Iranian leaders projected an image of confidence as the Islamic Republic commemorated its 45th anniversary on February 11. But despite their bombastic Revolution Day speeches, government-organized “spontaneous” rallies, military parades, and fanfare, they ought to have been concerned about the widening gap between state and society in Iran: The republic of God, the government’s own opinion polls show, rules over an increasingly secular society, in which 72.9% of the population demands separation between religion and state.

While some nondemocracies have little regard for domestic public opinion, the Islamic Republic has always been sensitive to changes in the climate of opinion and prevailing values in society, which can potentially impact regime legitimacy and ultimately the regime’s survival. Against this background, the Iranian Parliament on April 5, 2000 passed “The Third Economic, Social and Cultural Development Plan Act,” which, among other things, tasked the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance to regularly conduct comprehensive opinion polls.

Opinion polling in nondemocracies presents methodological challenges due to public distrust in the government and lack of cooperation among government agencies. For example, during early attempts at government opinion polling, the security services at times arrested ideologically nonconformist respondents, which likely compromised the scientific accuracy of the results and undercut the credibility of the polling. Nevertheless, the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance’s polling effort has hitherto resulted in three valuable volumes. The first two were published in 2000 and 2003, under President Mohammad Khatami. Khatami’s successor, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, ignored the law, and the third volume was released in 2015, under President Hassan Rouhani. The latest volume, “The Fourth Wave of the National Polling of Values and Views of Iranians” was completed under President Ebrahim Raisi and presented at a January 20 press conference. Despite the “presentation,” the book has yet to be published and distributed to libraries and bookstores, but select chapters are reportedly circulating among “policymakers and academics.”

Iranian commentators have since asked why the regime is keeping the findings of the polling secret, and those privy to parts or complete contents of it intimate what the motives behind the secrecy may be. In a February 9 post on X, previously known as Twitter, economist Parviz Khosroshahi wrote that government “compliance with the findings of this polling … equals throwing water over the fire of existing tensions in society. Attempting to change these values and viewpoints, on the other hand, will further inflame them.” On the same day, Somayeh Tohidlou, a sociologist, disclosed on X that the book is “marked classified … but its findings are remarkable and meaningful.” Abbas Abdi, who was involved in taking hostages at the U.S. Embassy in Tehran in 1979 but has since become a critic of the regime, used his February 12 column in reformist Etemad newspaper to criticize the classification of the book as secret and warned: “You can’t silence the voice of the people.”

The “voice of the people” indeed was not silenced – Chapter 8 of the book, “Religious Views and Practices,” was leaked to BBC Persian and released online February 20.

The introduction to the chapter disclosed that the polling was based on in-person interviews with 15,878 randomly selected Iranian nationals 18-years-old or older from all Iran’s 31 provinces and provincial capitals, along with representative cities and villages. Although the report itself does not explain the criteria for the questions asked, they fall into three main categories: In the first category, questions mainly addressed the so-called pillars of the faith according to Shia theology, which includes belief in the oneness of God, line of succession after the Prophet Muhammad according to Twelver-Shia doctrine, and belief in the day of judgement and the resurrection. In the second category, questions addressed the so-called ancillaries of the faith according to Twelver-Shia doctrine, including five daily prayers, fasting, pilgrimage to Mecca, and the like. In the third category, questions addressed application of religious beliefs to public life and politics.

In the first category of questions, rather than asking if the respondent believed “There is no God but God, and Muhammad is the Messenger of God,” which would potentially expose the respondent to accusations of apostasy, the pollsters asked: “How religious do you consider yourself?” Of the respondents, 10.1% answered “nonreligious,” 24.1% “modestly religious,” 23.2% “moderately religious,” 29.2% “very religious,” and 13.4% “extremely religious.” Answering the question, “How has the degree of the people’s religiosity changed compared with five years ago?” 85% of the respondents said, in their opinion, Iranians have become “less religious.” In a related question about whether Iranians will be “more religious in the coming five years,” 81% answered that Iranians will become “even less religious.”

