The war in Ukraine has exacerbated the divide between the West and East. The latter, increasingly referred to as the Global South, is not a homogenous entity but rather a collection of groups of countries as well as separate big actors, such as India and Indonesia, that are motivated by varying degrees of anti-Westernism. Members of the Global South often see NATO expansion as the real motivator behind the conflict in Ukraine. Yet, there are also actors within the Global South that see the war, more opportunistically, as a way to increase their global position.  

The Gulf Cooperation Council countries have carefully navigated the dividing lines since the February 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. Not all six GCC states responded in unison to the war. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have continued to maintain close ties with both sides, while Kuwait and Qatar have remained critical of Moscow’s actions. None of the GCC states, however, have signed onto Western sanctions that have been imposed on Russia since the invasion of Ukraine. Recent media accounts report that the UAE and Saudi Arabia are ready to play a more active role in mediating a conclusion to the war. 

Gulf-Russian Relations 

GCC states have maintained close economic ties with Russia, which may help explain why they have not more fully backed Ukraine. For instance, the value of bilateral food trade between Russia and the Gulf countries exceeded $1.6 billion in 2023. Trade between Russia and the UAE increased from $5.3 billion in 2021 to $11.2 billion in 2023, and trade between Russia and Saudi Arabia grew from $2.2 billion to $3.3 billion over the same period. Russia’s commercial ties with the other Gulf Arab states also expanded. 

Saudi Arabia has maintained close energy cooperation with Russia through the OPEC+ alliance. The UAE has helped Russia refocus its trade away from the European Union toward the Middle East and Asia more broadly. Since 2022, trade between the UAE and Russia has expanded, reaching $11.4 billion in 2023. Since the invasion, affluent Russians have migrated to Dubai, and Russians are among the biggest purchasers of real estate in the emirate. 

Yet the Gulf countries have also taken issue with Russian engagement in the region. For instance, they are concerned about Russia’s expanding military and political ties with Iran as well as recent reports on talks coordinated by Iran regarding potential Russian missile deliveries to the Houthis in Yemen.  

Gulf Mediators and Support for Ukraine 

Saudi Arabia and the UAE have used their ties to serve as mediators in the Ukraine conflict. They have both negotiated prisoner swaps, and Saudi Arabia hosted a peace conference in August 2023, with Ukraine and key countries, although Russia did not participate. The conference came after the Saudis hosted the Ukrainian president in May 2023 at an Arab summit in Jeddah. 

In June the GCC and the United States held ministerial-level meetings with discussions on the war in Ukraine among representatives from dozens of countries. Over the summer, the UAE sent 250 tons of humanitarian aid supplies to Ukraine. In June, Saudi Arabia and the UAE joined more than 90 countries for a “peace summit” in Switzerland that did not include Russia. Interestingly, Saudi Arabia and the UAE – signaling a continuing effort at balancing – chose not to sign the final document (though Qatar did). And while the GCC states have been prepared to support some United Nations resolutions denouncing Russia’s actions, they haven’t taken meaningful steps to pressure Moscow, such as implementing Western sanctions. 

Amid this balancing approach, the war in Ukraine has allowed the GCC countries, especially Saudi Arabia and the UAE, to demonstrate to the United States the important role they play. To a degree, they took on this role after the United States expressed unhappiness with their initial positions on Russia’s military action against Ukraine and pressed them for more support for Ukraine. That dynamic is part of a broader U.S. effort to pull Saudi Arabia and the UAE away from Russia, an effort that has been met with mixed results. Meanwhile, the Gulf Arab states benefit from the continuing war in Ukraine given the EU’s efforts to redirect its energy purchases from Russia to the Gulf region. Brussels has pushed for closer ties with the Gulf countries since the start of the war as a sure way to diversify energy imports. In 2022, the EU imported more than $66 billion in oil from the GCC states, up from $25 billion in 2021. And Europe has increasingly turned to liquefied natural gas to replace gas imports from Russia.  

Gaza War 

Since late 2023, however, the war in Ukraine has been overshadowed by the war in Gaza and the spiraling tensions between Iran and Israel. The tragedy in Gaza lies closer both geographically and culturally, while the Ukraine war is seen as a distant, purely European conflict that does not pose a direct threat to the Gulf region. Still, the Gulf countries, especially the UAE, have tried to facilitate exchanges between Kyiv and Moscow, including through political contacts and prisoner swaps. 

Other Gulf Arab countries, too, have made efforts to step up diplomacy. In April, Qatar hosted a meeting in preparation for the June summit on Ukraine in Switzerland. The conference included national security advisors and senior officials, though it produced little notable progress except for some formalities before the summit in Switzerland. 

This, however, does not mean that the Gulf states no longer see diplomatic and commercial opportunities in the war in Ukraine. As ambitious middle powers, Saudi Arabia and the UAE continue to foster investment and trade ties with Russia while at the same time outwardly expressing solidarity with the Ukrainians. Moreover, Ukraine remains critical as a key food provider for the Global South, where Saudi Arabia and the UAE want to present themselves as major actors. 

For the GCC states, the war in Ukraine, though widely viewed elsewhere as a flagrant example of the violation of international norms regarding respect for sovereignty and inviolability of state borders, nevertheless presents both opportunities and challenges for neutral states. So far, the Gulf Arab countries have managed to navigate the divide over Ukraine to their own benefit as Ukraine, along with Western countries, and Russia try to win their approval on crucial issues related to the conflict and global security. With Donald J. Trump headed for a second term as U.S. president in January 2025, the expectations are that diplomatic pressures will mount for a resolution to the conflict. GCC countries are likely to continue their balancing game in ways that respond to U.S. efforts to end the conflict.