The stepping down of Yemen’s president, Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi, and the formation of a presidential council mark a turning point in the conflict in Yemen. Hadi was an unpopular president, but nonetheless the Yemeni people received the news with great concern. Questions over the constitutionality and legitimacy of the presidential council immediately arose but were quickly overshadowed by considerations of whether it will improve the economic situation and basic services and end the 7-year war.

Problematic Formation

There have been several presidential councils in Yemen’s recent history. Most of these councils were a cover for an individual ruler – the president of the council – holding power, and the presence of others was more or less symbolic. The rest were set up with an equal power distribution among members, so no individual was able to monopolize decision making, resulting in many conflicts. The most recent presidential council was established following the 1990 unification of Yemen and ruled until conflict broke out among the council’s parties in 1994.

On April 7, the new presidential council was formed, consisting of eight members. It was established in Riyadh after Saudi and Emirati consultation, or perhaps pressure. According to several Yemeni politicians who were there, they were not involved in the discussions and were only brought in to sign the document transferring power. They presumed the document was crafted by the Saudis and Emiratis. These Yemeni politicians mentioned concerns that members of the new council would not feel themselves accountable to the Yemeni people. According to these Yemeni political figures, the council members were selected according to three criteria: geographical distribution, ties to armed groups on the ground, and a relationship with either Saudi Arabia or the United Arab Emirates. For instance, four Northerners and four Southerners are on the council as well as four members who are backed by Saudi Arabia and four who are backed by the UAE.

The council’s establishing decree stated that a legal committee would be formed to establish the rules and regulations for the council and its separate committees, although the legal committee has reportedly yet to meet, and the person who was selected to head this committee declined the role. The decree did, however, define the mandates and authorities of the president of the council, which were wide-ranging, such as authority over the army and military issues; appointing governors, security leaders, judges, and other key positions; and serving as the arbiter of disagreements among council members. However, this does not mean that the president of the council has the authority to monopolize power as happened in previous councils. The other members represent military powers and, as such, will likely be able to insist the decree’s distribution of power be adhered to.

What is most concerning to many observers is that the decree did not set a specific term for this council; members’ terms only end with death, disability, or resignation. With an open term, the council could end up, over time, being a source of polarization and division. As the highest political authority in a state that is incredibly divided, the attempt to rule by collective long term could end up reinforcing rather than ameliorating the fractured realities in the country. There are also concerns that the success of this council relies too heavily on its members’ success in coordinating and balancing Yemen’s relationships with Saudi Arabia and the UAE. This is a problematic approach given the history of rivalry and competition among the groups inside Yemen that are allied with these two countries.

A Step Forward for the Houthis

There is no provision in the constitution for the establishment of such a presidential council, raising a number of questions about its legitimacy. The move to establish a presidential council also indirectly raises questions about Houthi obligations to respect prior political agreements, a concession that the Hadi government had insisted on as a prerequisite for negotiations. These include the Gulf Cooperation Council initiative, which was signed in 2011 to transfer power from then-President Ali Abdullah Saleh to Hadi; the outcomes of the 2013-14 National Dialogue Conference, which the Houthis accepted, except the points related to federalism; and United Nations Security Council Resolution 2216, which was adopted in 2015, legitimizing the Saudi-led coalition’s military operation to restore Hadi as president and his government. Despite any Hadi government demand, however, the Houthis rejected this resolution as they no longer at that point recognized Hadi’s legitimacy.

In the decree forming the presidential council, the Houthis were mentioned by their name “Ansarallah.” They were not referred to as a rebel group or militia but as a party to be included in negotiations. With the establishment of the council, Hadi was removed from power, which was one of the Houthis’ demands. Furthermore, the formation of the council recognized the military powers produced by the war, which the Hadi government had refused to do, insisting they must disarm and withdraw from cities. This could pave the way for the Houthis to join the council, like any other armed group currently represented.

The council is a turning point in Yemen, ending the era after Yemen’s unification in 1990 when the recognized political parties served as the only legal forms of political participation. This council is the first political body to embody the drastic political and military changes that have resulted from the war: Political parties’ powers have faded, and religious-sectarian and regional armed groups have become increasingly dominant. The council’s establishment is also emblematic of regional powers’ influence on Yemen, which, in addition to hosting a toxic swirl of internal conflicts, has increasingly become the battlefield of others’ conflicts.

Recognizing the facts on the ground is always a good idea in addressing a conflict, even if it is not necessarily a step toward solving the sources of the conflict. It is at least a step toward explicitly – hopefully accurately – defining the conflict. However, while this formula may end the Saudi-led military intervention, it is unlikely to stabilize Yemen or bring peace anytime soon, as it does not address the regional and sectarian dimensions of the conflict.

Yemen’s local powers have lost a great deal of their autonomy, a reality that will make resolving the conflict difficult. For example, the Yemeni political parties, such as Islah and the General People’s Congress, have become connected to regional powers – Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Turkey for Islah, and scattered among Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Oman for the GPC. Also, the Houthis have come under greater Iranian influence than they were before the war. Other groups have also been supported by external powers, such as the Republican Guards led by Tariq Salih and the Southern Transitional Council led by Aidarous al-Zubaidi, both backed by the UAE. These groups are armed, so further political differences will likely be expressed through weapons rather than elections or other political processes.

This council is another powerful manifestation of Saudi Arabia and the UAE’s desire to end their direct military involvement in Yemen. So, whether the truce holds or not, Yemen’s conflict is moving into a new phase, with its own troubling issues.