Qatar’s November 8 decision to evict Hamas leaders from Doha, prompted by U.S. pressure, marked a significant shift in regional diplomacy. The decision was largely brought about by the stalled progress on cease-fire negotiations and hostage releases between Israel and Hamas, particularly following the execution of hostages in recent months, including a U.S. citizen.
Hamas was initially widely expected to go to Turkey, but questions remain about the permanence of both its departure from Qatar and welcome in Turkey. The practical effect on the Israel-Hamas conflict appears limited. Despite the value of maintaining diplomatic channels, Israel’s unwavering stance on dismantling Hamas – and its demonstrated commitment to this goal – suggests that relocating Hamas’ political office is unlikely to fundamentally alter the conflict’s trajectory.
Support From Qatar
Since 2012, Doha has served as the headquarters for Hamas’ international political office – an arrangement orchestrated by the United States, with Israel’s active acquiescence. This pragmatic decision reflected a shared understanding between the United States and Israel regarding the necessity for stable communication channels with the Hamas leadership, with Qatar serving as a capable intermediary. For Qatar, this role enhanced its strategic value to U.S. policymakers, a perennial priority for the Gulf state.
This arrangement proved largely successful for a decade. Hamas consolidated its local authority in Gaza while receiving billions in aid through Qatar and other channels. This funding supported its civil administration and, as is now evident, the construction of an extensive underground military infrastructure throughout Gaza. The apparent stability in Gaza satisfied multiple strategic objectives: preventing the emergence of more extreme groups like Islamic Jihad, while maintaining a fractured Palestinian opposition that kept Hamas and Fatah divided – a core goal of successive Israeli administrations. This passive crisis management approach appeared successful until the catastrophic October 7, 2023 attacks.
Israel’s policy toward Hamas operated along two increasingly contradictory tracks. While pursuing limited engagement through Qatari mediation – occasionally yielding results including a November 2023 cease-fire – Israel simultaneously sought to fundamentally alter the status quo by dismantling Hamas’ military capabilities. This latter goal, however, proved impossible without the destruction of Hamas as it exists and major destruction of infrastructure in Gaza, with a concomitantly high level of civilian death. Set against this background, room for Hamas to negotiate diminished to a demand for it to self-destruct or suffer ongoing attack.
Turkey Bound?
Reports indicate that the Hamas office in Doha has ceased to function and some elites, such as the group’s leader outside Gaza, Khalil al-Hayya, have moved to Turkey. However, some Hamas representatives remain in Qatar, as indicated by apparent progress with some ongoing negotiations. Nonetheless, Hamas leaders and operatives are no strangers to Turkey. The Turkish government has hosted and supported the group for many years logistically and allegedly financially. More recently, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan reaffirmed his support for the group, arguing, to considerable cost and international criticism, that “Hamas is not a terrorist organization, but a liberation group, a mujahideen group that struggles to protect its lands and citizens.”
None of this, however, suggests that Turkey will become a new base for Hamas. While Erdogan’s government can weather diplomatic criticism for rhetorical support of Hamas, hosting its operational headquarters would carry substantially greater costs both regionally and internationally.
Polls in Gaza indicate that Hamas’ popularity has risen in recent months. However, it remains unclear if this is representative of wider populations around the Arab world. However, key regional governments seem not to be fans of the group, seeing it as a retrograde Islamist organization that has brought on the immiseration of its people, although some governments in the region have responded to intense public anger over the past year by accusing Israel of genocide and allowing surrogates to reference Palestinians’ right to resist occupation. Nonetheless, as Islamist leanings become ever less popular as drivers of government policy, for Erdogan to facilitate such a quintessentially Islamist and violent group as Hamas would be out of step.
Moreover, embracing Hamas would significantly strain Turkish-U.S. relations at a critical juncture. The administration of President Joseph R. Biden Jr. places considerable responsibility on Hamas for its perceived intransigence in cease-fire negotiations. Supporting an organization increasingly viewed as an obstacle to de-escalation would further complicate Turkey’s already delicate diplomatic position. This calculus becomes even more precarious with the incoming administration of President-elect Donald J. Trump, in which pro-Israeli sentiment could transform support for Hamas into a serious strategic liability.
Qatar: Black Swan Prevention
Qatar’s approach to foreign policy reflects dual imperatives: exercising pragmatic caution while seeking opportunities to establish itself as a distinctive diplomatic player. This careful positioning has helped Qatar develop specific forms of influence valued by partners such as the United States.
This duality is evident in Qatar’s track record. When necessary, Doha has demonstrated tactical flexibility, moderating Al Jazeera’s coverage of Saudi Arabia in the 2000s to repair bilateral relations and expelling various Islamist leaders during the 2014 Gulf diplomatic crisis to meet regional demands. Simultaneously, Qatar has cultivated a unique diplomatic niche by engaging with controversial but strategically significant actors, including Hamas, numerous Islamist groups during the Arab Spring uprisings, and the Afghan Taliban. Notably, Qatar also played a – or even the – key role in encouraging the Jabhat al-Nusra to give up its al-Qaeda affiliations and morph into Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, the umbrella group that led the toppling over recent days of the Baathist party in Syria after over six decades in power. It is, consequently, unsurprising that today Qatar looks ideally placed to open up lines of with Syria’s leading rebel group-cum-proto government.
These engagements typically occur either at Western powers’ explicit request or in close coordination with Western political and security services. The rewards have been substantial: effusive praise from the U.S. director of central intelligence, public thanks from senior U.S. diplomats, and elevation to non-NATO ally status.
Yet the Israeli-Hamas conflict remains uniquely volatile in global politics. While mediating regional tensions offers diplomatic prestige and supporting core U.S. foreign policy objectives aligns with Qatar’s long-term strategy, these calculations carry significant risks. Qatar’s recent experience with black swan events – notably the 2017-21 boycott of Qatar by its Gulf neighbors – has shaped its risk assessment. The boycott’s unprecedented scale, despite Qatar’s ultimate resilience, demonstrated how seemingly manageable policy choices can trigger disproportionate responses.
More recently, Texas A&M University’s decision to withdraw from Qatar, though primarily driven by domestic U.S. politics, exemplifies how Qatar’s broader reputation can backfire. These experiences have prompted a more conservative risk appetite in Doha, particularly anticipating a Trump presidency. Trump’s mercurial decision making and his initial support for the boycotting states in 2017 suggest that additional caution may be warranted.
Implications
Israel seeks to reshape Palestinian politics through unprecedented force, aiming to create conditions incompatible with Hamas’ existence. This goal appears unattainable, yet until the Israeli leadership acknowledges this, Hamas’ role in regional politics remains uncertain. The focus on exile locations and targeting Hamas’ leadership are tactical moves without strategic direction. Whether Hamas operates from Doha, Ankara, Tehran, or Gaza matters less than this fundamental disconnect and the broader absence of any coherent vision – from Israel, the Palestinians, or the international community – for future Arab leadership in Gaza.
