Since President Bashar al-Assad fled Syria on December 8, 2024, Syrians have had mixed expectations and varying views on this sudden, unexpected shift. Initially, the prevailing mood, however, was one of joy and relief because people felt that the oppressive chapter of Assad had come to an end and that new possibilities for the country and economy had begun to emerge. Ahmed al-Sharaa, the head of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, was seen as the liberator. How his forces entered the cities – peacefully and showing respect for citizens of all backgrounds and sects – was unexpected from HTS.

After the initial shock, a realization set in regarding the critical issues threatening this transitional phase. In speaking with Syrians during a visit to the country, it is clear there are several key concerns regarding the economy, security, and society.

The Economy and Inclusiveness

The Assad regime’s economy was built on corruption, Captagon trade, and a murky financial system jerry-rigged to evade international sanctions. After the regime’s fall, the economy, which was already in steep decline, plummeted, and the interim government had no clear strategy for reviving a shattered economy overseen by the heavily sanctioned Central Bank of Syria. This deepening economic decline – reinforced by news indicating that any sanctions relief would be piecemeal and restrained – shifted the mood in the streets from joy to despair and anger.

While the United States and Europe offered temporary sanctions relief for some sectors, this was insufficient to drive long-term investments – either from Syrian or foreign investors – to support the economy and create jobs. The destruction is too vast – across Hama, Salamiyah, Homs, Aleppo, Azaz, and the surrounding countryside, with the country in need of urgent, extensive rebuilding, that Syrians are eager to start. And the sanctions relief has been far too limited and begrudging to have much impact on the choking economic sanctions layered on by the international community over several decades.

The economic situation is becoming increasingly dire and urgently needs to be addressed to avoid backlash against the new government or further insecurity that could exacerbate social and political divisions. Much of this is not new. According to the World Bank, as of 2022, 69% of Syrians – around 14.5 million people – were living in poverty, with extreme poverty concentrated in three key areas: Hama, Aleppo, and Deir al-Zour. These regions, with their histories of deep division and conflict, are critical to maintaining stability. Without massive infusions of investment and reconstruction assistance to boost the impact of humanitarian assistance, this human suffering the economy is inflicting on Syria’s people will continue. And yet with the current international sanctions regime still firmly in place, little to none of this investment and rebuilding assistance can get in.

Prices have surged, with items such as bread, gas cylinders, and bus fares becoming unaffordable for the average citizen. However, new foreign goods have appeared in markets, such as bananas from Idlib and Turkey. But these goods are not accessible to the poorest families or employees whose salaries have been decimated by years of massive inflation and currency devaluations. The Syrian pound’s plummeting value against the U.S. dollar is exacerbating the situation. While the new government has recognized the dire economic challenges people are facing, and announced a recent 400% wage increase for public sector employees, insufficient funding seems to have caused delays and government backtracking about which employees are eligible for the raise. The more serious issue is that the impact of the wage increase for individual wage-earners and their families is negligible, given a decade of ruinous spikes in cost of living in Syria, in tandem with stagnant salaries. The government may find itself unable to fulfill even this limited commitment: While Qatar publicly committed to paying for a significant increase in salaries for government employees, recent reports indicate that U.S. economic sanctions still in place seem to be preventing the Qataris from fulfilling the pledge.

The massive economic challenges are hamstringing the government’s ability to provide services and raising questions about its ability to govern effectively. While much of this poor performance lies at the doorstep of international sanctions and an economic disaster the Assad regime bequeathed Syria’s new leaders, it is not stopping Syrians from second-guessing the interim government’s choices and competence. Although Syrians have long tolerated power shortages, they are asking: When will the electricity return to even seven hours a day? They believe that efficiency is a challenge for most of the interim government’s appointed ministers. While officials seem to be succeeding in Idlib, they seem overwhelmed by the issues facing the entire country. To improve efficiency, many Syrians believe the president must seek more local-level consultation and appoint more skilled technocrats who can help resolve obstacles, such as central bank policy, reconnection of the electrical grid, and reconstruction of infrastructure and homes. Additionally, many Syrians think the government should seek advice from experts abroad – Syrians who have studied and worked in Europe and the United States over the last decade – who could offer advanced models for reconstruction, communication infrastructure, and economic planning.

