Pakistan and Iran’s long-standing bilateral relationship has been put to the test by recent tit-for-tat attacks. On January 16, Iran launched strikes in Pakistan on alleged hideouts of Jaish al-Adl, an anti-Iran Baluch militant group involved in a January attack on a police station in the Iranian city of Rask. Pakistan responded January 18 with attacks targeting camps of anti-Pakistan Baluch separatist groups in Iran. This surprising confrontation, and escalation, has highlighted not only the complex nature of Iran-Pakistan relations but also the fault lines that affect their trajectory.
Uneasy Coexistence
The bilateral relationship between Iran and Pakistan remained cordial in the first three decades after Pakistan’s independence. However, dynamics began to shift after the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran as both states found themselves in different political groupings and pursued competing versions of Islamization.
In recent decades, the most critical point of contention between the two countries, unsurprisingly, has been border security and the activities of insurgents on both sides of the border. In Iran, the anti-Iran separatist group Jundullah and its successor, Jaish al-Adl, have operated from Pakistan without Pakistani law enforcement taking meaningful action. Similarly, in Pakistan, attacks by various Baluch insurgent groups in Baluchistan province and their use of hideouts in Iranian territory have remained a national security concern. After every big attack on either side of the border, the bilateral relationship becomes tense. In 2017, Iranian officials threatened to carry out attacks across the border if militant groups were not dealt with. Outside of that, rhetoric by both states has tended to be more measured, signaling a cooperative approach favoring engagement over confrontation. Over recent years, Pakistani and Iranian security officials have held meetings, opening up communicational channels to address grievances.
The Fallout From Iran’s Strikes
Against this backdrop, Iran’s recent strikes inside Pakistan against alleged hideouts of Jaish al-Adl militants were shocking. Iran’s attack coincided with meetings between Iranian and Pakistani officials and Pakistan-Iran naval drills, suggesting there was no prior coordination between the two sides. The strikes in Pakistan were especially notable because they occurred alongside strikes in Iraq and Syria. By grouping Pakistan, a nuclear power, together with the weak states of Iraq and Syria, Iran showed a unique confidence in its ability to strike across the wider region against elements undermining its national security. However, the attack challenged Pakistan’s strategic deterrence, which is predicated on preventing such foreign intrusions and retaliating in kind if they occur.
Iran’s attack unified Pakistan’s rather polarized political environment and was quickly followed by calls for retaliation across mainstream and social media. There was consensus among Pakistan’s intelligentsia and masses that this violation of Pakistani sovereignty could not go unanswered, as it could incentivize Pakistan’s other neighbors to launch similar attacks under the guise of attacking insurgent groups – particularly India, which has continually accused Pakistan of supporting separatist movements within the Indian-administered Kashmir region. The outpouring of public anger gradually built up pressure on Pakistan’s government and the military to respond. The initial steps of expelling Iran’s ambassador and recalling Pakistan’s chief diplomat in Tehran were deemed insufficient, and air and rocket strikes were eventually launched against militant hideouts in Iran, making Pakistan the first external actor to carry out attacks inside Iran since the end of the Iran-Iraq War.
Interestingly, Pakistan named the military operation “Marg Bar Sarmachar” in Persian, or “death to insurgents/guerrillas.” The name of the operation, which rhymes with the popular Iranian slogan “Marg Bar Amerika” (Death to America), conveyed a message to Iran that the “Sarmachars” – Baluch insurgents on Iran’s side of the border – would not be tolerated anymore. Iran’s muted reaction to Pakistan’s retaliation showed a willingness to de-escalate and restore the political status quo.
On the political front, these events greatly damaged Iran’s rather positive reputation in Pakistan as a beacon of resistance against the United States, in contrast with the Gulf Arab states, which are generally viewed as U.S. allies. This attack even compelled most pro-Iran voices in Pakistan to condemn Iran and highlight how the attack diverted global attention away from the plight of Palestinians in Gaza. Simultaneously, Iran’s attack also emboldened anti-Iran religious groups in Pakistan to demonstrate against Iran in major cities, thus providing them a much-needed political boost as Pakistan’s general elections approach.
On the security front, this incident has broken the long-established rules of engagement between Tehran and Islamabad, and those in Pakistan who already had a negative impression of Iran and its activities within Pakistan appear vindicated. These developments may further aggravate the “intelligence war” between the two countries, both inside and outside Pakistan. Moreover, the attack may end the patience of Pakistani security agencies regarding Iranian-backed militants in the country. Already, Pakistani officials have stepped up domestic operations against Zeinabiyoun members.
The crisis between Iran and Pakistan may have been resolved quickly, but the scars it left on the Pakistani and Iranian security establishments will take time to heal, and there may be longer-term repercussions for the bilateral relationship.
