It has been an eventful month for Kuwait driven by Emir Meshal al-Ahmed al-Jaber al-Sabah. On May 10 Meshal issued a decree suspending the Parliament, or National Assembly, for up to four years along with several constitutional articles concerning its authority. This unconstitutional action at least temporarily strips Kuwait of its legislative branch and its assertive – and at times counterproductive – Parliament. It also casts doubt on whether Kuwait will maintain its uniquely powerful elected assembly, and the political freedoms enjoyed by its citizens, or whether it will transition toward a more centralized and autocratic system reminiscent of other Gulf monarchies.

Freed from parliamentary oversight, the emir made another decision June 1 consequential for Kuwait’s future: He named his successor, Sabah al-Khaled al-Sabah. This appointment, presumably done in coordination with a council of prominent Al Sabah family members, came as somewhat of a surprise. Since his assumption of power in December 2023, speculation had been growing among Kuwaitis and analysts that he would seek to appoint one of his own sons. Instead, he turned to the more experienced Sabah al-Khaled, a longtime diplomat, foreign minister from 2011-19, and prime minister from 2019-22.

This move defies Gulf trends in significant ways, suggesting that, despite the suspension of Parliament, once again Kuwait may be hewing to its own path, at least in ruling succession.

All the Kings’ Sons

By tradition, and later by constitution, Kuwaiti rulers have been restricted to the descendants of Mubarak al-Sabah, who served as emir from 1896-1915. For many decades, rule alternated between two of Mubarak’s sons and their descendants, the “Jaber” and “Salem” lines. However, since 1977, apart from the very brief appointment and removal of Saad al-Abdullah al-Sabah in 2006 due to his incapacity to rule, the country has been governed by the sons of Ahmed al-Jaber. This continued despite the advancing age of these half-brothers; indeed, rule passed between three octogenarians in quick succession from 2020-23.

There are similarities to the Saudi history of succession in which rule was passed through a long series of siblings, the sons of the kingdom’s founder, Mohammed ibn Saud. Like the Al Saud family, the Al Sabah family has maintained the customary monarchical deference to seniority, resisting a shift to the next generation. At 83 years old, Meshal al-Ahmed is now the youngest surviving son of Ahmed al-Jaber active in public life. As such, it was expected that rule would pass to the next generation of “Jaber” sheikhs, and perhaps, as in Saudi Arabia, authority might bypass elders in the subsequent generation of the Al Sabah family in favor of the emir’s son.

There were other reasons for this expectation. Meshal is known to be an admirer of the shift toward youth in Saudi Arabia and of the way Saudi Arabia’s young crown prince has been forcing through change in the kingdom. Indeed, the decision to suspend the Parliament was portrayed by Meshal as a necessary action: to end parliamentary “interference” in the emir’s sovereign right to appoint ministers and his successor; to terminate perceived parliamentary abuse of its right to interrogate ministers; and to end the spread of corruption and waste of public funds. The up to four-year interruption of Parliament will presumably give the emir the space to govern as he sees fit and perhaps to change the constitutional rules that have defined Kuwait’s unique model of power sharing.

Other Gulf sovereigns have been centralizing rule, in governing bodies directly accountable to the ruler, sometimes empowered over the heads of appointed ministers. And the number of ministerial posts held by ruling family members has been declining, in favor of technocrats who can better execute the complex tasks required of governance in diversifying and globalizing polities. In this way, the centralization of government and the consolidation of rule in the hands of the sovereign have developed together in more technocratic – and autocratic – states.

This consolidation has another element: a marked trend toward direct patrilineal succession, or fathers appointing their sons as heir. This occurred not only in Saudi Arabia but also in Oman after the passing of the childless Sultan Qaboos bin Said, in Qatar where Emir Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani abdicated in favor of his son, and in the United Arab Emirates where President Mohammed bin Zayed al-Nahyan appointed his son Khaled as his heir apparent nearly a year after formally inheriting power from his brother. Uniquely in the Gulf, Bahrain has a constitutional requirement of primogeniture; but even there, Crown Prince Salman bin Hamad al-Khalifa only recently consolidated governing powers as prime minister, after the passing of his long-lived and powerful uncle.

