Saudi Arabia is an important economic and financial partner for the United States, but the dimensions of actual and potential Saudi investments and trade with the United States are currently being exaggerated.
President Donald J. Trump has said he will consider making Saudi Arabia the destination for his first foreign visit if the kingdom buys $500 billion of products from the United States. He also claimed that during his last presidency Saudi Arabia agreed to buy $450 billion of U.S. products. The Saudi Press Agency reported that during a phone call with Trump “His Royal Highness the Crown Prince affirmed the Kingdom’s intention to broaden its investments and trade with the United States over the next four years, in the amount of $600 billion, and potentially beyond that.” A few days later, during his address to the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, the president suggested that the kingdom should up its commitment to the United States to $1 trillion and also called on Saudi Arabia and OPEC to lower the price of oil (which would make achieving the trade and investment commitments more difficult). Last, Saudi Finance Minister Mohammed Al-Jadaan stated that Saudi Arabia has “more than $770 billion of investments in the United States.”
There is a strong economic and financial relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia. The United States is the second largest provider of goods to Saudi Arabia (although well behind first-placed China), while Saudi investors hold large amounts of Treasury securities and other U.S. financial assets. Further, the Saudi riyal is pegged to the U.S. dollar, and oil, Saudi Arabia’s main export, is priced in U.S. dollars.
Verifying the numbers quoted by Trump, Al-Jadaan, and Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman is not easy. Definitions are not always clear, data on Saudi investment in the United States is not comprehensive, and there are errors and omissions in the Saudi balance of payments data that could mean its imports are underrecorded. With these constraints in mind, the following is a best effort at pulling together the relevant information on U.S.-Saudi trade and investment relations to see which numbers stand up to scrutiny and which do not.
Saudi Arabia’s Purchases of U.S. Goods and Services
Even if Saudi Arabia agreed to buy $450 billion of U.S. products during the last Trump presidency, purchases on this scale did not materialize.
The United States has exported $455 billion of goods and services to Saudi Arabia over the past 25 years combined according to data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. During 2017-20, U.S. exports of goods and services to Saudi Arabia totaled $92 billion. This four-year total was below the $110 billion recorded during President Barack Obama’s second four-year term. If the coronavirus pandemic year of 2020 is excluded, the annual average of U.S. exports of goods and services to Saudi Arabia was still nearly $4 billion lower in 2017-19 than during the Obama years. Data from the Saudi statistical agency is less comprehensive than the U.S. data, as it only includes trade in goods (not services), but it shows a very similar pattern. Even if it is assumed that some procurement contracts signed under the Trump presidency entailed delivery of goods and services after he left office, this would still not boost the export number anywhere near $450 billion.
If it is assumed that the $450 billion figure suggested by Trump includes purchases of U.S. financial assets by Saudi investors, the number still looks too high. Saudi foreign assets increased by around $200 billion between the end of 2016 and the end of 2020. Even if all of this increase was due to purchases of U.S. financial assets (unlikely as Treasury data indicates that Saudi portfolio holdings of U.S. equities and bonds increased by around $130 billion between the end of 2016 and the end of 2020), these purchases, together with exports of goods and services, would total less than $300 billion during 2017-20.
Saudi Investment in the United States
Saudi Arabia could have investments of $770 billion in the United States, but this is difficult to substantiate from publicly available information.
Saudi Arabia’s total foreign assets were close to $1.5 trillion at the end of the third quarter of 2024. Al-Jadaan’s $770 billion figure would therefore suggest that about half of Saudi Arabia’s foreign assets are invested in the United States. This is certainly possible, given the close link between the U.S. and Saudi economies and financial systems. Data published by the International Monetary Fund suggests that around 53% of global foreign exchange reserves, a subset of total foreign assets, are held in U.S. dollars (this does not necessarily mean they are held in U.S. financial assets though), and there is reason to believe that the dollar share for Saudi Arabia could be higher than average because of the U.S. dollar exchange rate peg and the reliance on oil, which is priced in dollars.
