On December 18, 2023, Iraq held its first provincial elections in a decade, a crucial vote amid heightened political tensions and regional instability. Over 6,000 candidates from various political groups vied for 285 seats across 15 provinces (excluding the autonomous Kurdistan region). The official results, announced just before the new year by the Independent High Electoral Commission, revealed a significant victory for pro-Iranian political groups backed by the ruling Coordination Framework alliance. The outcome mirrors their success in the 2021 parliamentary elections, raising concerns about Iraq’s future trajectory and its relationship with the West, particularly the United States.

The biggest winner among the Coordination Framework-backed groups was the Nabni (We Build) alliance that was dominated by a network of largely pro-Iranian paramilitary groups. The alliance was led by Hadi al-Amiri, a senior commander of the Popular Mobilization Forces, Nabni won an impressive 37.5% of the total vote. The Nabni alliance’s results made clear its primacy in the Shia provinces by controlling 43 seats in 10 Shia provinces. Within Nabni, the Al-Sadiqoun bloc, led by anti-U.S. Shia militia leader Qais Khazali, emerged on top with 181,000 votes surpassing Amiri’s fellow PMF Badr Organization, which received 121,000 votes.

Former Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki’s State of Law Coalition also performed well, particularly in Baghdad. Overall, Maliki’s coalition won 35 seats by garnering 567,000 votes, including 144,000 just in Baghdad, which ensured his primacy in the capital. Additionally, the Alliance of Nation State Forces led by former Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi and the leader of the Wisdom Movement, Ammar al-Hakim, won 24 seats.

Low Turnout

An electoral boycott launched by Muqtada al-Sadr, influential Shia cleric and leader of the Sadrist movement, appears to have substantially diminished voter participation. Of Iraq’s 23 million eligible voters, only 16 million registered, with only 6.6 million casting their votes. Despite the Independent High Electoral Commission’s claim of 41% voter participation, the turnout comprised a mere 26% of the eligible electorate.

The statistics reveal a broader issue: widespread voter apathy and a lack of confidence in the ability of the election process to deliver meaningful change. The victory of pro-Iranian groups, which have placed nearly 1 million people on the state payroll in recent years, comes as no surprise. The 2023 Iraqi budget hugely favored PMF-affiliated parties. The number of PMF militia personnel reportedly doubled, while the budget of the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research, led by Al-Sadiqoun, increased by 600%, and the Ministry of Transportation, led by Badr, tripled its budget. This patronage system, fueled by that government budget support and awarding of government jobs to supporters, appears to have paid off electorally, disproportionately mobilizing party loyalists and public sector beneficiaries to vote.

Setback to Opposition Groups

The absence of prominent opposition groups (including the Sadr Movement, even though Sadr was a part of the post-2003 establishment until recently) significantly swayed the provincial elections in favor of pro-Iranian groups. The boycott of the elections by Sadr, ostensibly carried out to undermine the legitimacy of the elections, and the Emtidad party’s withdrawal due to internal disputes, left the field wide open for pro-Iranian groups. This marked a notable setback for the broader Iraqi opposition movement, which had gained momentum over the past four years.

The 2019 Tishreen Movement protests led to the formation of the Emtidad party, which represents disfranchised Iraqi youth. The protesters had unprecedented success in forcing the traditional political parties that had controlled the post-2003 Iraq political landscape to make reforms. They toppled Prime Minister Adel Abdul Mahdi and forced Parliament to dissolve provincial councils and reform election laws. However, the movement splintered over internal leadership battles, ultimately preventing Emtidad from fielding candidates in the recent local elections. The group’s fractured efforts, in tandem with Sadr’s withdrawal and boycott, undercut prospects for a strong opposition and allowed pro-Iranian groups to consolidate their grip on provincial councils, snuffing out prospects for reform and heightening concerns about the influence of pro-Iranian parties and militias in Iraqi politics.

