On January 17, the presidents of Iran and Russia met in Moscow to sign a strategic partnership agreement, establishing deeper bilateral ties for the next two decades. The treaty, aimed at enhancing trade and security cooperation, comes following the sudden downfall of their common ally, Bashar al-Assad, in Syria.
While to an American audience its timing – days before President Donald J. Trump returned to office – suggests strategic messaging, the implications go beyond Washington’s perception of an anti-Western alliance. As Tehran aims to recover from military setbacks experienced in 2024, Moscow’s closer engagement with Iran could influence this process significantly, with substantial consequences for Middle East security, especially in the Gulf.
More crucially, the agreement elevates nuclear and space technology cooperation to unprecedented levels. While officially framed for civilian purposes, these exchanges raise concerns over potential military applications, mainly as Iran advances its ballistic missile program and space ambitions. The treaty also formalizes the technological collaboration that had been developing informally over the past decade, raising questions among Gulf and Western officials about the potential ramifications of this intensified partnership.
Nuclear Cooperation Beyond Energy?
Officially, Russia has maintained an ambivalent stance regarding Iran’s nuclear program amid international concerns over Tehran’s intentions. Since the 1990s, Russia has assisted Iran in developing its civilian nuclear sector, notably through the construction of the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant. This collaboration, however, has always been subject to global political shifts. While Moscow has contributed to Iran’s civilian nuclear projects, it has also used its involvement as leverage in its relations with the West, reflecting Moscow’s broader diplomatic positioning rather than a steadfast strategic alignment with Tehran.
While no clear evidence currently indicates Russia has provided direct military nuclear assistance to Iran, the worsening geopolitical climate and their growing mutual reliance could alter Moscow’s calculus. Hamidreza Azizi, visiting fellow at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs, explained: “What has changed now is that, unlike in the past, Russia’s break with Europe appears definitive, reducing its previous hesitations over how this collaboration might impact its standing with Western powers.”
With both countries facing intensified Western sanctions – though the United States has recently signaled a potential shift toward easing restrictions, European measures remain stringent – Russia appears increasingly inclined to support Iran’s nuclear program. The January treaty further institutionalizes this cooperation, prompting questions about whether Moscow’s involvement will remain confined to civilian projects or extend into more sensitive domains. During Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian’s visit to Moscow, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced Russia’s interest in building new nuclear power units in Iran – a move that has raised concerns over Tehran’s nuclear ambitions and the potential role of Russian assistance in advancing them.
Recent reports suggest that Russia may have shared technical knowledge of nuclear fuel fabrication with Iran in exchange for missile deliveries to support its war effort in Ukraine. While both sides deny these claims, their defense-industrial cooperation’s opacity heightens Western concerns.
According to Mohammed Al-Basha of the Risk Advisory Firm Basha Report: “Gulf states are increasingly alarmed by the deepening cooperation between Russia and Iran, which encompasses sweeping defense and nuclear energy collaboration. This alliance is seen as a game changer that could embolden Iran’s ambitions and upset the regional security balance.”
As military and security interdependence between Iran and Russia grows, Moscow’s ability to pressure Tehran into maintaining a civilian-only nuclear program diminishes. In fact, Russia may even have an incentive to look the other way – or subtly encourage nuclear advancements – to prevent any future rapprochement between Iran and the West that could undermine Moscow’s strategic interests.
Space Cooperation: Launching Capabilities and Concerns
Likewise, Russia is deepening its space cooperation with Iran, with Tehran seeking to capitalize on Moscow’s isolation from the West to secure advanced technology. This partnership gained momentum in 2022 when Russia launched Iran’s Khayyam satellite from Kazakhstan’s Baikonur Cosmodrome using a Soyuz-2.1b rocket. The launch immediately raised concerns in the West about potential military and intelligence applications.
A December 2022 agreement between Roscosmos and Iran’s Space Agency further paved the way for joint projects, testing, and infrastructure development. Subsequent launches, including the Pars-1, Kowsar, and Hodhod satellites in 2024, significantly improved Iran’s surveillance capabilities over the Gulf and Israel. U.S. intelligence also claims that Russia has provided technical support to Iran’s Space Launch Vehicle program, which shares critical technologies with intercontinental ballistic missile systems.
