Sudan’s deadly war has dragged on nearly two years, killing around 150,000 people, displacing more than 11 million, according to some reports, and causing widespread famine. Both sides have been accused of widespread war crimes, but in early January, the United States formally accused one of the warring parties, the Rapid Support Forces, of genocide, and sanctioned its leader, Lt. Gen. Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo (known as Hemedti). U.S. officials also sanctioned Sudan’s army chief, Lt. Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, alleging that the Sudanese Armed Forces intentionally targeted civilians and denied humanitarian aid access during the war. U.S. officials also argue that the Sudanese Armed Forces have used chemical weapons.

Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar have all attempted to support conflict mitigation and humanitarian aid in Sudan’s deadly conflict, but these efforts have been overshadowed by increasing Gulf competition and power projection in Sudan’s war as Gulf states seek to deepen their influence in the Red Sea and Horn of Africa. The war between the Sudanese Armed Forces, led by Burhan, the head of Sudan’s Sovereign Council, and the Rapid Support Forces, led by Hemedti, in many ways has become a proxy war for influence in the strategic Red Sea region. Rights groups and the United Nations have reported that Egypt, Turkey, the UAE, Iran, Russia, and neighboring African countries have facilitated the supply of military equipment to different sides of the war, violating a leaky U.N. arms embargo, though officials from these countries deny these accusations. Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar have all played different roles in Sudan’s conflict and have some shared and divergent threat perceptions about Sudan. Their outsized influence in Sudan and the wider Horn of Africa gives them leverage that they can use to help bring the war to an end.

Gulf Interests

Sudan’s location along the Red Sea makes its security and regional stability in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea important for Gulf states, particularly Saudi Arabia. Riyadh has invested heavily in developing its Red Sea coastline into an international tourist destination with flagship gigaprojects like Neom that are integral parts of Saudi Vision 2030 plans for economic development and diversification, making Red Sea security a national security priority for Riyadh. Sudan is also a member of the Arab League, Organization of Islamic Cooperation, and OPEC+ oil alliance.

Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar have provided financial assistance and invested heavily in Sudan’s economy at different points. Sudan is rich in minerals and has strong agricultural productivity. It exports billions of dollars of gold, annually, primarily to the UAE. Most of the Gulf states have signed agreements for agricultural investments in Sudan to boost exports and help improve food security in the Gulf, a region with record-high temperatures and little rainfall. Sudan’s Red Sea coastline attracts Gulf investment projects in port infrastructure development to facilitate trade between the Middle East and Africa.

Over many decades, Gulf states have supported different Sudanese political actors that have aligned with their ideological, economic, and strategic interests. Qatar, for example was previously a close partner to Sudan’s long-time president, Omar al-Bashir, who was ousted from power in 2019 and known to be politically close to Sudan’s Islamist parties. Saudi Arabia and the UAE have traditionally been closer to Sudan’s army and supported the rise of Sudan’s transitional Sovereign Council, which included both of Sudan’s current warring parties, the Sudanese Armed Forces and Rapid Support Forces. They have also historically been the most concerned about Islamist groups gaining political influence in the region, especially in the decade after the 2011 Arab Spring uprisings. After Bashir’s ouster, Saudi and Emirati support for the Sudanese Armed Forces and Rapid Support Forces also sidelined Bashir’s Islamist party, but in today’s conflict, the role of Islamists from the Bashir era remains controversial. Media reports citing army sources say that thousands of Islamists from the Bashir regime are fighting alongside the Sudanese Armed Forces, raising concerns in some Gulf capitals that Islamists could be regaining ground in Sudan.

Gulf Statecraft Around Sudan’s War

All of the Gulf Arab states have stressed the importance of ending the war in Sudan and preventing the fighting from spreading to neighboring African countries or from empowering terrorist or extremist groups in eastern Africa, including al-Shabab in Somalia. While the Arab League, Gulf Cooperation Council, and U.N. officially recognize the authority of the Sovereign Council, led by Burhan, the actual positions of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar are more complex.

In the early days after the war broke out in April 2023, all of the Gulf Arab states supported conflict mitigation efforts, such as facilitating evacuations for foreign nationals, sending humanitarian aid, and in some cases easing visa restrictions for refugees. Due to its close proximity and ties with the Sudanese government, Saudi Arabia played a particularly important role in facilitating mass evacuations, delivering aid, and jumpstarting a mediation process, in partnership with the United States. While the mediation process has stalled in recent months, all the Gulf Arab states have officially supported it.

Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar have each cultivated relationships with both sides of Sudan’s war. Saudi Arabia perhaps has the strongest ties to both sides, while the UAE maintains closer ties to the Rapid Support Forces and Qatar (and neighboring Egypt) to the Sudanese Armed Forces. Saudi Arabia and the UAE worked particularly closely with the Rapid Support Forces, which took part in the Saudi-led coalition’s military campaign against the Houthis in Yemen. But the UAE maintained the closest economic and security relationship with Hemedti and the Rapid Support Forces, even allegedly providing weapons disguised as humanitarian aid via neighboring Chad according to a U.N. panel of experts and a New York Times investigation, though the UAE denies this. The United States sanctioned seven companies in the UAE for trading gold and facilitating weapons purchases for the Rapid Support Forces. The Sudanese army in particular says that the UAE is the main military backer of the Rapid Support Forces and has accused the UAE of violating the arms embargo, leading to a very public battle at the U.N. between the two. Qatar’s position most closely echoes the official GCC and Arab League one, which supports the Burhan-led Sovereign Council as the legitimate authority in the country. Burhan has traveled to Doha (as well as Cairo and Ankara), likely seeking financial support for the army’s war effort. Qatar affirms that its role in the war is limited to providing humanitarian aid through the army’s stronghold of Port Sudan, on the Red Sea coast.

Fraught Mediation

Both Saudi Arabia and the UAE are now directly involved in the mediation process, while Qatar has remained outside of it throughout the war. Saudi Arabia has attempted to use its ties to both sides, and particularly its close relations with the Sudanese Armed Forces, to help mediate an end to the conflict, in partnership with the United States, but these efforts have been unsuccessful in ending the war. Riyadh and Washington have both faced serious challenges in even bringing the warring parties to the table, and there have been disagreements over the format of the talks and which outside countries should participate. The Jeddah process, launched in May 2023, was one of many mediation efforts, reflecting deeper disagreements over whether the process should be Arab led or African led. The initial Jeddah talks only included the United States, Saudi Arabia, and delegations from the warring parties, upsetting African regional bodies, such as the African Union, as well as neighboring countries directly affected by the war, such as Egypt. An African Union-supported mediation effort led by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development in eastern Africa also began in June 2023, but Jeddah seemed to be the most serious and consistent in the early months of the war. On May 11, Sudan’s two warring parties signed the “Jeddah Declaration” agreeing to protect civilians and humanitarian aid flows, leading to a handful of short-lived cease-fires that were all violated. Sudan’s warring parties did not respect the agreement and war resumed and intensified. Jeddah meetings did not take place as often as necessary, and backchannels began to develop among the warring parties in different African and Gulf capitals, including Bahrain. Over the summer of 2024, the Jeddah process moved to Geneva and added observer participants, including the U.N., the African Union, Egypt, and the UAE. However, while the Rapid Support Forces sent a delegation to the August 2024 meeting in Geneva, the Sudanese Armed Forces refused to attend. Despite no direct meeting between the two sides, the mediators still held the talks and announced the creation of the Aligned for Advancing Lifesaving and Peace in Sudan Group, which helped increase the access points for humanitarian aid delivery. However, the absence of a Sudanese army delegation in Geneva stalled any progress on achieving a cease-fire. As the Sudanese Armed Forces gains ground on the battlefield, it may be calculating that it should focus on increasing its military gains to improve its negotiation position in future political talks.

Some major shifts have taken place in recent weeks on both the mediation front and the battlefield in Sudan. On the mediation front, fresh off brokering a tenuous deal between Ethiopia and Somalia, Turkey offered to mediate between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the UAE. Turkey is close to the Sudanese army and reportedly supplies it with weapons. The UAE and Turkey have had a fraught history due to tensions over Turkey’s alliance with Qatar and their support for Islamist groups across the region in the aftermath of the 2011 Arab Spring uprisings as well as Turkey’s growing regional influence. But over recent years, the UAE and Turkey have embarked on a detente, improved political relations, and signed major economic cooperation agreements. Somewhat surprisingly, the UAE welcomed Turkish mediation in an official statement, likely because Abu Dhabi thinks Ankara can bring the Sudanese Armed Forces to the negotiating table in ways that other allies of Sudan’s army, such as Egypt, could not. On the battlefield, the Sudanese Armed Forces recaptured the strategic city of Wadi Madani in January and parts of greater Khartoum in recent days, its most important gains in the nearly two years since the war started. Amid the army’s gains, on February 22, the Rapid Support Forces signed an agreement in Kenya to form a rival government, further entrenching Sudan’s political divisions.

Opportunities for Collaboration

Even if their policies toward Sudan have differed over many years, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar should use their enormous economic and political clout to push for an immediate end to the war in Sudan. They should also avoid letting intra-Gulf competition for regional influence cloud their decision making and opt for close coordination and cooperation on Sudan. Their close ties with the warring parties, essential role in humanitarian diplomacy, and potential roles in future reconstruction efforts give them huge leverage to bring both of the warring parties to the table to try and reach a viable cease-fire.