Despite Sadr’s political retreat and call for a boycott in this electoral cycle, Sadr loyalists currently hold the governorship in three crucial provinces – Najaf, Dhi Qar, and Missan – creating significant obstacles for the transition of power to newly elected officials. The pivotal question is whether Sadr will agree to relinquish control, potentially diminishing his already receding political influence and control of powerful patronage networks. If he refuses, it could create another political crisis and further chip away at public confidence in the credibility of elections.

Prime Minister Mohammed al-Sudani seems uneasy about potential unrest. Appointed in 2022 as the result of Coordination Framework political dominance at the time, he has urged the winners to let Sadr remain in control of two of the three provinces despite the election results. While Sadr’s rivals Maliki and Khazali oppose this, others among the victors in recent provincial elections appear to be open to the prime minister’s proposal. Although legally questionable, Iraq’s flexible legal system has accommodated political deals in the past, making such an arrangement possible should Sadr agree. Were he to do so, it would reinforce his and his group’s hybrid status, significantly controlling pieces of the government (and its patronage potential), while claiming outsider, if not opposition, status.

Three Key Provinces to Watch

The victory by pro-Iranian groups raises uncertainties about the future of power sharing in Iraq. Three pivotal provinces – Baghdad (the political capital), Basra (the economic capital), and Kirkuk (Iraq’s ethnosectarian mosaic) – will serve as crucial tests as to whether the victorious pro-Iranian groups will attempt to sideline their rivals or adopt a more conciliatory stance. Specifically, the handling of Sunnis, particularly Mohammed al-Halbousi, who was removed as speaker of parliament by the Supreme Court in November 2023, is a key question.

Halbousi’s Taqadum list performed well and won eight seats in Baghdad, bringing the total Sunni seats in Baghdad to 19, compared to nearly 30 seats for Shias. However, potential intra-Shia conflicts over power sharing in Baghdad could further complicate matters for Sunnis who traditionally have held the head of the provincial council in Baghdad, as the Nabni and State of Law lists each control nine seats and are vying for the governorship. One potential way to resolve the intra-Shia dispute is to increase the number of plum political positions to be handed out, by attaining full control and dividing up roles such as the governorship and head of the provincial council among rival Shia groups. If this happens, it could deprive Sunnis of power at the local level in the capital for the first time since 2003.

The Tasmeem Alliance of Asaad Al Eidani, the current governor of Basra, secured 12 out of 24 seats, including a quota seat allocated for Christians, followed by Nabni with five, State of Law with three, the Alliance of Nation State Forces with one, the Al-Asas Alliance (Base Alliance) led by Mohsen al-Mandalawi (the first deputy speaker of the Iraqi Parliament) with one, and the allocated quota seat went to the Babylon Movement, ensuring Christian representation.

Despite Eidani’s impressive win, the results of Coordination Framework-affiliated alliances and blocs, taken together, also represented a strong showing, increasing these groups’ leverage. Basra’s governor faces potential pressure from Nabni and in particular from elements in Asaib Ahl al-Haq, an Iranian-allied Shia militia. Some factions within the Coordination Framework, including Maliki’s State of Law and Qais Khazali’s Sadiqoun, seek to replace all governors and the heads of provincial councils, potentially making Eidani’s hold on power uncertain despite his Tasmeem Alliance garnering 164,774 votes – far surpassing his closest rival, Al-Sadiqoun’s Odai Awad, which won only 28,793 votes. This contrasts with the tight race between the two in the October 2021 parliamentary elections, where the margin was only 6,611 votes. Several factors contribute to Eidani’s resounding electoral victory. For example, the smear campaign during the election against Eidani – accusing him of selling “Iraqi land to Kuwait” and other corruption charges against him and his family – may have backfired. Additionally, many of Sadr’s supporters seem to have defied his boycott and voted for Eidani against his rivals.

The Coordination Framework sought judicial intervention by asking the federal court to reinterpret the 50 plus one ratio required to form the local government. The Coordination Framework’s legal strategy has proved effective in isolated instances. Fahram Haik, a Christian, won the minority quota in Basra by getting 1,375 votes, while his rival from the Babylon Movement garnered 180 votes. However, Haik was judicially disqualified under the pretext of Baathism despite being initially cleared for the elections. His seat was awarded to the Babylon Movement, which is ostensibly part of a Christian militia group aligned with Qais Khazali, the leader of Asaib Ahl al-Haq.