The dire economic conditions in the country are also prompting an apparent disconnect between the Syrian population and international community about the priority going forward. While foreign diplomats call for an inclusive government based on religious, sectarian, and national affiliation, Syrians inside the country are demanding an inclusive government based on qualification and effectiveness in addressing the daunting economic challenges the country faces. In the recurring, inevitably distorting, dichotomy in Syria, often captured in shorthand by some variation of the phrase “between bread and freedom,” economic privations have caused the pendulum, for now, to swing toward a focus on resolving Syria’s myriad economic challenges.

Civilian Security

It isn’t only the economy that worries Syrians. Following the fall of the regime, there is a palpable sense of chaos and a lack of clear authority in everyday life. In Damascus, only HTS military personnel are seen in major areas, providing a sense of security and attempting to organize traffic – though with limited success. This is a consequence not only of limited HTS capacity, now stretched to its limits by the need to run an entire country rather than part of one province. It is also a symptom of the abrupt breakdown of traditional security structures. Police stations and courts were closed in most cities in the initial days after the Assad regime collapsed, and thefts – both of cars and homes – became widespread due to the shortage of newly trained police.

Regime-era police officers, rarely completely effective when on the job due to prevalence of bribe taking or more egregious criminal behavior, were no longer present at all in most instances, leaving a security vacuum. Though this eliminated organized institutionalized crime committed by the Syrian police, it left the public vulnerable to petty theft and a complete collapse in the structures and appearance of law enforcement, creating a sense of insecurity, particularly in residential areas.

In conversations with residents, no one wanted the old police back, even the traffic officers who were notorious for extorting bribes in exchange for avoiding fines. Nonetheless, Syrians need security to feel safe in their daily lives, and more police personnel are urgently needed across the country. While conditions seem to be improving, the situation requires more time to stabilize – especially at night.

Sectarian Security and Transitional Justice

In mixed-sect areas such as Homs, HTS has put in place measures to prevent sectarian tensions from escalating. HTS has set up checkpoints across the city to inspect vehicles and question passengers. These measures aim to prevent vengeance attacks, particularly perpetrated by people who have lost loved ones or suffered under the regime’s loyalists.

In these sensitive areas, people from different sects – including Alawites who were not involved in any crimes – said they felt protected by Sharaa’s approach to transitional justice. His policy focuses on individual “accountability based on systematic violations,” led by the government using transitional justice imperatives rather than individual or group acts of vengeance against entire sects. Many Alawites fear retribution from fellow citizens who have suffered greatly. They see Sharaa’s approach as just and equitable. The challenge for the Sharaa government on this front will be to convince members of Syria’s other sects and ethnic groups, whose members suffered mightily at the hands of a regime that became increasingly defined by its Alawite affiliations, that individually prosecuted cases based on law and judicial procedure are sufficient to address the heinous crimes that members of this regime committed.

Although sectarian tensions have not erupted into the bloodbath some feared, many Syrians are still angry, unsure of who is truly responsible for their suffering. A major challenge will be determining who is accountable for the killings, torture, and destruction wrought by the regime’s forces – who gassed entire villages, raped citizens, and trafficked bodies.

No Turning Back

In discussions with military personnel, many agreed with Sharaa’s approach to accountability. They emphasized that all Syrians, whether from the Sunni or Alawite sect, must be held accountable for their individual crimes. This reflects a deep level of awareness and maturity that came from the liberation process and the hardships of the last 14 years.

Whether talking with average Syrians or military and security personnel, the conversation often returned to the person of Sharaa: Is he the man of the hour? Is he up to the job of leading Syria at this time of critical challenges and fragile transition? The initial, provisional answers Syrians are giving is “yes,” evident in the perhaps overly optimistic formulation of one of the members of the Free Syrian Army: “This man – Al-Sharaa – can do anything. If he succeeded in removing sectarian hatred from the hearts of all those soldiers during the liberation, then he can do anything.” While Sharaa has been remarkably successful on the international stage, he now faces the challenge of unifying Syrians internally and convincing them that he and his evolving HTS movement can lead this post-Assad transition responsibly. They will need to evolve again and become a movement that speaks to and captures the aspirations of all the Syrian people and addresses their pressing economic concerns and their need for rebuilt, responsive, representative institutions of governance and security. Moving from Abu Mohammad al-Jolani, his nom de guerre, to President Ahmed al-Sharaa, without turning back, will require a series of bold decisions. Syrians, people in the region, and others will be watching and assessing if he is up to the task.