From May 13-16, President Donald J. Trump will repeat the opening gesture of his first administration by making the initial major diplomatic travel of his second term to Saudi Arabia (excluding his unanticipated visit to Rome for the funeral of the late Pope Francis) but this time also including the United Arab Emirates and Qatar. This trip comes at a highly significant moment in U.S.-Gulf Arab relations, and all parties will have specific agendas and deliverables at stake. Overall, Trump’s trip reinforces the centrality of these partnerships for all sides and signals that he continues to view Gulf Arab countries as important partners, not just for the United States but for his personal and political goals.

Trumps’s Crucial Saudi Agenda

The most important stop, as in May 2017, will once again be Riyadh, where Washington will have three overriding objectives: encouraging Saudi investment in the United States, securing weapons and other specific economic deals with the Saudis (including a $3.5 billion proposed missile sale), and encouraging the kingdom to use its influence, along with Russia, in the OPEC+ alliance to maintain acceptable oil pricing, despite ongoing Saudi budgetary woes arising from lower-than-expected oil prices. Trump will be accompanied by a number of major corporate CEOs, including Larry Fink of BlackRock, Jane Fraser of Citigroup, Jenny Johnson of Franklin Templeton, and Ruth Porat of Alphabet. They are all expected to address a U.S.-Saudi Investment Forum on May 13. That’s the day Trump arrives in Saudi Arabia to begin meetings with Crown Prince and Prime Minister Mohammed bin Salman.

The United States will seek to lock in as many specifics as possible regarding a promised $1.3 trillion in future Saudi investment in the United States. The 2017 trip focused heavily on new and existing weapon sales to Saudi Arabia, which Trump volubly valued at $350 billion over 10 years. Trump will undoubtedly seek to once again emerge from talks with gigantic figures regarding Saudi military goods and services purchased from, and upcoming investments in, the United States. The Trump administration appears to be seeking to simultaneously maintain the U.S. dollar as the global reserve currency while devaluing it against other currencies to bolster the competitiveness of U.S. exports. This essentially means that friendly countries will have to continue to invest in the dollar, especially through U.S. Treasury bonds and similar mechanisms but on significantly less advantageous terms than in the past. Washington apparently hopes that Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states, along with Japan and similar traditional U.S. partners in Asia, will be among those who agree to continue to invest in dollars but with less promise of immediate financial profit. On the personal side, it’s hard to imagine that Trump won’t spend at least some time on a planned Trump Tower in Riyadh, as well as one in Jeddah, and a planned series of major investments between his family’s company and Dar Global for numerous luxury real estate projects around the region.

Riyadh’s Priorities

Saudi Arabia, naturally, has its own priorities. Riyadh will undoubtedly seek to bolster military ties with Washington and probe the possibility of renewing drafts for both a Strategic Alignment Agreement and Mutual Defense Treaty that had been developed to a highly advanced stage under the administration of former President Joseph R. Biden Jr. However, both Washington and Riyadh are well aware that for such agreements to be meaningful they would have to be approved by the Senate, and that this is unlikely unless Saudi Arabia recognizes Israel. But the Saudis have made it clear that Israel must end the Gaza war and reopen the pathway to the creation of a Palestinian state in the occupied territories, both of which have been flatly rejected by the government of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Given this categorical rejection of a Palestinian state by Israel, even in theory, it seems highly unlikely that Trump will succeed in convincing the Saudis to join the Abraham Accords or otherwise normalize relations with Israel. Despite recent upbeat statements by Trump and his chief negotiator, Steven Witkoff, about a “very, very big announcement” that is “like, as big as it gets,” according to the president, it’s nonetheless hard to imagine a sudden announcement regarding Saudi normalization with Israel under current circumstances. It seems equally unlikely that Saudi Arabia will be able to secure its strategic and defense agreements with Washington in a meaningful way without such a recognition. However, that doesn’t alter the centrality of the relationship for both sides.

