Syrian Democratic Forces commander General Mazloum “Kobani” Abdi is worried. Abdi, a Syrian Kurd, commands tens of thousands of Kurdish and Arab forces in northeastern Syria and has partnered closely with U.S. special forces there in the fight against the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant. In an August 28 interview, Abdi said that his forces continue to conduct daily attacks on ISIL, in cooperation with U.S. forces that advise and assist behind the front lines, making arrests and disrupting planning and execution of attacks. Without such kinetic pressure, he is convinced ISIL would succeed in reconstituting itself in northeastern Syria from its safe haven in the Badiya desert, nominally under Syrian regime control – but largely ungoverned space below the large northern quarter of Syrian territory that Abdi’s forces control. ISIL continues to have funding streams in the northeast, including kidnapping for ransom and extortion, as well as regional inflows, and to find localized safe haven in communities with residual sympathy for the group.

U.S. Central Command Says ISIL Attacks Have Doubled 

U.S. Central Command echoes Abdi’s assessment, with sources recently pointing to a significant spike in attacks – 153 ISIL-claimed attacks in the past six months already surpassing the total claimed by the group in Syria and Iraq in 2023 – as a key indicator of the group’s determination to rebuild. The United States continues to maintain a small group of special forces, estimated around 900, colocating with the Syrian Democratic Forces soldiers, primarily Kurdish, that provide security on a number of small bases in northeastern Syria. The United States also continues to train and equip the SDF for the fight against ISIL, and senior U.S. military commanders meet regularly with Abdi and his senior team. Despite that continued U.S. presence, assistance, and close cooperation with the SDF, Abdi and his commanders are aware the United States will not stay forever, and they worry that a withdrawal could come sooner rather than later, as happened in 2019 when then-President Donald J. Trump abruptly ordered forces in Syria to withdraw before reversing that decision. The administration of President Joseph R. Biden Jr. has shown no indication it is considering any withdrawal of these forces, especially given the heavy criticism it received for withdrawing forces from Afghanistan in 2021.

War in Gaza Complicating Effort Against ISIL

In this continuing, still challenging fight against ISIL forces in Syria, three other factors weigh on Abdi. First, he is concerned that the war in Gaza – in tandem with the ongoing war in Ukraine – has distracted the United States and pulled its attention away from the fight against ISIL. In addition to having some impact on U.S. assistance – Abdi did not clarify whether in terms of training or financial assistance – that U.S. distraction feeds SDF concern that the clock is ticking on the longer-term U.S. military presence in northeastern Syria. After the start of the Israel-Hamas war October 7, 2023, there was also an increase in attacks on U.S. and SDF forces by Iran-backed militias, including armed drone attacks by groups egged on by an Iran that supports Hamas and a Syrian regime, backed by Iran, that would like to put pressure on U.S. forces to withdraw from Syria. The SDF reported in February, for example, that Iraqi Hezbollah, a group backed by Iran, took credit for an attack on the Omar oil field compound that killed six of his forces.

Abdi also worried about a regional situation that was becoming progressively more complicated for his forces to continue the fight against ISIL, particularly with the war in Gaza. While condemning the October 7 Hamas attacks on civilians as completely unacceptable and reprehensible, Abdi said Gaza – with what he termed Israel’s disproportionate military response – was creating a “fertile breeding ground” for extremism and boosting ISIL propaganda and recruiting efforts. He continued that the further the conflict spread, the more problematic the situation would become for the SDF. As resistance to U.S. efforts and presence in the region increased over Gaza anger, it became more difficult and dangerous for the SDF to operate.

Abdi expressed a related concern that Turkey might feel emboldened to act on its threat to mount another military incursion into northeastern Syria, assessing that the Gaza conflict had distracted the attention of the United States and the broader international community. Abdi said that Turkish forces in the past seven to eight months had attacked his forces, oil production facilities, and civilian infrastructure, including water purification and delivery systems, electrical grids, and medical facilities. The attacks were making life difficult for the civilian population in northeastern Syria and endangering SDF efforts against ISIL. Couching his criticism carefully, he said the United States “could do more” to prevent these attacks in northeastern Syria by taking a firm position in telling Turkey it is endangering U.S. forces and undermining the fight against ISIL. Abdi assessed that the late-March elections in Turkey had weakened the ruling party and expressed hope that might improve prospects for de-escalation and dialogue with Turkey. He spoke elliptically about some contacts and said the SDF was open to this communication. While he expressed a similar openness to dialogue with the Syrian regime – and acknowledged ongoing contacts – Abdi assessed that at present the regime had little to no interest in reaching any sort of agreement or accommodation with the SDF.

Imprisoned ISIL Fighters Remain Major Security Challenge

The final major challenge Abdi underscored was that posed by ISIL legacy populations in Syria, comprised of some 10,000 imprisoned fighters captured on the battlefield or in counterterrorism operations, and the 50,000 family members housed in the sprawling al-Hol camp. The fighters constitute an enormous internal security challenge, Abdi said. Imprisoned fighters plotted to escape and external ISIL elements regularly planned prison breaks, like the one at Sinaa prison in 2022 that temporarily freed hundreds of ISIL fighters and killed some 122 members of the SDF. The United States has helped with shoring up physical security of the dozen or more makeshift prison facilities, jerry-rigged into service by converting school buildings and small factory compounds. While the SDF recently announced a limited amnesty for Syrian citizens held on terrorism charges and links to ISIL, including elderly and sick prisoners, without blood on their hands, the estimated 600 expected to be released will hardly dent the overall ISIL prison population, confined in relatively primitive, overcrowded, and deeply radicalizing conditions. Excluding Syrians and detainees from neighboring Iraq, more than 2,000 of the ISIL captives are foreigners whose countries do not want to repatriate them.

Although the population in al-Hol camp is made up of family members as opposed to fighters, it also represents a large population with significant numbers almost certainly undergoing or at least maintaining extreme beliefs. While repatriation efforts have continued, even the significant progress made since 2019 when the camp swelled to absorb this population has left the SDF with some 50,000 family members, including significant numbers of boys rapidly crossing the threshold to young manhood. Abdi expressed hope that repatriation for this population, including the large population of Iraqis, would be ramped up but recognized the faltering efforts offered no near-term solution to the massive security and social challenges that al-Hol constituted. He said the camp represented a “ticking time bomb.”

Asked about contacts with Gulf Arab officials, Abdi said he would welcome better relations. While not providing any details, Abdi spoke in general terms of some useful intelligence exchanges on terrorism. He acknowledged closer contact from 2017-19. Media accounts in 2018, for example, recounted substantial stabilization assistance provided to northeastern Syria by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Since then, Gulf Arab countries have begun to normalize relations with the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in Damascus.