After winning India’s general elections in June by a slender majority, Prime Minister Narendra Modi has encountered deepening challenges in the Middle East – a region that generously credited him many foreign policy successes in the last decade. During his first two terms in office (2014-19 and 2019-24), Modi’s renewed focus and proactive approach toward the Middle East – an area previous Indian prime ministers have long considered fraught with uncertainty and too volatile and risky to engage – rejuvenated hopes about India’s ability to navigate the region’s intricate web of rivalries and conflicts.

Modi’s approach has been guided by the country’s “India First” and “The world is one family” philosophies. In his first term, Modi’s visits to the United Arab Emirates in 2015, Saudi Arabia and Iran in 2016, Israel in 2017, and Ramallah in 2018 set the tone for deeper engagement in the Middle East. In his second term, Modi played a key role in facilitating initiatives such as the I2U2 grouping, comprised of India, Israel, the UAE, and the United States, in 2022 and the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor, or IMEC, in 2023. While still working through implementation challenges, these efforts strengthened India’s diplomatic and economic presence. At the same time, Modi’s focus on building personal relations with Gulf Arab leaders and ties with the Indian diaspora cemented stronger political and people-to-people connections in the region. Now, in Modi’s third term, the challenge of maintaining a cohesive foreign policy amid domestic coalition constraints and the shifting geopolitical landscape of the Middle East has become increasingly pronounced.

Despite the electoral setbacks suffered in early June, including losing the single-party majority in Parliament and adding constraints imposed by domestic coalition politics, Modi has retained the freedom to shape foreign policy, ensuring continuity in his approach on the Middle East. On the domestic front, Modi faces the challenge of maintaining tight control over the National Democratic Alliance, a coalition of political parties led by the right-wing pro-Hindu Bharatiya Janata Party, with divergent policy agendas. However, on foreign policy matters, their differences are less pronounced and have a minimal impact on Modi’s overarching approach.

Similarly, the opposition Indian National Development Inclusive Alliance, or INDIA, bloc’s singular focus on domestic rather than foreign policy issues ­has enabled Modi to sustain his pragmatic policy toward the Middle East. However, Modi and the NDA must navigate pressure from the main opposition Congress Party, historically a strong supporter of the Palestinian cause, which has strongly criticized Israel’s actions in Gaza.

Modi’s third term will be defined by the challenge of balancing internal dynamics while pursuing ambitious foreign policy goals. Steering India’s Middle East strategy amid uncertainty and long-term instability will require securing energy supplies amid escalating violence, building defense capabilities in the face of disruptions to weapons and military technology transfers, and enhancing trade through strategic partnerships during a period of economic volatility.

Strategic Continuity

Since the beginning of his third term in office, Modi has demonstrated a will to continue to advance his Middle East policy, particularly engagement with the Gulf Cooperation Council countries, Israel, and Iran. During the G7 summit in Italy in June, India and other countries reiterated their desire to promote Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment initiatives, including flagship projects such as the nearly 3,000 milelong IMEC road, railroad, and shipping network connecting Asia, the Middle East, and the West.

S. Jaishankar’s visit to the UAE, within two weeks of his reappointment in June as the country’s external affairs minister, demonstrated the importance India attaches to maintaining close ties with the Gulf Arab states. While the Israel-Hamas conflict and its implications for the region were discussed during the visit, India and the UAE prioritized reviewing their comprehensive strategic partnership elevated in 2015 as well as the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement signed in 2022. In September, India and the UAE signed an agreement between Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited and Emirates Nuclear Energy Cooperation for the operation and maintenance of the UAE’s Barakah nuclear power plant. This was preceded by a 15-year agreement between the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company and Indian Oil Corporation Limited for the supply of 1 million metric tons of liquefied national gas per year to India. India-UAE trade reached nearly $84 billion in fiscal year 2023-24 and is expected to exceed $100 billion annually within the next five years.

Jaishankar also visited Qatar in late June. Although India’s bilateral trade with Qatar only reached $14.08 billion from 2023-24, Qatar remains a key player in India’s strategic calculations, particularly through its role as India’s largest supplier of natural gas. In February, India and Qatar signed a long-term energy agreement, providing India with 7.5 million metric tons of LNG annually for 20 years beginning in 2028. Additionally, Qatar’s influence with nonstate actors beyond the Middle East, including the Taliban in Afghanistan, mediation efforts in regional conflicts, such as the war in Gaza, and strategic location in the Gulf position Doha as an indispensable strategic partner for India in navigating the evolving regional dynamics.

