Muqtada al-Sadr’s supporters won the plurality of seats in the Iraqi Parliament in the October 2021 parliamentary elections, forming a coalition and presenting a program that would have limited Iran’s influence. However, his recent move calling for his supporters to resign from Parliament is likely to prompt a resurgence of Iranian influence. Sadr aimed to form a majoritarian government that would move beyond the traditional national-unity government arrangement that has prevailed in Iraq since 2003. He stated, for example, that he wanted a government that is “neither Eastern nor Western,” i.e., without foreign interference. He also stated that there would be no place for militias in the country if he formed the government, implying he would disarm the Iran-allied militias. Now, pressure is mounting on Sadr’s former allies, and Iranian-allied groups will either form the government or be in a better position after early elections.

This latter result is a function of Iraq’s recent political history. Iran, through political and armed supporters and proxies, gained tremendous influence in Iraq after the 2003 U.S.-led invasion. Hadi al-Amiri, a senior leader in the Coordination Framework and Popular Mobilization Forces commander, spent decades in Iran and fought alongside Iranian forces in the Iran-Iraq War. Moreover, Nuri al-Maliki, who served two terms as Iraq’s prime minister, commanded a military camp in Iran in the 1980s. After the 2003 U.S.-led invasion, and particularly after the United States’ 2011 withdrawal, Iran’s political influence became so pervasive that one scholar dubbed Tehran the king of kingmakers in Iraq.

However, declining economic and political conditions in the country created a backlash against Iran’s influence. Demonstrators, for instance, in 2019 set fire to the Iranian Consulate in Karbala and demanded that Iran cease its interference in Iraq. A few weeks later, the demonstrators set fire to the Iranian Consulate in Najaf and chanted “Iran out of Iraq.” The mounting social pressure forced the Iraqi government to resign and call for early elections. Sadr’s list won the plurality of votes and aimed at forming a majoritarian government, contrary to Iran’s wishes. This prodded Brigadier General Ismail Qaani, head of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ Quds Force, to visit Sadr more than once. Sadr’s adamance on excluding Iran’s allies, especially Maliki, played a large role in creating the political deadlock since the October 2021 elections over the formation of the government. After Sadr departed from the political scene, the Coordination Framework, which is comprised of Iranian-aligned figures and groups, won most of the seats left by Sadr’s bloc, a result that may damage Sadr’s credibility as a partner at future junctures of horse trading and coalition building, when potential political allies consider aligning with him.

The Sunni Sovereignty bloc, led by Speaker of the Parliament Mohammed Halbousi and businessman Khamis al-Khanjar, had allied with Sadr in an attempt to form a majoritarian government, but they faced tremendous pressure from Iran and its allies to split from his coalition. Sunni political parties were uniquely united during the 2021 elections. However, this Sunni bloc faces tremendous challenges. Even before Sadr’s political forces and allies withdrew from the Parliament, there was an attack on Halbousi’s political party headquarters. Another attack targeted the headquarters of Khanjar’s Azm Party. Iranian-aligned figures have also resurrected previously sidelined Sunni politicians to sow discord within the Sunni camp. In the middle of the political jostling between Sadr and his Sunni allies, on the one hand, and the Coordination framework on the other, Rafia al-Issawi, a former finance minister and popular Sunni leader, was released from prison. In addition, Ali Hatam Suleiman, another popular Sunni politician, was allowed to return to Baghdad after charges against him were dropped. Suleiman was accused of terrorism, and was exiled for eight years after clashing with Maliki. Iran’s supporters appear to be using a carrot-and-stick approach to co-opt Sunni politicians, aiming to fragment the Sunni camp in any future elections and to make it easier to pressure its leaders.

The Kurdistan Democratic Party has equally faced pressure from pro-Iranian forces to break from Sadr’s bloc. The current political standoff over Iraq’s presidency between Masoud Barzani, head of the KDP and the former president of the Kurdistan Regional Government, and those aligned with the Coordination Framework reflects political tensions with a long history. In a meeting with a high-level U.S. delegation, Barzani complained about the role of Shia militias in 2017. In return, Shia militias vowed to fight Kurdish forces after Barzani called for a referendum on the independence of Kurdistan. In 2020 the supporters of the Shia militias stormed the KDP office in Baghdad and set it ablaze. The protesters also burned the Kurdish flag and stepped on pictures of Barzani. In addition, there have been several attacks on Erbil by Iranian-backed forces to pressure Barzani into reconsidering his political alliance with Sadr. The KDP’s alliance with Sadr brought on pressure from Iran. Now, with the withdrawal of Sadr, the pressure is mounting further. For instance, a leader in the Iranian-allied Fatah Alliance issued a direct threat against both Halbousi and Barzani. He said that he would drag both of them into a government that will be formed by the Coordination Framework, threatening that there are six Popular Mobilization Forces brigades on the border with Kurdistan.

Sadr’s gambit may be a tactical maneuver to hand over the country to Iran’s allies with the strategic aim of pulling the rug from under their feet because of mounting social pressure on the political system. It remains unclear whether such a strategy will work and how long, if successful, it would take to bear fruit. Regardless of the merits of this strategy, Iran’s allies will gain much more influence in the government in the short and intermediate term. They will certainly use the Iraqi state’s resources not only to strengthen their position but also to pressure Sadr’s former political allies. At least in the short term, Iran’s influence will expand, especially as the Sunnis and Kurds lack the political power to face the Coordination Framework without Sadr. Although Sadr has been counted out many times before and has managed to reassert his and his followers’ influence, it is hard to see how his current gambit doesn’t, for the foreseeable future, aid his political rivals at his expense.