While the $770 billion Saudi investment number seems possible, it is difficult to verify. The data discussed below indicates an estimated $490 billion of Saudi investments in the United States. Data from the U.S. Treasury Department shows that, at the end of the third quarter of 2024, identified Saudi portfolio holdings of U.S. long-term securities (including treasuries, agency bonds, corporate bonds, and equity) were $350 billion. However, about one-quarter of total holdings of U.S. portfolio securities are held by offshore financial centers, such as Bermuda, the Cayman Islands, Ireland, and Luxemburg. While it is impossible to know if Saudi investors hold U.S. securities through these financial centers, it is likely that they do. If a simple allocation mechanism is applied where the holdings in these four financial centers are allocated according to the share of identified investments, this would add close to another $110 billion to the Saudi holdings. Other relevant data from the Bank for International Settlements shows that the liabilities of U.S. banks to Saudi residents total nearly $24 billion, while the stock of Saudi foreign direct investment in the United States was $9.5 billion at the end of 2023, according to the Bureau of Economic Analysis.
Can $600 Billion in Trade and Investment Be Achieved?
The commitment to increase Saudi trade and investment with the United States by at least $600 billion over the next four years is very optimistic and is unlikely to be achieved.
The scale of the $600 billion commitment needs to be put in context. The $150 billion per year average this implies is equivalent to 14% of Saudi Arabia’s annual gross domestic product, 40% of its annual export revenue, and just over 50% of its annual imports of goods and services. For context, 9% of Saudi Arabia’s goods imports so far in 2024 have come from the United States compared to 23% from China.
Saudi purchases of U.S. goods and services will likely increase over the next four years as the kingdom continues to seek to diversify its economy and strengthen its military capabilities. Defense, technology, construction, finance, tourism and entertainment, health, and education are all sectors where U.S. companies will find an expanding market in Saudi Arabia. However, even if it is optimistically assumed that U.S. exports of goods and services to Saudi Arabia grow by 10% per year during the Trump presidency, these exports would total $125 billion over his four-year term. Multiyear procurement contracts agreed to during the next four years but met over a longer period are unlikely to add significantly to this figure.
The remaining $475 billion would therefore have to come from new investments. Again, it seems likely that Saudi investments in the United States will grow as the country seeks the transfer of skills, technology, and experience from U.S. companies to the domestic economy, but the scale of the commitment looks too large.
The IMF is projecting that Saudi Arabia will run current account deficits during 2025-28. If this forecast is correct, the kingdom will not have the current account surpluses of past years (15 of the past 18 years have seen current account surpluses) to redeploy into the global financial system as new investments. This means that additional investments in the United States will have to come from reallocating existing foreign assets or increasing liabilities to finance new investments through debt issuance or the sale of domestic assets to foreign investors. While these are all possible, and indeed likely to some degree, meeting the commitment solely from reallocating existing foreign assets would mean that over 80% of Saudi Arabia’s foreign assets would be held in the United States.
The Next Four Years
The economic and financial relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia will continue to deepen under the Trump presidency, but the numbers being given for past and future Saudi trade and investment with the United States generally look too high.
The question also needs to be asked about how increased trade and investment with the United States on the scale being talked about fits into the Vision 2030 reform agenda. The Public Investment Fund, the country’s main vehicle for driving the Vision 2030 reforms, has recently indicated that it intends to focus more of its investment in the domestic economy rather than overseas as it tries to accelerate growth and diversification. This would not seem consistent with increasing trade and investment with the United States, particularly at a time when oil revenue is well down from its recent peak.
Last, Trump’s request to Saudi Arabia and OPEC to lower oil prices complicates the picture. Lower oil revenue would make achieving domestic spending ambitions and the new trade and investment commitments more difficult. Responding to the requests that are coming from the new U.S. administration will provide a stern test for the Saudi authorities. Meeting domestic economic objectives while keeping the U.S. administration onside will be a difficult tightrope to walk.
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