India has also maintained a strong defense partnership with Israel. India, Israel’s largest defense buyer, reportedly imported $2.9 billion in military hardware from Israel over the last decade. However, imports have been delayed due to the war in Gaza. Reports of India’s secret arms exports to Israel during the conflict have stirred controversy, though these claims have been denied, and defense sources have said that India made a “policy decision” not to supply artillery shells to Israel. India and Israel have collaborated on the manufacturing of advanced weapon systems, including the Hermes-900 unmanned aerial vehicle, produced by India’s Adani Defence and Aerospace in collaboration with Israeli firm Elbit.

At the same time, India has nurtured ties with Iran. Indian Minister of Highways and Road Transport Nitin Gadkari attended the July inauguration of President Masoud Pezeshkian. During the visit, India and Iran assessed progress on the development of Chabahar port. In May, India signed a 10-year agreement committing to invest $120 million for the development of the Shahid Beheshti Terminal at Chabahar port besides offering a credit window of $250 million for infrastructure upgrades. At the point of Gadkari’s visit, the loading and unloading of goods at Chabahar port had increased by 62% – in the first four months of the year – compared to the same period in 2023.

Iran is India’s main partner in the International North-South Transport Corridor, a transregional network of roads, railways, and shipping routes connecting India to Central Asia, Russia, and Europe through Iran’s Chabahar port. For India, Iran is key in its efforts to facilitate the construction of such transnational corridors that Delhi hopes will promote economic growth and strategic partnerships with competing actors across the Middle East and Central Asia. Israel also plays an important role in this corridor, with the port of Haifa on the Mediterranean serving as a transit hub and a gateway for entry into Europe. The port was purchased in 2023 by a consortium led by India’s Adani Group.

Challenges to India’s Balancing Act in the Middle East

Shifting geopolitical dynamics in the Middle East are creating new obstacles for Modi’s multialignment strategy ­of engaging in strategic partnerships with rival actors without compromising India’s strategic autonomy. Worsening conflicts such as the war in Gaza, escalating tensions between Israel and Hezbollah, a potential confrontation between Israel and Iran, and U.S. warnings regarding sanctions for countries doing business with Iran are threatening India’s energy and economic ties. The war in Gaza has stalled the IMEC project, although India’s external affairs minister has expressed confidence that work on the corridor would resume after the war. The war has also hindered progress on the International North-South Transport Corridor. Additionally, growing international pressure on Israel has further exposed India’s vulnerabilities due to its excessive dependency on defense imports. According to reports, India accounted for nearly 9.8% of total global arms imports from 2019-23 and was the fourth-largest recipient of military hardware from Israel. Further, ongoing tensions in the Middle East have hardened Iran’s position toward India, as Tehran intermittently criticizes India’s treatment of its Muslim population.

Balancing India’s historical support for the Palestinian cause with its strong defense partnership with Israel and interest in advancing multilateral initiatives such as I2U2 and IMEC amid ongoing tensions presents a delicate policy dilemma. India condemned the October 7, 2023 Hamas attacks on Israel. In October 2023, India abstained from a United Nations General Assembly vote on a proposed U.N. resolution because it failed to condemn Hamas attacks. Additionally, in mid-September, India abstained from a U.N. General Assembly vote on a resolution demanding an end to Israel’s illegal occupation of Palestinian territory within a year.

While explaining India’s decision to abstain, India’s ambassador to the U.N. emphasized that India remains a strong advocate of dialogue and diplomacy, stressing that there are “no winners in conflict” and maintaining a need for a two-state solution for the Israelis and Palestinians. He reiterated that India’s position on the conflict in Gaza has been “clear and consistent,” as it condemns the loss of civilian lives and calls for an immediate cease-fire and release of hostages. India urged both sides to build bridges not further the divides. India has contributed over $35 million to the U.N. Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees to support education, health care, and social services for Palestinian refugees.

Balancing Strategic Interests

At the U.N. General Assembly in New York in September, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu presented two visions for the Middle East – one as a “blessing” symbolized by IMEC and another as a “curse,” depicting a “map of an arc of terror that Iran has created and imposed from the Indian Ocean to the Mediterranean.” India is trying to navigate these contrasting visions carefully, signaling a preference for stability and cooperation without becoming entangled in regional confrontations.

With the war in Gaza ongoing, escalating tensions between Israel and Hezbollah following the killing of Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah, and the threat of an expanded regional war very real, Modi’s strategy in his third term reveals a deliberate effort to maintain strategic autonomy while navigating the complex and volatile Middle East. This nuanced position reflects India’s long-term interests in securing uninterrupted energy supplies, advancing defense capabilities through modernization, and deepening economic ties with the GCC states, Israel, and Iran. As the Middle East adapts to a new normal – where conflict and cooperation coexist – India is signaling its renewed intent to avoid entanglements in regional rivalries, focusing instead on pragmatic engagement that protects its national interests.