On September 25, the Kurdistan region of Iraq commemorated the sixth anniversary of its independence referendum. The historic vote came at the pinnacle of Kurdish political, military, and diplomatic power in 2017. However, the audacious move toward independence led to a sequence of profound reversals for Iraq’s Kurdish region, including the loss of 40% of the territory it had controlled since 2014 and over 250,000 barrels per day in oil production from the fields in Kirkuk due to an offensive by Iraqi security forces. Furthermore, the legal status of the Kurdistan Regional Government came under intense scrutiny and assault, not only from the Iraqi government but also from neighboring countries in the region.

Since 2017, Baghdad has been implementing a comprehensive strategy aimed at consolidating power in Iraq, utilizing legal, financial, political, and military pressures against the KRG. The systematic approach against the Kurdistan region was starkly evident in a recent letter written by KRG Prime Minister Masrour Barzani and addressed to President Joseph R. Biden Jr. In the letter, Barzani expressed concerns about the possible unraveling of the Kurdish project if Washington did not step in to help safeguard federalism in Iraq.

Iraq’s Economic and Legal Battle

Baghdad has vigorously pursued legal avenues to curb Kurdish oil exports and assert control over Kurdish oil resources. One significant strategy involved blacklisting companies that have engaged in oil-related activities in the Kurdish region since 2007 without Baghdad’s approval, posing a legal threat and serving as a deterrent to international oil companies. Additionally, Iraq turned to the Paris-based International Chamber of Commerce’s Court of Arbitration, filing a case against Turkey over its role in facilitating Kurdish oil exports through Turkish pipelines. The court ruled in March that Turkey had violated the 1973 Turkey-Iraq Pipeline Agreement and ordered Ankara to pay Baghdad around $1.5 billion. In response, Ankara halted Kurdish oil exports through the Turkish port of Ceyhan. This has led to a $5 billion loss of revenue to the KRG, slowing down the economy and delaying salary payments to Kurdish civil servants.

In parallel with the Iraqi government’s efforts to consolidate power, at the expense of the KRG, the Iraqi judiciary has engaged in a constitutional struggle against the Kurdistan region. Frustrated with the level of dysfunction of the judiciary in the Kurdistan region, Kurdish opposition parties have turned to the Iraqi judiciary. In rulings on lawsuits filed by Kurdish opposition parties, such as the New Generation, and Kurdish Members of Parliament Yousif Mohammed, Srwa Abdulwahid, and Kawa Abdulqadir, the Iraqi Supreme Court asserted jurisdiction and has moved to dissolve critical institutions, including the Parliament and provincial councils, which are essential for legislation and decision making, impeding the KRG’s ability to function as a normal government.

Despite the initial reluctance of the KRG to recognize the jurisdiction of the Iraqi Supreme Court, the KRG has gradually, though reluctantly, moved toward accepting its decisions. This is primarily driven by the imperative to mitigate further complications in the ongoing budgetary issues between Erbil and Baghdad. With the loss of over 90% of its oil revenue, the KRG is in a precarious position in which compliance with the court’s rulings has become essential to prevent the deterioration of its relationship with the federal government.

Baghdad is simply capitalizing on internal Kurdish political divisions and mistakes made by the Kurds themselves. Some of these calamities could have been prevented had the KRG adhered to its election schedule and provided effective governance. However, political divisions between Kurdish parties hindered attempts at good governance, and the reluctance of the Kurdish political elite coupled with disagreement over a new election law to hold elections took precedence over broader Kurdish interests. The last time Kurdistan region held an election was September 2018.

Loss of Political Influence 

The Kurds, who once held substantial political sway in Baghdad and played a pivotal role in shaping the Iraqi government, often with negotiations occurring in Erbil, have lost significant political power in Baghdad due to a confluence of factors. Factionalism among Kurds has weakened their collective bargaining position in Baghdad, reducing their effectiveness as a united political force to advocate for Kurdish rights. While the former president of Iraq, Jalal Talabani, leveraged the presidency, which was traditionally reserved for Kurds, beyond its constitutional limits, his successors have struggled to fill the void left by his passing in 2017 and use the office to exercise significant influence at the national level. At the same time, increased political stability in Baghdad and reduced violence have made the central government stronger allowing it to centralize power and, in turn, weaken the Kurds in the political arena. The Baghdad government’s centralization of financial control has enabled Shia ruling parties to act with a measure of impunity. This tilt of the balance of power in favor of Shia parties has led them to disregard the constitution and previous agreements with the Kurds. While this has noticeably strengthened Iraqi federal authority – and the influence of Shia political parties – it has cost the Kurds dearly in political and economic power.

The Shia political elite has also worked to diminish the Kurdish presence on the international stage. While, for example, Iraq used to be represented at the United Nations General Assembly by the president, an ethnic Kurd, the prime minister, a Shia, has attended the past two summits instead, depriving Kurds of a valuable platform for global diplomatic engagement.

Security Challenges

The Iraqi government has also taken military measures to weaken the Kurdistan region. The Popular Mobilization Forces, an umbrella of Iraqi Shia militias that contains pro-Iranian forces, has actively recruited Kurds, and similar efforts are underway by the Iraqi Defense Ministry to put the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan’s battalions on its payroll. The intra-Kurdish infighting has provided the Iraqi government a strategic advantage to make military and security inroads into the Kurdish region. Furthermore, Baghdad has increased its presence along the Kurdistan region’s borders, deploying forces and surveillance cameras. Shia paramilitary forces that are part of the Iraqi security forces have attacked Kurds and targeted key infrastructure in the region.

Baghdad has not been the only one to chip away at Kurdish political and security authority. Turkey has significantly escalated drone surveillance and strikes in the Kurdistan region, while Iran has threatened potential military incursions under the pretext of targeting Iranian Kurdish opposition groups.

Prospects for a New Relationship

Over the past two decades, the Kurdistan region’s prosperity – and the extent of Kurdish political, economic, and cultural rights – has seemingly been directly related to the amount of turmoil and instability present in Iraq. In the past six years and accelerating in the past two, Iraqi federal power, nurtured by relative stability in much of the country, has been ascendant, in inverse relation to power in Erbil. What Kurds need to convince Baghdad of is that such zero-sum inversion is not foreordained: Baghdad and Erbil can both thrive by adopting a mutually beneficial mindset and policies. By embracing the growth of Kurdistan as an integral part of its own development, Iraq could transform into a strong, cohesive country where the Kurdish people feel fully integrated. That is the case that Kurdish leaders and opinion makers must make with Baghdad, preferably in the wake of greater Kurdish political unity than can currently be mustered. A coldly calculating Baghdad – long annoyed by the perception of Kurdish good fortune as the rest of the country struggled – finds itself much happier with the current reversal of fortunes and is likely to remain skeptical of win-win scenarios. With greater Kurdish political unity, Iraq’s Kurds can perhaps hunker down and wait for a shift in circumstances more favorable to balanced relations and influence between Erbil and Baghdad. In the current situation, Baghdad has the advantage and likes it that way.