The devastating Israel-Hamas conflict in Gaza and other aspects of the aftermath of Hamas’ October 7 attack on southern Israel are reverberating throughout the Middle East. Policies and strategic calculations are being reshaped, not least among deeply divided Gulf Arab countries. With Qatar continuing to support Hamas while successfully brokering hostage releases and the United Arab Emirates most explicitly condemning Hamas’ attack, Gulf Cooperation Council countries are maneuvering to adjust to the unfolding situation. Perhaps most meaningfully, Saudi Arabia says that it has frozen talks with the United States regarding a potential triangular agreement involving diplomatic normalization with Israel. The region is bracing for what unfolds on the ground as Israel’s offensive appears to be underway and, particularly, for the prospects of a wider conflict involving other pro-Iranian militias, most alarmingly Hezbollah in Lebanon.
Does a significant range of Gulf responses reveal persistent, deep divisions within the GCC? How would Gulf states react to a wider conflict? Can Gulf countries that have normalized relations with Israel, or were discussing doing so, play any role in moderating Israeli conduct and limiting the humanitarian catastrophe for Palestinians in Gaza? What will Gulf countries be willing or able to do to support reconstruction in a postconflict Gaza? How will the conflict affect Gulf relations with Iran and the United States? And, finally, what does the apparent revival of potent Arab sentiments in favor of Palestinians and their national cause mean for Gulf Arab countries?