During the discussions with Biden, the Saudis found the third major agreement – U.S. oversight of, or involvement in, a Saudi civil nuclear energy program exploiting the country’s own uranium – to be more challenging at the bilateral level than the strategic and military agreements that were ultimately only thwarted by Israel’s refusing to budge on Gaza or a Palestinian state. However, given that Saudi Arabia remains keen on using its heretofore neglected uranium deposits to produce energy for domestic consumption and preserve oil reserves for international sale and the acquisition of foreign exchange, developing such an agreement remains a Saudi priority and a bilateral question that is effectively independent of Israeli-Palestinian issues. Secretary of State Marco Rubio and other officials have maintained that Saudi Arabia needs to agree to some version of a “gold standard” 123 agreement but traditional understandings of such an arrangement would not suit the Saudi economic agenda as it would force the country to export and import its own uranium multiple times, thereby considerably undermining profitability. Saudi Arabia will undoubtedly continue to press for either a different arrangement altogether or a modified version of 123 that takes into consideration the country’s intention of mining its own uranium rather than purchasing refined rods on the international market, the model the United States has routinely insisted on before allowing any exportation of U.S. nuclear energy technology.

Saudi Arabia will certainly also seek to encourage Washington to find a nuclear accommodation with Iran. During the U.S.-Iran talks under then-President Barack Obama, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Arab countries, along with Israel, were highly skeptical of the negotiations. Gulf Arab countries were especially concerned that neither Iranian missile stockpiles nor Tehran’s network of Arab militia groups, dubbed the “axis of resistance,” were under consideration. Ten years later, Saudi calculations and priorities are very different. Iran’s militia network has suffered extreme blows, particularly the downfall of the former Syrian dictator, Bashar al-Assad, and continues to be battered by Israeli and at times U.S. attacks, particularly against the Houthi rebels in Yemen. Moreover, Saudi Arabia is today much more focused on using the vast majority of its resources and capacities for its economic transformation program to a post-hydrocarbon economy. This overriding national priority has prompted Riyadh to prioritize regional calm, and security and stability, to avoid entangling Saudi Arabia in costly and bitter disputes. Saudi Arabia learned a harsh lesson during the first Trump administration, when it participated in Washington’s “maximum pressure” campaign of intensified containment against Tehran. Iran’s “maximum resistance” campaign mainly targeted Gulf Arab interests, culminating in a devastating attack in September 2019 on Saudi Aramco facilities that went unanswered by the United States. Having been effectively, from its point of view, set up as a target, but not protected, by Washington, Saudi Arabia is even more averse to being drawn into any potential conflict with Iran and so will undoubtedly be urging Washington to come to terms with Tehran.

Trump and the UAE

The UAE had a similar experience to Saudi Arabia given what appeared to be an apathetic response from the Biden administration to a Houthi attack on Emirati oil facilities near Abu Dhabi in January 2022 that killed three civilian workers. It, too, was in the process of rethinking the wisdom of exposing itself to harm without sufficient protection from Washington in campaigns of containment and intimidation aimed at Iran.

Abu Dhabi is also focused on domestic development, particularly concentrated on technology and artificial intelligence. When Trump visits Abu Dhabi, he is likely to be drawn into discussions about AI coordination and investment between the two countries. The United States and the UAE are also major players in a new economic alliance with India and others designed, in effect, to counterbalance China’s Belt and Road Initiative and other international investment and development projects led by Beijing. The project – the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor – will surely be an important shared agenda item. Given that the UAE has also sought to effectively match the over $1 trillion Saudi investment pledge in the United States, Trump will be similarly seeking as many big ticket items and large number specifics, no matter how generalized, he can tout as economic and diplomatic triumphs from the agenda. These will almost certainly include a major semiconductor chip deal that will give the UAE access to some of the most advanced U.S. computer technology, and, on a more personal front, a planned Trump Tower in Dubai. The UAE-based Cryptocurrency Ventures is also pursuing a massive $2 billion deal with the world’s largest cryptocurrency exchange, Binance, centered on USD1, a stablecoin recently launched by a firm that is backed by Trump’s sons.

