On September 14, 2024, a senior Emirati official dismissed reports about the country’s interest in resuming long-deadlocked negotiations to purchase Lockheed Martin’s F-35 Lightning II aircraft should Donald J. Trump secure a second presidential term. However, Trump’s return to the White House in January has reignited questions regarding the potential for a resumption of talks. Meanwhile, in mid-October 2024, a Saudi military delegation, led by Royal Saudi Air Force Commander Turki bin Bandar al-Saud, made a state visit to Turkey, where it met with top figures in the defense sector, including Defence Industries Agency Chairman Haluk Gorgun and Turkish Aerospace Industries officials. Rich in symbolism is the picture portraying the Saudi commander and Defence Industries Agency chief alongside a KAAN aircraft – Turkish Aerospace Industries fifth-generation fighter jet. Two months later, several media outlets circulated news about Saudi Arabia’s intention to procure a hundred KAAN units.

Air power has long played a paramount role in the strategic thinking of the Gulf Arab countries, significantly contributing to shaping their defense procurement approaches and military doctrines. As air threats grow in complexity, the UAE and Saudi Arabia are paying increasing attention to defense solutions that allow them to keep a military edge on adversaries by leveraging next-generation technologies and ultramodern combat aircraft.

UAE: Is the F-35 Standoff Over?

On January 20, 2021, during his last day in office during his first term as president, Trump authorized a $23 billion arms sale to the United Arab Emirates, which included 50 F-35s, 18 MQ-9 Reaper unmanned combat aerial vehicles, and a $10 billion package of advanced munitions. When President Joseph R. Biden Jr. came into office, the administration quickly put the deal on hold for review over concerns about the UAE’s capacity to keep critical U.S. weapons technology secure from foreign espionage, especially from China. Four months later, the White House notified Congress about its intention to proceed with the proposed sales. However, it clarified that reviews and consultations with Emirati counterparts were ongoing. Yet, the UAE suspended negotiations on the F-35 deal in mid-December 2021, citing “technical requirements, sovereign operational restrictions, and the cost/benefit analysis” as central in the decision to halt the talks.

A few weeks before the discussions reached a standoff, the UAE signed a $19 billion contract with France, including the purchase of 80 Rafale F4 fighter jets. The purchase seemed aimed at achieving two primary goals: addressing medium-term air defense needs and buying time.

First, the Rafale aircraft is a cost-effective way to strengthen the frontline combat fleet of the Emirati air force in an air environment increasingly threatened by missile and unmanned technology proliferation. The aircraft is a 4.5-generation multirole fighter jet with advanced defensive and early-detection components, such as the SPECTRA electronic warfare system and the Thales RBE2 passive electronically scanned multimode radar. In this regard, the Rafale would allow the Emirati air force to counter conventional and asymmetric threats while gradually replacing its aging fleet of combat jets.

Second, the acquisition of the Rafale fighter jet serves as a stopgap to close technological gaps in the UAE’s air defense architecture until more favorable conditions emerge for the resumption of negotiations with the United States over the F-35s. For Abu Dhabi, the Rafale deal was a gesture to signal discomfort with Washington’s demands and a show of force, underlining the Emirati leadership’s resolve to stand by its terms and diversify its security partners. However, it left the door open for future talks. The Emirati air force commander, Major General Ibrahim Nasser Al Alawi, indicated the Rafale and F-35 fighter jet purchases would be complementary as part of a multistep procurement plan to modernize the mission-ready aircraft fleet.

With the F-35 negotiations stalled, some analysts argued that the UAE could turn to China to meet its fifth-generation stealth aircraft needs. UAE-China air defense cooperation has made quantum leaps forward over the past few years, particularly through arms sales and military drills. The Emirati air force operates an undisclosed number of Chinese Wing Loong unmanned combat aerial vehicles, and, in November 2023, it received the first batch of Hongdu L-15A Falcon jet trainers as part of a 12-unit purchase order. In July 2024, China and the UAE held their second joint air force “Falcon Shield” exercise.

Nonetheless, despite the growth in defense ties between Abu Dhabi and Beijing, the UAE is unlikely to purchase China’s Chengdu J-20 stealth fighter jet for three reasons. First, it would represent a radical departure from the UAE’s strategic posturing and defense procurement policy, which could negatively affect Emirati relations with long-lasting business and security partners in the West and Asia. Second, acquiring the J-20 would require significant on-site support from Chinese military personnel. This would undoubtedly unsettle Western armed forces based in the UAE due to concerns over Chinese access to their military technology. Finally, with Western-made weapons systems representing the bulk of the UAE’s armaments, purchasing J-20s would pose significant interoperability and integration challenges for the Emirati air force.

