Since the October 7 Hamas attack on southern Israel, Iran has come under scrutiny for its long-standing support for the Gaza-based militant group. There has been significant speculation about the extent of Iran’s support for the assault and how Tehran might react to Israel’s military response in Gaza. Since the beginning of this crisis, the regime in Tehran has expressed its full support for Hamas and made clear its willingness to continue backing it. Despite the deadly clashes and the heightened risk of a regional war that may well threaten Iran’s security, the regime is confident in its position, reflected in Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian’s visits to Lebanon and Qatar to meet with heads of Hamas and Hezbollah shortly after the attack. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force commander, Ismail Qaani, remained in Beirut for much of October, his presence signaling activation of a joint operation room for Iran’s regional allies and willingness to coordinate a possible broader confrontation with Israel. What is the source of the regime’s confidence?

Part of it emerges from fierce ideological attachment to a visceral anti-Israeli rhetoric: Iran has long called for the destruction of Israel. In August 2022, Qaani stated that “Hezbollah’s sons,” a term broadly used to describe supporters of the Iranian regime’s ideology beyond the militia group in southern Lebanon, are preparing “to bring down the last blow against the Zionist regime” and “eradicate Israel from … the face of the Earth.” Beyond denunciatory rhetoric, Iran is emboldened by its success, over decades, in providing Hamas with funding, weapons, and training as a part of its strategy of building the “axis of resistance” – Tehran’s array of allies and allied militias throughout the region.

Moreover, Iran has successfully implemented a strategic, confrontational foreign policy: Tehran has been a strong proponent of the emergence of a “new world order” in which U.S. domination of the global system is ended, giving way to a multipolar world led by countries such as China and Russia, and middle powers, such as Iran, gaining power and status globally. In an April 2022 speech to university students, Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei said, “The world is on the threshold of a new world order” suggesting the United States “is becoming weaker day by day.” In efforts to bring about this envisioned new world order, Tehran has worked to expand its sphere of influence, not only across the region and through its traditional “axis of resistance,” but also beyond its immediate neighborhood. Supporting Hamas against Israel is part of this strategy, which at this still indeterminate stage of the Hamas-Israel confrontation Iran has little difficulty portraying as a success. For now, Iran perceives itself closer to attaining its long-desired global position via the conflict in Israel, as well as the crisis in Ukraine, exerting greater pressure on Western powers.

At the same time, senior Iranian leaders, particularly Khamenei, have adopted an Islamic ideological narrative to facilitate this foreign policy and Iran’s strategy of expanding its spheres of influence. Khamenei has employed a populist approach through his discourse creating a binary of “us” – the oppressed Muslim people – versus “them” – the oppressor (the United States and its allies). The approach aims to mobilize the oppressed people against what he pitches as the global corrupt elite. This transnational discourse is built on religious concepts, such as jihad, that are shared across the Muslim world, with varying frames of meaning. The influence of Khamenei’s populist jihadi discourse has been clear in the aftermath of the attack on Israel. For instance, protesters shouted pro-Khamenei slogans at a demonstration in support of Palestinians in London.

Despite the long-standing support for Hamas and Tehran’s more recent, confident embrace of the Palestinian resistance movement, Iran has been careful in articulating its support for Hamas. Two days after the horrific Hamas attack, at a military academy in Tehran, Khamenei said, “We kiss the shoulders and foreheads of the clever designers of these attacks” and claimed Israel had been defeated “beyond repair.” While applauding the attacks, he however denied Iran’s involvement by saying, “Those who claim these attacks have been designed by anyone other than the Palestinians clearly do not know the Palestinians.” Khamenei’s public denial of Iranian involvement at the time possibly signaled rising concern about the potential for an Israeli or U.S. military retaliation. However, on October 14, as such concerns seemed to ebb, Amir-Abdollahian cranked back up the rhetorical knob and called on Israel to stop its attacks on Gaza and warned that if the conflict expands and Hezbollah intervenes, Israel will face a “huge earthquake.”

The October 7 attack has been perceived in Tehran as a powerful blow to Israel and welcomed as a dramatic sign of the success of its confrontational foreign policy, with its rhetorical overlay of resistance and appeals to Islamic oppression. The regime seems to have welcomed the Hamas attacks, as well, as a powerful diversion from the aftermath of the domestic crisis it faced this past year.  The Iranian regime faced a series of setbacks and domestic pushback against its agenda. It was shaken by the 2022 “Woman, Life, Freedom” protest movement, and faced sustained domestic criticism for a desperately fragile economy – even as recently as early October, in the aftermath of the Hamas attack, the already failing Iranian rial declined against the U.S. dollar.

At the same time, the Iranian regime likely viewed the political divisions and massive protests in Israel prompted by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s plan to overhaul the Israeli judicial system as a moment of historic internal weakness for Israel. While it’s doubtful the carefully calculating Iranian regime is convinced that Israel has suffered any fatal weakening in its political and security systems, an opportunistic Tehran sees little downside in a carefully managed embrace of Hamas, which prioritizes rhetorical support and is accompanied by stern but generally stated warnings to Israel to cease its military actions in Gaza. Iran calculates it can continue such support for Hamas in the Palestinians’ confrontation with Israel. While Tehran will continue to pay lip service to achieving its ideological and strategic goals of the “complete destruction of the enemies of the Islamic system,” while also allowing it to remain relevant in the region’s strategic calculus, its present posture offers hints that it will avoid direct regime – or irretrievable Hezbollah – entanglement in the Israel-Hamas confrontation. Such relevance, buttressed with formidable ambiguity, is understood by the regime as a sign of power that can elevate its position in a freshly reshuffled regional order.

Iran has been signaling a sense of confidence that is to be taken in earnest. The Iranian regime is likely to continue using its jihadi populist discourse and championing of Hamas and the Palestinian issue, taking advantage of the Palestinian cause to expand its spheres of influence across the region and beyond. In taking such steps, it will exercise caution, disguised by bold rhetoric and ambiguity, to shield its core strategic interests from the possibility of significant retaliatory blowback.