Iranian ambitions extend to the Chabahar spaceport, which is slated to become western Asia’s largest launch site by 2028. Its proximity to the equator optimizes fuel efficiency for satellite launches. Yet Tehran’s progress remains dependent on Russian expertise and access to Russian and Kazakh launch facilities. Iran’s space aspirations align with its broader strategy of countering Western technological dominance. In particular, Iran aims to develop an independent satellite navigation system akin to Russia’s Glonass to reduce its reliance on U.S.-operated GPS services, which Tehran sees as a critical national vulnerability.
The geopolitical implications of these developments are significant. As Iran seeks autonomy in space-based communications and navigation, it nevertheless risks further entrenching its dependence on Russian resources. For Moscow, meanwhile, this partnership bolsters its Middle Eastern footprint while showcasing its ability to cultivate non-Western technological alliances amid its diplomatic isolation.
Iran’s Deterrence Strategy at a Crossroad
For decades, Iran avoided direct military confrontation, relying on a “forward defense” doctrine centered on ballistic missiles, drones, and proxy forces. However, recent setbacks – Israel’s systematic killings of key Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and proxy leaders, the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria, and precision attacks on Iran’s missile production facilities – have prompted internal debates over shifting toward a nuclear-based deterrence. While public rhetoric emphasizes civilian applications, internal discourse reflects growing support for potential weaponization. “The crumbling Iranian deterrence system has heightened regional and international concerns that Tehran might take drastic, unprecedented steps to restore its strategic leverage,” wrote Mohammad Alzghool, head of the Iranian Studies Unit at the Emirates Policy Center.
Although the latest U.S. intelligence indicates that Iran is not actively building a nuclear weapon, it remains a threshold nuclear state. According to February 2025 International Atomic Energy Agency quarterly reports, Tehran’s stockpile of 60% enriched uranium has exceeded 275 kilograms – enough for multiple nuclear devices if further enriched to weapons-grade levels.
Iran’s ballistic missile program has also rapidly advanced over the past decade, with a growing arsenal of short-, medium-, and long-range systems, many of which are potentially nuclear capable. Reportedly, Tehran is integrating maneuverable reentry vehicles to enhance missile precision and penetration of air defenses. In October 2024, Iran reportedly utilized two of its most advanced domestically produced medium-range ballistic missiles – the Kheibar-Shekan and the Fattah – during its latest missile bombardment on Israel.
Not least, recent European intelligence reports suggest that Iran has received shipments of missile propellant components from China, potentially enabling the production of hundreds of additional medium-range ballistic missiles despite the extensive damage to its production facilities because of Israeli strikes.
Implications for Regional Actors
For Gulf states, these technological advancements raise alarms about shifting regional dynamics. Iran’s nuclear threshold status, coupled with its improved missile and space capabilities, is increasingly seen as a direct challenge to the region’s security architecture. Iran’s nuclear ambitions are also a geopolitical bargaining tool. As Iran moves closer to nuclear threshold status, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia are likely to accelerate their own nuclear programs. Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has previously stated that Riyadh will seek nuclear capability if Iran develops a weapon. The UAE, which has operated a civilian nuclear program since 2020, may similarly reconsider its policy of nonenrichment.
Beyond proliferation concerns, Russia’s engagement in Yemen has also heightened regional anxieties. Reports suggest that Moscow is not only providing intelligence and military support to the Houthis but is also involved in illicit grain and fuel exports through a covert dark fleet, further complicating regional stability. “Russia’s dual role as both an ally to Iran and a growing supporter of nonstate actors like the Houthis raises critical questions about its neutrality as a mediator,” Al-Basha explained. “As Gulf countries enhance their missile defense systems, bolster intelligence sharing with Western allies, and modernize their military assets, they are effectively hedging against a backdrop of shifting global alliances and an uncertain U.S. commitment.”
The broader question is whether Gulf states see Russia as a potential mediator in restraining Iran’s nuclear ambitions or as a partner complicit in Tehran’s nuclear advances. If Iran continues expanding its nuclear program with Russian support, the regional security architecture will face profound shifts.
