organization negotiators sitting at an empty table waiting for Israelis who never come and talks that don’t achieve anything if they ever take place. Waving the bloody shirt, Hamas plainly hopes, will be the key to finally eclipsing the secular nationalists who have dominated the Palestinian national movement since its reconstitution in 1968 and fulfilling its founding mission from 1987 to turn the Palestinian cause into an Islamist movement dominated by this Muslim Brotherhood party and militia.

At least one key figure in Doha is pointing the way to this potential approach, apparently recognizing the political crisis that potentially awaits Hamas if Israeli troops withdraw, allowing Palestinians the psychological and political space to question what Hamas has wrought through the October 7 attack. If Israel stays in Gaza, Hamas will undoubtedly secure a major victory. But if Israel leaves soon, it is possible that Hamas might suffer a massive political fiasco as Palestinians survey the wreckage, calculate the costs, and ask what has been accomplished. In recent days, Abu Marzook, one of the most senior Hamas figures in Doha, suggested the organization was ready to make the ultimate compromise in domestic Palestinian politics. In an interview with Al Monitor, he said that Hamas was ready to join the PLO and that it understands that in order to do this it must accept the primacy and legitimacy of all of the PLO’s treaty obligations, specifically the 1993 recognition of Israel by PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat. This is a total reversal of the standard Hamas position since 1993, which has completely rejected the Oslo agreements and the letters of mutual recognition and, specifically, the PLO’s recognition of Israel and its citizens’ right to live in peace and security. Even when Hamas leaders have occasionally implicitly, or explicitly, suggested the potential of recognizing Israel, they have never done so with reference to the 1993 PLO recognition. This would be a major innovation and capitulation.

Opinion polls show that Palestinians overwhelmingly want a national unity government rather than Fatah or Hamas rule. Reconstituting the PLO, including Hamas and refugee organizations, would be overwhelmingly popular with Palestinians, and it could be done if Hamas really is ready to join the organization on Fatah’s terms, accepting the recognition of Israel, turning away from armed struggle, and joining the negotiating process. This would effectively mean surrendering Hamas’ major competitive advantage against Fatah in domestic Palestinian politics, marketing its relatively unpopular Islamist social agenda through outbidding Fatah on resistance to Israel and armed struggle. It would also potentially allow Hamas to be part of a broader organization that deals directly with the Israelis to secure reasonable arrangements in the immediate term and an independent state in the longer term. It would be enormously popular and could save the organization from a potentially disastrous political blowback in the wake of Israel’s onslaught.

Abu Marzook’s comments suggest a range of possibilities for a postconflict Hamas – led by the Politburo currently in Qatar – and for a major role, almost as an international fiduciary for Gaza, for Doha itself. This could well constitute a way to avoid traps that Hamas, Qatar, and Israel have all variously set for themselves in the current conflict. It’s also entirely possible that Abu Marzook is speaking only for himself, or represents just one faction within the Politburo, or that the exiled leadership will be unable to reassert its power even if the Gaza-based leaders are virtually all killed or captured. But his comments raise fascinating possibilities for these three parties – Israel, Hamas, and Qatar – all of which are in very difficult situations with no other obvious ways out.

Scenario three is certainly a long shot, and history suggests Israel is most likely to persist with its pattern of assassinating its enemies around the world. But as the weeks drag on, Israeli leaders must be increasingly wondering what they are going to do in Gaza, assuming they wish to deny Hamas its longed-for protracted insurgency against Israeli occupation forces in Gaza. It would require all three parties, and possibly the United States as well, to act boldly, with imagination and a willingness to change long-standing policies to accommodate badly needed new arrangements. Yet necessity being the mother of invention, scenario three is by no means impossible.