Yet, because the UAE is more exposed and vulnerable to potential Iranian retaliation for U.S. or Israeli strikes on its nuclear facilities than Saudi Arabia, (the UAE, like other small states in the Gulf, has virtually no strategic depth and, like all other states, limited missile defense), Abu Dhabi will be similarly pressing Washington to do its best to find a compromise in the nuclear talks with Iran.

Trump and Qatar

Qatar is still in the process of managing a tricky, and even parlous, diplomatic conundrum with Washington over Doha’s historical and ongoing diplomatic support of Hamas, given the October 7, 2023 attack on southern Israel. Doha has deftly managed to avoid a crisis over the issue with Washington, especially by responding cleverly to U.S. cues about whether or not it should host Hamas Politburo leaders, most of whom were relocated to Turkey in 2024. The Trump administration will certainly urge Doha to use its influence with Hamas to get the Palestinian extremist group to release Israeli hostages, particularly a U.S. dual citizen who is presumed among the remaining living captives.

Qatar’s relationship with the United States is vastly enhanced by its military cooperation with Washington – providing the indispensable Al Udeid air and military base at virtually no cost to, and with effectively extraterritorial jurisdiction for, the Pentagon. The Trump administration will similarly seek major Qatari investments in both the U.S. dollar and economy more generally. Qatar Airways is poised to make the biggest single investment in U.S. interests of any Gulf country, with a plan to order 100 Boeing wide-body civilian jets. Like Saudi Arabia and the UAE, Washington surely sees Qatar as another friendly country that ought to be willing to continue to invest in dollars albeit on less advantageous terms than usual, thereby protecting its global reserve currency status while achieving a degree of devaluation.

The United States will probably also seek to clarify and remove any Qatari objections to the use of the Al Udeid air base for potential attacks against Iranian nuclear facilities, given that its runways are by far the nearest to Iran that can accommodate the B-2 bombers that would deliver the bunker buster and other massive ordinance conventional weapons required for such a strike. Qatar, conversely, may emphasize that it does object to such usage, and the two countries may have to come to an understanding about this issue, given that the alternative to an agreement with Iran may prove to be military action to prevent nuclear weaponization, if Iran moves decisively in that direction.

And on the personal front, Trump certainly has important business in Qatar. A Boeing 747 that used to belong to a former Qatari prime minister is being overhauled as an interim solution while Boeing works through major delays in delivering a pair of Air Force One replacement jets. The Trump organization is also seeking to build a Trump International Golf Club, Doha in partnership with Dar Global and the government-owned Qatari Diar, another important investment for the president’s family company.

A Win-Win Scenario

Overall, the trip has many makings of a win-win scenario for all the parties. Gulf countries, especially Saudi Arabia, are being promoted diplomatically by the Trump administration as major allies and important global or regional diplomatic actors. All Gulf three countries, in turn, are willing to help with aspects of Trump’s agenda, both personal and national. They will probably raise the issue of investments and reconstruction in Syria – and push to varying degrees for the lifting of U.S. sanctions – while ensuring current actions do not violate existing U.S. sanctions or provoke the Treasury Department. And, of course, all three are looking to avoid the new U.S. import tariffs, especially the suspended reciprocal ones. The Trump administration, in turn, will be pressing Gulf countries to use their influence in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and elsewhere to stabilize the region and limit U.S. exposure to instability and even new eruptions of terrorism. All the parties have an interest in working together to eliminate threats to the region and maritime security posed by the Houthis in Yemen (despite the recently announced U.S.-Houthi cease-fire) and to limit or even end the war in Gaza, though that seems increasingly unlikely. After May 16, if Trump has emerged with new investments and sales about which he can boast, potential unprecedented conflicts of interest notwithstanding, and the three Gulf countries have solidified their partnerships with Washington, this visit will be regarded as a significant step forward in U.S.-Gulf Arab relations.