On October 16, the European Union and the Gulf Cooperation Council held their first-ever summit. The meeting in Brussels, Belgium gathered leaders and representatives of the two organizations and respective member states at a critical juncture in the interinstitutional relations between the two blocs.
The GCC region has rarely topped the EU strategic agenda. However, the acknowledgment of the growing interdependency between the two blocs showcased by global crises, such as the coronavirus pandemic and Russia’s war on Ukraine, and the rising diplomatic role of the Gulf Arab countries in global affairs have prompted Brussels to step up political engagement with the GCC.
From a Gulf standpoint, the renewed resolve of GCC countries to diversify partners in a world order tilting toward multipolarity, coupled with the reconciliation after the 2017-21 Gulf crisis, has injected new life into the GCC project, strengthening the bloc’s standing as a meaningful institutional interlocutor.
Shifting Tide in EU-GCC Relations
Since the May 2022 adoption of the “EU Joint Communication for a Strategic Partnership with the Gulf,” a document outlining policy fields and action points for joint cooperation, EU-GCC relations have quickly expanded.
Brussels has worked to expand its regional visibility, opening an EU Embassy in Qatar in September 2022 and taking concrete steps to launch a diplomatic mission in Oman. Additionally, senior EU leaders have regularly visited Gulf capitals, underscoring the GCC’s newfound centrality in EU foreign policy.
Beyond the diplomatic foothold, the two blocs have developed the EU-GCC Joint Action Program for 2022-27, a roadmap outlining joint institutional, policy, and technical cooperation initiatives.
Institutionally, the EU and the GCC have launched new platforms to advance dialogue on security and defense affairs. In January, the first EU-GCC Regional Security Dialogue gathered senior officials from both blocs to discuss regional security and specific areas for increased cooperation, including maritime and cybersecurity and nonproliferation. The first High-Level Forum on Regional Security and Cooperation, an initiative spearheaded by EU Special Representative for the Gulf Luigi Di Maio, in April reunited European and Gulf foreign ministers for discussions on regional and global security issues. Initially received with skepticism by Gulf analysts, Di Maio has seemingly increasingly gained the trust of Gulf policymakers through an active political presence in the region and “energic advocacy.”
There has additionally been increased sector-based cooperation between the EU and GCC. In April, at the World Future Energy Summit in Abu Dhabi, the two blocs launched the EU-GCC Green Transition Project. The European Chamber of Commerce opened in Riyadh in May. Also, the EU supported the GCC in a project to enhance the preparedness and response capabilities for nuclear and radiological emergencies of the Kuwait-based GCC Emergency Management Center. Another achievement has been the “Young Leaders in Regional Diplomacy” initiative, which brought junior GCC diplomats to Belgium to learn about the EU and engage with senior EU officials, junior EU diplomats, and others.
Fostering such people-to-people connections is at the core of the EU-GCC partnership. The EU delegations in the Gulf capitals have sought to facilitate cultural exchanges between GCC nationals and the EU by hosting social events and festivals on European film, cuisine, and languages. Most importantly, the European Commission announced a five-year, multiple-entry Schengen visa for Saudi, Omani, and Bahraini nationals. Emirati citizens already have permission to travel to the region for three months without a visa.
Testing Ties
Despite these recent developments in enhancing ties, three particular issues are testing the resilience of EU-GCC relations.
First, investigations by the Belgian authorities have embroiled Qatar in a corruption scandal involving several individuals linked to the European Parliament. For the Belgian prosecutors, the suspects allegedly received large sums of money in exchange for lobbying for Qatar. Although Doha denied any involvement, some suspects pleaded guilty, and the corruption probe has expanded to other members of the European Parliament. Ultimately, the bribery scandal damaged Qatar’s reputation and froze negotiations around visa-free entry for Qatari nationals.
Second, a series of Quran burnings by extremist right-wing movements in Europe between 2023 and 2024 drew public outrage in the GCC states. Local authorities in Sweden, Denmark, and the Netherlands allowed Islam’s holy book to be burned in these incidents saying the action was protected under national freedom of expression laws. Across the Gulf capitals, Danish and Swedish ambassadors were summoned to demand the end of the repeated attacks on the Quran. Although the EU firmly condemned the Quran burnings, the opposition of several EU member states to a United Nations Human Rights Council motion on combating religious hatred widened the divide between the two blocs. Although incidents have significantly subsided, the rise of European far-right parties raises concerns about an uptick in anti-Arab and anti-Islam sentiments across the continent.
