For the first time in a long time, there is growing optimism that the war in Yemen might end sooner rather than later. Much of this is a direct result of the China-brokered deal between Saudi Arabia and Iran in March to restore diplomatic relations. As part of the deal, Iran agreed to stop arming the Houthis and pressure the group to cease cross-border rocket attacks into Saudi Arabia.

Then, in mid-April, a Saudi delegation visited Houthi-controlled Sanaa to discuss a permanent cease-fire. Despite a trio of sticking points – the use of oil revenue, a timeline for the exit of foreign troops from Yemen, and the payment of civil service salaries, including security forces – the talks were followed immediately by another positive step: a prisoner exchange overseen by the Red Cross.

Altogether, nearly 900 prisoners were released by the Houthis and Saudi Arabia. Perhaps most notably, the Houthis handed over the brother and eldest son of Tariq Saleh, who is a member of the Presidential Leadership Council and the commander of the National Resistance Forces; Mahmoud al-Subaihi, the former minister of defense; and Nasser Mansour Hadi, the brother of former Yemeni President Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi. Both Subaihi and Hadi had been held since early in the war, and all four men were significant hostages to release, suggesting the Houthis no longer felt the need to hold them as human shields.

But regardless of when the war ends, next month or next year, and no matter the form the final agreement takes, one state or two, whatever is left of Yemen is going to face a serious challenge the day after any peace deal is signed.

Typically, when a war like the one in Yemen ends, outside mediators and negotiators (sometimes the United Nations and sometimes not) oversee a process of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration. Basically, armed groups hand over their weapons and disband before being either reintegrated back into society or placed into regular military units.

Unfortunately, this is unlikely to work in Yemen. The country has already attempted variations of this process with little success. In 2019, military units affiliated with the Southern Transitional Council expelled forces loyal to Hadi, then president, and the U.N.-recognized government from Aden. Worried that the anti-Houthi coalition was collapsing, Saudi Arabia brokered a deal between the two ostensible allies. The Riyadh Agreement was intended to fold military units loyal to the Southern Transitional Council into the military of the Hadi government. Not surprisingly, however, the deal failed as both sides dragged their feet, talked about “sequencing,” and blamed the other side for failure to comply.

In 2022, Saudi Arabia tried again, forcing Hadi out as president and replacing him with an eight-man Presidential Leadership Council, which was designed to present a common front to the Houthis both diplomatically and militarily. But once again the deal failed, as various factions within the council spent more time fighting one another than they have the Houthis. The Presidential Leadership Council has survived, but it is hardly a model for emulation.

The Southern Transitional Council’s military units remain under separate command and control from those of the U.N.-recognized government, as do Tariq Saleh’s National Resistance Forces and the Giants Brigades, all of which are backed by the UAE.

Indeed, in Yemen, the longer the war lasts the more armed groups emerge. The relatively simple conflict between the Houthis and the Hadi government, backed by the Saudi-led coalition, in 2015, morphed into a three-sided war among the Houthis, Hadi government, and Southern Transitional Council in 2017 and 2018. Now, as the Presidential Leadership Council’s varied membership suggests, Yemen is a deeply fractured country with a multitude of armed groups, most of which actively distrust one another.

Partly this is a result of politics, but mostly it is economics. As the war has dragged on, alliances have split and fractured as different groups have seen an opportunity to advance their own partisan goals. For example, Tariq Saleh was once allied with the Houthis. And the Southern Transitional Council, despite being part of the Presidential Leadership Council, continues to advocate for and espouse an independent Southern state, which is at odds with the goals of the other members of the council. But that is at the elite level. For most of the foot soldiers, the individuals who make up the bulk of the armed fighters in these groups, the issue is largely salaries.

The war has collapsed and split Yemen’s economy into two unequal parts with two central banks and two competing exchange rates. Prior to the war, the Yemeni rial was trading at 250-1 against the dollar. Today it is closer to 600-1 against the dollar in Houthi-controlled Sanaa and hovers around 1,100-1 in Aden. Faced with a collapsing currency, rising prices, inflation, and the lack of employment opportunities, many men, as well as thousands of children, have turned to armed groups as a source of income.

These are the individuals who are key to securing peace in Yemen. If they can be convinced to lay down their arms, if they are presented with livable salaries and a viable alternative to remaining in an armed group, then peace in Yemen might actually stick. If not, the war will continue regardless of whatever deal the Houthis and Saudi Arabia sign.

If the international community wants to ensure that Yemen’s war actually ends when the peace deal is signed and the various armed groups actually disband and demobilize, it needs to rebuild the country’s economy. This will take significant and sustained outside funding at a time when many Western countries appear to have moved on. But without it, the war in Yemen will go on, much as it has for the past eight years.