The question about line of succession after the Prophet Muhammad according to Twelver-Shia doctrine was similarly indirect. Instead of asking whom the respondents perceive as the legitimate successor to the Prophet Muhammad, the pollsters asked: “To what extent do you love and are devoted to the household of the prophet of Islam?” Of the respondents, 6.3% answered “none,” 9.8% “modestly,” 7% “moderately,” 31.6% “significantly,” and 45.3% “very significantly.” As for the belief in the day of judgement and the resurrection, the pollsters asked if the respondents agreed with the statement: “The good and bad deeds of man are judged on the day of judgement.” Here, 6% declared themselves “totally opposed,” 9.4% “opposed,” and 7.2% “neither opposed, nor in agreement,” while 38.3% “agreed” and 39.1% “totally agreed.”

The second category began with the question of five daily prayers – 25% of respondents “totally agreed” and 36.8% “agreed” with the statement “religious devotion depends on a pure heart and not on praying prayers,” while 6.8% were “indifferent,” 21.4% “disagreed,” and 9.9% “totally disagreed.” Asked “How often do you pray?” 22.2% answered “never,” 9.7% “seldomly,” 13.3% “occasionally,” 9.3% “often,” and 45.5% “always.” The polling seems to reflect that the month of Ramadan and enforced fasting in public can be seen as an annual hassle: 27.4% of the respondents answered they “never” fast, 9.5% “seldom” fast, 11.6% “sometimes” fast, 9.5% fast “often,” and 42% “always” fast during the month of Ramadan. Pilgrimage to Mecca too appeared to have limited appeal to the respondents. Answering the question, “If the circumstances are right, how inclined are you take on pilgrimage” to Mecca?” 25% of the respondents said that they have “no inclination” to do so, and 14.3% were “modestly” inclined.

Answers to questions in the third category on application of religious principles to public life and politics are particularly damaging to the Islamic Republic: Reacting to the question: “All women must wear a hijab,” 10.8% were “totally opposed,” 34.4% “opposed,” and 13.% “neither in favor, nor opposed,” while 33% “agreed” and 7.9% “completely agreed.” Answering the question, “How do you deal with women without the hijab?” 38% answered they don’t have any problem with it, and 46% said they are opposed to it but do not interfere with women not wearing the hijab. To the proposition, “Employment of individuals at government offices should not be based on their religious beliefs,” 61.9% “totally” agreed or “agreed.” In the 2015 polling, only 42.6% of the respondents believed that employment in government should not consider the religious beliefs of job applicants.

More controversially, 47% of the respondents said they do not follow a religious leader, or source of emulation in religious affairs. And devastatingly to the Islamic Republic, 72.9% of respondents agreed with the statement: “Religion must be separated from state.” By comparison, in the 2015 polling, 30.7% of the respondents were either in agreement or total agreement with separation between religion and state.

Declining religiosity in Iran is not a unique phenomenon. Arab Barometer’s 2013 and 2018-19 studies of religiosity in 10 Arab countries showed an increase from 8% to 13% of people across the region identifying as “not religious.” The Culture and Islamic Guidance Ministry polling also shows that the average Iranian is not an atheist but holds spiritual convictions and his or her ethical codes are based on belief in afterlife and divine justice on the Day of Judgement. What the average Iranian no longer appears to believe is the authority of Shia religious leaders and the state’s interpretation of the faith. In the absence of authorities, the average Iranian appears to have developed a personalized religion in which having a “pure heart” is more important than religious practices, such as prayer, fasting, and pilgrimage to Mecca.

Less religious, opposed to state interpretation of the faith, not following religious sources of emulation, and demanding separation between religion and state, the Iranian society poses a serious threat to the religious legitimacy of the Islamic Republic. Having failed to shape the society to its liking, the question is if the republic of God is capable of adapting itself to an increasingly secular society.