Saudi Arabia: Buying, Building, or Both?

Reports of Saudi Arabia’s interest in buying F-35s date back to 2017. The issue of a potential U.S. sale of F-35s to the kingdom resurfaced in May 2024 amid growing hype about Washington and Riyadh nearing the conclusion of negotiations over a bilateral defense agreement. Over the past two years, the Biden administration intensively engaged Saudi Arabia to reach a long-lasting defensive treaty providing Riyadh with formal security guarantees and access to advanced U.S. arms sale packages in return for the kingdom curbing the purchase of Chinese-made weapon systems and inroads into the Saudi economic-industrial fabric.

Despite the Biden administration’s significant progress in advancing talks with the Saudis, the new Trump administration will still encounter challenges. Even if Washington and Riyadh succeed in brokering a defense agreement during Trump’s second term, the U.S. sale of Lockheed Martin’s stealth aircraft to Saudi Arabia will likely be conditioned on the kingdom establishing full diplomatic ties with Israel and require intense pro-Saudi lobbying by Israel in Congress. Both scenarios seem unlikely in the medium term.

Meanwhile, Turkey’s KAAN may be an alternative to the F-35 for the Saudis. Riyadh’s public displays of interest in the Turkish fifth-generation fighter jet have grown since July 2024, when a delegation led by Saudi Defense Minister Khalid bin Salman al-Saud and Chief of Staff General Fayyad al-Ruwaili visited Turkey. During the visit, the Saudi officials, accompanied by Gorgun, toured the manufacturing facilities of Turkish Aerospace Industries and Baykar and met with representatives from the Turkish defense company Aselsan. The delegation looked at the KAAN along with the Baykar-made Kizilelma and Akinci unmanned combat aerial vehicles.

The KAAN continued to feature prominently in Saudi-Turkish military-industrial cooperation talks during Saudi Commander Turki bin Bandar’s state visit to Turkey in October 2024. During the trip, he also met with Turkey’s air force commander and officials from leading Turkish defense companies, such as Roketsan and Aselsan. And in late December 2024, Gorgun led a Turkish delegation to Riyadh, where he met with key figures in Khalid bin Salman’s close entourage entrusted to advance Saudi Vision 2030’s defense targets and strategic military projects.

Saudi Arabia and Turkey have yet to comment officially, but the steep intensification in Saudi-Turkish engagement over the past six months signals a growing momentum on the KAAN dossier. The mobilization of key figures in the Saudi and Turkish defense procurement structures suggests that negotiations may be moving to a more advanced phase, where sale parameters and technology transfer clauses are discussed. Should Riyadh and Ankara succeed in finalizing a procurement contract for the KAAN fighter jet, the purchase deal is likely to mirror the August 2023 Saudi-Turkish export agreement for Baykar’s unmanned combat aerial vehicles, which included significant technology transfers and joint production opportunities.

The KAAN could bring tactical and strategic gains to Saudi Arabia. Tactically, it would serve as a versatile platform to bolster the air force’s force projection capabilities, especially for air-to-air warfare and precision strike roles. Advanced radar-absorbing materials, aerodynamic design, and advanced avionics will give the aircraft an improved stealth coating, making it hard to detect. The KAAN is poised to feature artificial intelligence-enabled systems that will allow the aircraft’s pilot to directly control loyal drones from the cockpit, providing pilots with a critical tactical edge when operating in saturated air defense environments. Strategically, the KAAN’s long-range strike capabilities could strengthen Saudi deterrence vis-a-vis regional rivals. At the same time, the local production of KAAN components could advance the country’s military-industrial base in the aerospace sector, where domestic manufacturing capabilities are still nascent.

Nonetheless, the KAAN is not a ready-to-buy, combat-tested option. The KAAN is still in the prototyping phase, with only two test flights on record. It will be at least three years until it reaches serial production and operational service, with Turkish Aerospace Industries executives estimating the delivery of the first 20 KAAN units by 2028. The main challenge the KAAN faces in gaining the fifth-generation tag concerns the twin-engine propulsion system. In its current version, the KAAN fits U.S.-made GE Aerospace’s F110 engines, the same model powering several fourth-generation aircraft, including Lockheed Martin’s F-16s. Turkish companies are working to develop homegrown propulsion capabilities that allow the aircraft to fly at supersonic speeds without afterburners, which is a must for the Saudis.