Furthermore, Eidani’s Shia rivals in the Coordination Framework seek to undermine him through increased judicial intervention and by enticing his allies to switch sides. Allegations of abuse of power, favoritism in land allocation, and an investigation into Eidani’s wife for money laundering have been launched by the Federal Commission of Integrity. Furthermore, there are efforts to buy off the winning members of Eidani’s alliance, getting them to switch sides and vote for Awad to become the next governor of Basra. Such poaching and seeking political benefit from a previously politicized judiciary have become common practice in Iraq.

If control of the local Basra government goes to a group affiliated with Asaib Ahl al-Haq, there may be consequences for Iraq’s relations with Gulf states and the overall stability of the region. Basra is crucial to Iraq’s economy, serving as the lifeline for oil exports and international trade. It controls the country’s sole waterway connecting Iraq to international maritime trade and occupies a strategic position between Iran and Kuwait. Additionally, it sits on the Iraqi side of the sensitive border with Kuwait and, by extension, with the Gulf Cooperation Council states. If the richest province in Iraq is governed by a close ally of the Iran-allied Khazali, it would provide significant financial, economic, security, and geopolitical leverage to Shia militia groups, who have posed threats to Gulf security in the past.

Finally, Kirkuk, Iraq’s most ethnically diverse province, is pivotal for the country’s stability. Despite Kurds losing control of the province politically and militarily in 2017, in the recent local elections, they maintained a surprising majority in both seats and votes, with the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan earning five seats and the Kurdistan Democratic Party securing two, totaling seven Kurdish seats. Arabs claimed five seats, Turkmen two, and the Christian quota seat went to a Babylon candidate affiliated with the PMF and close to the PUK.

The challenge lies in the enduring divisions between the KDP and PUK, which have obstructed the election of a Kurdish governor since the 2017 referendum on Kurdish independence. Rakan Jibouri, an Arab governor appointed by Baghdad, has held office since. Whether the KDP and PUK can bridge their differences to elect a Kurdish governor for Kirkuk remains uncertain. Arab lists have joined forces since the elections and proposed Jibouri’s reappointment. They’ve also approached Turkmen and the KDP to secure the nine votes needed to form the provincial council and elect the governor. If this happens, it could significantly weaken Kurdish influence at the national level – since it may push the PUK to strengthen alliances with Shia groups – and heighten intra-Kurdish divisions, impacting governance in the Kurdistan region.

Reviewing these provincial election results nationwide, it seems clear the Coordination Framework was able to capitalize on its victories from the October 2021 parliamentary elections to register a follow-up victory in the recent provincial council elections, despite low turnout. The results strengthen the Coordination Framework’s version of Iranian-backed, commanding Shia political influence in Iraq, at national and local levels. Although the elections were local, they could have national and regional implications. How pro-Iranian groups choose to manage their victory – through further marginalization of non-Shia rivals or with calculated inclusivity – will significantly shape Iraq’s political trajectory. The former could reinforce powerful aspects of Shia dominance, already starkly evident on the Iraqi political scene for years. With the 2025 parliamentary elections already looming, alarmed predictions regarding Shia autocracy in the country have begun to be bandied about, underpinned by fears that Sunnis and Kurds could be eventually maneuvered out of power in Baghdad. At a key provincial level, the maneuvering linked to Basra’s local council elections and Eidani’s candidacy for reelection as governor offer clues to this complicated broader political maneuvering – much of it intra-Shia but in some instances resulting in or reinforcing diminished Sunni and Kurdish political prospects. This Basra maneuvering is also significant due to its potential impact on Iraq’s foreign relations, specifically with neighboring Gulf countries. If the Coordination Council, for example, succeeds in the courts in undermining the incumbent governor’s candidacy for a second term, it could reinforce these concerns over political marginalization, felt more acutely perhaps among Sunni and Kurdish groups than among rival Shia elements, and reignite fears of overwhelming Iranian dominance in Iraq, heightening concerns that security threats to the Gulf region might escalate.