In Meshal’s short time in power, Kuwait looked to be trending similarly. Meshal’s eldest son, Ahmed al-Meshal, has taken a public role as head of Government Performance Monitoring. His younger brother, Talal, drew notice during the recent parliamentary elections, as he emerged from obscurity to make the rounds of prominent diwaniyas, or public gatherings. The Cabinet Meshal appointed after suspending the Parliament, remarkably, had only one Al Sabah family member apart from the prime minister, who came directly from his post as advisor to Meshal’s court.

Delays in both the opening of Parliament and naming of the crown prince seemed to indicate difficult negotiations within the ruling house. Thus, within both Kuwait and the regional environment, signs suggested the contentious, if necessary, generational transition among the Al Sabah family was imminent:  Meshal would appoint one of his sons as heir.

Expanding the Line of Succession

This did not happen. Indeed, with the appointment of Sabah al-Khaled as crown prince, the pool of potential future rulers among the Al Sabah family has demonstrably expanded.

Sabah al-Khaled is not the son of an emir nor even a grandson. He hails from a completely different line, separate from both the “Salem” and “Jaber” lines that have shared in rule. It was long believed that this lineage was a strike against his chances to rule, that bypassing senior members of the more powerful “Jaber” line would be too contentious. Indeed, in appointing Sabah al-Khaled as his successor, Meshal has passed over not only his sons, Ahmed (53 years old) and Talal (37 years old) but many other contenders among the descendants of Ahmed al-Jaber, cousins of varied age and experience. These include two former prime ministers – Nasser al-Mohammed (84 years old) and Ahmed al-Nawaf (68 years old) – as well as the recent defense minister, Ahmed al-Fahad (60 years old).

Still, all of these options were problematic. The label of “corruption” came to be affixed to their time in office, whether via revelation and popular protest or by declaration from the emir himself. What emerged from Meshal’s consultations with prominent Al Sabah family members was not a return to seniority, nor the norm-breaking appointment of one of Meshal’s progeny, but rather a compromise. Yet the appointment of Sabah al-Khaled does adhere to another very important norm of monarchical selection: fitness to rule.

A Seasoned Statesman

Sabah al-Khaled brings to the line of succession a wealth of experience in public life that will be extremely valuable to Meshal, whose own experience has been limited to the security file. Sabah al-Khaled’s leadership posts include diverse portfolios managing social policies, energy, and national security. He had a long career in foreign service culminating in being appointed foreign minister in 2011. This included key posts such as Kuwait’s permanent mission officer at the United Nations from 1983-89 and ambassador to Saudi Arabia from 1995-98. This powerful Gulf neighbor appears to be high among Meshal’s priorities. Saudi Arabia was the first overseas visit made by the emir in January and will be the first visit undertaken by the crown prince as well, demonstrating that the emir will be willing to actively utilize his foreign policy experience.

Sabah al-Khaled also served as prime minister during the difficult years of the coronavirus pandemic. This experience leading government and working with the Parliament will be invaluable. And notably, Sabah al-Khaled did not appear to generate the same degree of political backlash nor popular polarization that many have endured while in government.

An initial show of unity was reported by the Kuwaiti news agency, KUNA, stating that the appointment was welcomed by prominent members of the ruling family, specifically naming the senior members of both the Salem and Jaber lines, Ali al-Salem and Nasser al-Mohammed, and notably including the previous prime minister and son of the late emir, Nawaf al-Ahmed. Both of his sons later visited the new crown prince as well.

A Step Forward

While the emir’s suspension of Parliament has directed blame toward the legislative branch, unity within Kuwait’s ruling house has been wanting. It remains a necessary precondition for both political stability and progress in Kuwait’s economic development. The naming of an heir without a protracted struggle marks an important step forward.

More time will be needed to demonstrate that this initial show of unity may be maintained. In both emiri speeches – when Meshal first came to power and again upon his suspension of Parliament – he sharply criticized the actions of the previous government, implicitly condemning Prime Minister Ahmed Nawaf and his coordination with the once banished Ahmed al-Fahad. There have even been unsubstantiated reports that members of the previous government are under investigation and may be prosecuted.

There is still a long road to traverse the fissures that had opened within the Al Sabah family as well as the sharp divisions of opinion within society, all while reviewing Kuwait’s Constitution, the covenant of Kuwait’s political order. Having invested as heir apparent a noncontroversial politician and an experienced hand to assist with the navigation will help.

Correction: This piece originally stated Prime Minister Ahmed al-Abdullah is not a descendant of Mubarak al-Sabah and thus is ineligible to serve as emir. Ahmed al-Abdullah is a descendant of Mubarak al-Sabah.