Although momentum for the KAAN deal is growing significantly, Saudi Arabia is also reportedly exploring procurement contracts with leading European fighter jet manufacturers, including the French Dassault Aviation and the Eurofighter multinational consortium. Since late 2023, Paris and Riyadh have intensified talks over the possible sale of 54 Rafale aircraft to the kingdom. As negotiations have gained traction, high-level Saudi-French engagement at the institutional level has increased as well, with senior defense officials meeting frequently between 2023 and 2024.

Yet, with Germany lifting its veto on the Saudi bid to purchase 48 Eurofighter Typhoon combat aircraft in early 2024, Berlin’s U-turn in arms export policy could inject new life into the long-stalled procurement agreement. The Eurofighter is already a pillar in Saudi Arabia’s frontline fighter jet fleet, with the Saudi air force operating 72 Typhoon units. However, Germany blocked the kingdom’s efforts to procure a new batch of aircraft from BAE Systems in 2018 due to concerns about human rights violations. The Eurofighter is manufactured by a European industrial consortium of the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, and Spain, and each partner has veto power over export sales. Nevertheless, although the blockade lifting could pave the way for a resumption of negotiations, there is no sign of meaningful institutional momentum over the deal’s revival.

At this point, there is little indication which European aircraft the Saudis favor. Most likely, Riyadh’s multipronged outreach policy is part of a bargaining strategy playing one company against the other to achieve better terms on a purchase deal.

Beyond procurement, Saudi Arabia also seeks to acquire the advanced technologies for domestic manufacturing. Developing a military-industrial base capable of manufacturing state-of-the-art defense products is pivotal to attaining the ambitious localization targets enshrined in Vision 2030. One clear example of Riyadh’s resolve to step up its game in the aerospace industry is its expressed interest in joining the Global Combat Air Programme, a business partnership among Britian’s BAE Systems, Italy’s Leonardo, and Japan’s Japan Aircraft Industrial Enhancement Corporation to design, develop, and field sixth-generation fighter jets by 2035.

Since mid-2023, Saudi Arabia has repeatedly voiced its desire to join the alliance. While the U.K. and Italy have welcomed this, eager for an inflow of Saudi capital to lower production costs and accelerate development timelines, Japan has been opposed, reportedly over concerns about divergences on export polices and increased complications in negotiations causing production delays.

Although the alliance has taken off without Riyadh on board, it could still join at a later stage. Should Saudi Arabia win Japan’s backing, joining the alliance would help Riyadh make quantum leaps forward in advancing domestic manufacturing capabilities in the aerospace sector, positioning itself as the first country in the Middle East to be part of a sixth-generation aircraft development program.

The “Trump Effect”

During his first term in office, Trump backed a “Buy American” campaign to promote U.S.-weapons exports by loosening guidance on arms sales. While this was primarily a move to gain domestic consensus and strengthen his image as a dealmaker, it also led to several lucrative weapons contracts with the Gulf Arab countries. Trump’s arms sales to the Gulf, however, provoked political clashes between the White House and Capitol Hill. For instance, amid a standoff with Congress over weapons sale packages to the UAE and Saudi Arabia in 2019, the Trump administration resorted to emergency authority clauses in the Arms Export Control Act to break the impasse.

There is reason to believe Trump will be consistent with this approach to arms sales during his second term. As arms dealer-in-chief, he will have significant leeway to expedite U.S. foreign arms sales. Regardless, regional geopolitical turmoil will have implications – shutting some doors and opening others. For example, since a U.S.-brokered agreement to normalize relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel looks unlikely in the medium-term due to current geopolitical realities, any potential F-35 sale to Riyadh equally appears stalled. At the same time, the warming diplomatic climate between the United States and the UAE could pave the way for a resumption of F-35 talks. During the second half of the Biden administration, Abu Dhabi and Washington sought to mend fences, restore mutual trust, and implement concrete initiatives to strengthen the bilateral strategic partnership, as exemplified by the September 2024 joint U.S.-UAE statement on AI cooperation. The UAE and the United States could build on this momentum to finalize the sale of F-35 fighter jets.