Regional diplomacy in the Gulf has surged in response to the widening of the war in Gaza that has drawn in Lebanon and Yemen and triggered the exchange of direct military strikes between Israel and Iran. Meetings between leaders of Gulf Cooperation Council states and their Iranian counterparts have increased in frequency and volume in recent months, as the risk rose of a broader conflagration involving Iran. A perception has arisen in regional capitals that the administration of President Joseph R. Biden Jr. has been unwilling or unable to engage effectively to end the longest and most destructive cycle of Israeli-Palestinian fighting since 1948. The result has been a series of developments that have simultaneously reinforced existing dynamics in intra-Gulf reconciliation and created greater distance between Gulf states’ and U.S. positions that the new presidential administration, of whichever political hue, will have to grapple with as it takes office.

For officials in the Gulf states, such heavy investment in diplomatic initiatives reflects (and supports) the focus on economic growth, rather than political confrontation, and an emphasis on “de-risking” regional dynamics that might jeopardize the major projects underway across the region. This is especially the case in Saudi Arabia, where several of the gigaprojects so closely associated with Vision 2030 move into delivery phases, but also in Qatar, where the search for a post-2022 World Cup bounce continues, and other states, such as the United Arab Emirates and Oman, as they begin to navigate global energy transitions. There is no appetite for a renewed standoff with Iran amid a pragmatic management of the threat posed by regional affiliates of the “axis of resistance,” as evidenced by the Gulf states’ careful avoidance of any role in the airstrikes led by the United States and United Kingdom against Houthi positions in Yemen that began in January.

Any escalation in the tit-for-tat exchanges of fire between Iran and Israel could heighten the Gulf states’ vulnerability to being caught in the crossfire. Simply watching as events unfold and hoping that each successive round will not feature a miscalculation that could trigger an all-out conflict is not a viable pathway to attaining regional stability, and Gulf leaders have proactively chosen an alternative approach. This has taken a variety of forms, such as Qatari coordination with Egyptian, Israeli, and U.S. partners in mediation to secure the release of hostages held by Hamas in Gaza in return for a cease-fire, and plans reportedly developed by Israeli, Emirati, and U.S. officials to form the basis for an eventual postwar Gaza. The Saudi leadership has worked on the multilateral components of diplomacy and convened the Organization of Islamic Cooperation to facilitate dialogue, albeit with somewhat limited success, while Oman continues to serve as an occasional backchannel for U.S. and Iranian interlocutors in times of crisis.

After the July 31 killing in Tehran of Hamas political leader Ismail Haniyeh, one of the key Hamas negotiators in the hostage and cease-fire talks, regional diplomacy ramped up as leaders in the Gulf responded to the signals that Israel was preparing to escalate the conflict and U.S. officials became even less sanguine in their calls for a pause in the fighting. Israel’s subsequent military incursion into southern Lebanon and more expansive pattern of airstrikes across the country, together with the elimination of the heads of Hezbollah and Hamas, left the region on a knife-edge, especially after Iran’s October 1 retaliatory missile attack on Israel. Both the pace and level of meetings between Gulf and Iranian officials accelerated during this period, in some cases providing a vivid illustration of some of the gaps opening up in the Gulf states’ and U.S. regional posture. The sight of Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman receiving Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi in Riyadh on October 9, the day that Biden spoke with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu about the scope and scale of Israel’s next move against Iran, was as striking in its timing as it was in symbolism.

In October alone, in addition to his trip to Saudi Arabia, Araghchi visited Qatar, Oman, Bahrain, and Kuwait. His audience with King Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa in Manama generated its own headlines after years of Bahrain-Iran tensions following the Arab Spring events of 2011. Three separate high-level meetings of Saudi and Iranian leaders also took place, including one between Iran’s new president, Masoud Pezeshkian, and Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan in Doha on October 2, when Pezeshkian also met with Qatar’s emir, Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani. The fact that Pezeshkian traveled to Qatar, host of the forward headquarters of U.S. Central Command, a day after the barrage of missiles launched at Israeli targets, was itself a statement, even if Pezeshkian was there to attend a summit of the Asia Cooperation Dialogue. Later in October, the gathering of BRICS+ leaders in Kazan, Russia provided a further opportunity for Pezeshkian to engage in a multilateral setting, including a first meeting with UAE President Mohammed bin Zayed al-Nahyan, as well as leaders from other participating states.

It may be that a measure of success of all these interactions is determined as much by what does not happen as by what does, rendering it challenging for analysts to build a complete picture using only open-source information. Certainly, the latest salvo in the Israel-Iran exchange – the predawn Israeli strikes on Iranian military facilities on October 26 – was at the lower end of the escalatory ladder and an indication that quiet backchannel dialogue can still yield tangible results. To be sure, much of the diplomatic leveraging of Israeli officials is likely to have been done by members of the outgoing Biden administration rather than in the many meetings of Gulf states’ and Iranian leaders. With attention now turning to the November 5 U.S. presidential election, officials and diplomats in the region may choose to await the identity of the 47th president before assessing the potential impact on regional dynamics.

Regardless of who enters the Oval Office on January 20, 2025, the new White House will have to face up to the legacies left behind by multiple predecessors. Uncertainty in (some) GCC capitals over the reliability of the United States as a long-term partner has grown across three successive presidencies as different politically as President Barack Obama was to President Donald J. Trump and Trump was to Biden. Much of the rapprochement with Iran originated in Gulf leaders’ shock at the lack of an overt U.S. response to the multiple attacks (attributed to Iranian groups) on Saudi and Emirati maritime and energy targets in 2019. A statement by then-President Trump on the September 2019 attacks on oil facilities in Abqaiq and Khurais, which temporarily took half the kingdom’s production offline, drew a distinction between U.S. and Saudi interests. This prompted a reassessment in Riyadh that eventually yielded the March 2023 agreement to restore diplomatic relations with Iran, which was announced in Beijing with Chinese rather than U.S. assistance.

The frequency and high-level nature of regional diplomacy over the year of war in Gaza suggest that the thaw between Iran and the Gulf states has survived its first major post-Beijing test, and that the limitations of U.S. leverage in the conflict have triggered a more proactive assertion of diplomatic interests. While there are some in Washington who continue to hold out hope that a normalization of ties between Saudi Arabia and Israel is only a final breakthrough away, the actions of regional leaders paint a different picture, one that places a strategic premium on de-escalating flashpoints and focusing resolutely on major development projects. If anything, 2024 has further demonstrated the plethora of options facing the Gulf states as middle powers unwilling to become embroiled in geopolitical confrontation and with greater intent to stand up to offset an uncertain U.S. role to secure their interests. This is a reality the new administration will have to adjust to.