On his first visit outside the Arab world since taking office in December 2023, Kuwaiti Emir Meshal al-Ahmed al-Jaber al-Sabah was accompanied by a delegation of high-ranking officials to Ankara, where Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan awarded him the Order of State medal. The May 7 visit, which coincided with the 60th anniversary of Turkish-Kuwaiti diplomatic relations and was the first by a Kuwaiti emir in seven years, underscored the two countries’ low-profile yet growing relations.
Space for Growth in Ties
In 2022, Turkey accounted for just $975 million of Kuwait’s $64.6 billion in imports. Turkey’s share of Kuwait’s military trade that year was only 0.64%, up from 0.26% in 2021.
While economic ties between Kuwait and Turkey are currently limited, there is substantial opportunity for growth, with the two countries emphasizing their motivation to strengthen cooperation during the emir’s visit. Turkish Ambassador to Kuwait Tuba Nur Sonmez mentioned that the volume of trade between Turkey and Kuwait reached $700 million in 2023, but the parties are striving to “double this number in the coming years.” Kuwait made $2 billion in investments in Turkey in 2023 and is reforming its economic policies to increase investment abroad, according to Sonmez.
Cooperation Agreements
During the emir’s recent visit, Turkey and Kuwait signed six cooperation agreements, including a memorandum of understanding to establish a strategic dialogue as well as defense, diplomatic, and trade deals. The agreements envision high level cooperation in areas such as investment promotion, free economic zones, housing, infrastructure, and disaster and emergency management. Beyond the joint strategic dialogue, the agreement signed on state-to-state defense industry supply contracts was seemingly the most important outcome of the visit.
Kuwait signed a $376 million agreement with Turkey’s Baykar Technology for the purchase of TB2 drones. Baykar signed the largest defense deal in Turkish history with Saudi Arabia in July 2023, showing the ambitions of Turkey’s growing defense industry. From 2019-23, Turkey was the 11th largest arms exporter in the world, while Kuwait ranked among the top 12 importers of military products over the same period. Turkish companies aim to be among the top global arms manufacturers, and the Gulf states are among the top defense spenders. While this presents opportunities for increasing defense ties, bringing more Gulf buyers into the fold will require targeted effort.
Balancing Gulf Partnerships
Turkey, as a middle power, is angling to build economic and political ties with various actors across the Gulf. In recent years, there has been a notable de-escalation in intra-Gulf Cooperation Council political tensions and the Iranian-Saudi rivalry, which are two dynamics easing pressure on Turkey’s position in the region. However, Turkey’s increased military exports to Gulf states have the potential to trigger an armament rivalry, particularly if Ankara sells certain equipment only to select countries. As part of the Baykar agreement, Saudi Arabia will benefit from a joint military production facility in addition to technology transfer from Ankara, and the UAE is among the top buyers of Turkish defense products, yet Qatar hosts Turkey’s only military base in the GCC states. Turkey’s hedging in military sales is particularly critical because its role in localizing production via transferring certain technologies in exchange for defense sales to a certain Gulf capital but not others could create problems in intra-Gulf affairs. Turkey is similarly hedging in its economic relations.
In late April, Erdogan made a “historic” visit to Iraq, signing dozens of deals. Prime among them was the agreement for the Development Road project, an economic corridor venture among Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Iraq. The project may add new dimensions to intra-Gulf politics and challenge Turkey to manage the regional implications of consolidating ties with several Gulf capitals that may be rivals.
The Al-Faw Grand Port project is a key component of the Development Road. Yerevan Saeed emphasized that, if the Al-Faw Grand Port project is completed, it would stand as a competitor to Dubai’s Jebel Ali Port. However, he noted that the UAE has invested in the project, seeing the port as an opportunity to bolster its logistics portfolio. Nonetheless, the Al-Faw Grand Port would certainly be a competitor to Kuwait’s nearby Mubarak Al-Kabir Port project. Beyond the economic threat the project poses, Kuwait has concerns regarding Iraq’s involvement, tracing back to the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.
Hedging for a “Transformative Effect”
The creation of new trade infrastructure could benefit all states in the region by boosting economic cooperation, but as Turkey works to strengthen ties in the Gulf, Ankara will have to navigate clear minefields, including legacy Iraq-Kuwait tensions, growing economic rivalries in the Gulf waters stemming from competing trade connectivity projects, and Iran’s effort to increase its share of transregional trade. Nonetheless, in an interview with the author, Sonmez insisted Ankara can play a constructive role through cooperation that has a “transformative effect” on the entire region, not just one country.
Beyond its bilateral diplomatic and commercial forays with Gulf countries, Turkey continues to focus on the GCC. Turkey was the first country outside the Gulf to establish a bilateral strategic dialogue mechanism with the GCC, with the agreement signed in 2008. And in March, Turkey and the GCC agreed to launch negotiations on a free trade agreement that could establish the largest free trade zone in the world, according to Turkish Minister of Trade Omer Bolat. GCC Secretary-General Jasem Albudaiwi emphasized the economic significance of GCC-Turkey relations, and he said the GCC’s efforts to establish such free trade agreements are part of ongoing efforts to diversify revenue sources and support economic growth.
Intra-Gulf politics – including rivalries, perceptions of transnational threats, and power imbalances – have important implications for Turkey. Ankara is interested in balancing relations across the Gulf and deepening ties. But, as shown by the tensions Turkey’s regional policies caused with the UAE and Saudi Arabia during the 2017-21 boycott of Qatar, this may be a challenging balance to maintain.