Finally, the initial positions of unconditional support for Israel voiced by some EU leaders and member states in the aftermath of the October 7, 2023 Hamas attack generated an outcry from the Gulf. The stark contrast between the EU’s firm condemnation and sanctions as a response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and Brussels’ mild reaction to Israel’s war on Gaza fueled Gulf perceptions of Western “double standards.” The intra-European fragmentation harmed the bloc’s image, strengthening the reputation of the EU as an unreliable partner when exercising diplomatic pressure on Israel.
Realistic Deliverables
Held under the theme “Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity,” the October summit acknowledged that the security and stability of the two blocs are deeply interwoven, stressing that mutual objectives and common challenges call the EU and GCC to step up joint “dialogue, coordination and engagement” to promote de-escalation and peaceful conflict resolution regionally and globally. The participation of all heads of government of EU member states and top GCC leaders, including Qatari Emir Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, and Bahraini Crown Prince Salman bin Hamad al-Khalifa, demonstrated the degree of political support for the event.
The post-summit communique aligns with previous declarations outlining areas for sectoral and political cooperation. Trade, energy and climate, physical and digital connectivity, humanitarian aid, and people-to-people contacts were confirmed as top priorities for interinstitutional engagement, while Russia’s war on Ukraine, the Israel-Gaza war, and regional tensions were identified as critical issues on which to coordinate diplomatic action.
The summit also achieved new milestones. The blocs agreed to advance discussions for an EU-GCC Free Trade Agreement, committed to intensify energy cooperation through the EU-GCC Energy Experts Group, and endorsed a structured cooperation mechanism on disaster response between the EU Emergency Response Coordination Center and the GCC Emergency Management Center. Regarding political coordination, the blocs agreed on their support of the Global Alliance for implementing a two-state solution between the Israelis and Palestinians and developing a joint approach to maritime security in the Red Sea.
Maintaining the Momentum
The summit underscored the seriousness of the EU and GCC leaders in turning the partnership into a truly strategic cooperation. Yet, the long-term success of interinstitutional relations hinges on the capacity of the two blocs to keep the current momentum at the political and operational levels.
On the political dimension, decision makers in Brussels must provide sustained political backing for diplomatic outreach to the GCC. Although Ursula von der Leyen was reconfirmed as the European Commission’s president, the June EU parliamentary election results have led to a number of transitions expected in decision-making positions in the coming months. Former Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas will replace Joseph Borrell as the EU’s foreign policy chief. Taking up Borrell’s legacy will not be an easy task for Kallas, who is known for her hawkish positions on Russia and generally mild takes on Israel. Borrell was appreciated for his assertive support of regional de-escalation and dialogue, and he cultivated strong working relations with his GCC counterparts. Preserving and expanding the diplomatic capital built by her predecessor will be essential for Kallas to advance EU-GCC ties.
On the operational level, EU and GCC policymakers will need to focus next on ensuring the actual implementation of joint cooperation initiatives. As the mismatch between lofty pronouncements and tangible deliverables has long been a thorn in the deepening of EU-GCC relations, measurable progress is crucial to prove the strategic partnership’s added value to the respective member states. Cooperation could start with narrow, sector-focused matters that do not require lengthy negotiations, such as launching study abroad programs for students and establishing working groups on strategic security topics. Real progress in technical areas would positively underscore the partnership’s capacity to yield concrete results while building a conducive environment for dialogue on more structured policy issues. At the same time, “big ticket” elements often pushed to the back burner, including concluding free trade agreements and visa-free travel arrangements, should be moved forward to avoid wasting diplomatic capital.
A Strategic, but Not Exclusive, Partnership
For the GCC, the EU’s diversified economy, advanced technological capital, and solid defense credentials make it an ideal partner to tackle complex challenges, such as the energy and digital transitions and national security.
Yet, Brussels is not the sole interlocutor with which the GCC has sought to cultivate more structured institutional relations. Growing concerns over the U.S. commitment to the Middle East’s stability, combined with the revamped activism of traditional geopolitical heavyweights and the rapid rise of new protagonists in the global political stage, have prompted GCC diplomatic overtures to China, Russia, India, Japan, and like-minded regional organizations in the Global South, such as the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States and Association of Southeast Asian Nations.
As reflected in the GCC Vision for Regional Security, the Gulf Arab countries do not see themselves as passive spectators in the international arena but as active players in maintaining security and stability. To meaningfully advance the institutionalization of relations with the GCC bloc, the leadership in Brussels should heed this call for status recognition and genuine cooperation by speaking with one voice on critical matters, engaging with GCC interlocutors on an equal footing, and focusing on implementation of measurable deliverables.
