President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who has led Turkey for the past 20 years, and Kemal Kilicdaroglu, the head of the opposition Republican People’s Party, are in a close race for Turkey’s pivotal May 14 presidential election. While both candidates have made a host of promises to garner domestic support, the outside world is paying close attention to their competing approaches to foreign policy.

Foreign officials are well acquainted with Erdogan’s ambitious foreign policy. Under Erdogan, Turkey has aspired to become a major player in the Mediterranean, intervening in Syria, Libya, and Iraq. As one of the few countries to have strong ties with both Russia and Ukraine, Turkey has taken on a key role in the Russia-Ukraine war. However, Erdogan’s active foreign policy has left Turkey isolated from its Western allies. For instance, Turkey’s relations with the United States have deteriorated to the point that it was removed from the F-35 fighter program and sanctioned by Washington due to its purchase of Russian S-400 air defense systems.

Kilicdaroglu, on the other hand, has promised to adopt a foreign policy rooted in “peace at home, peace in the world,” the famous motto of Kemal Ataturk, the founder of the Republic of Turkey and Kilicdaroglu’s party. While the motto appeals to Kilicdaroglu’s Kemalist supporters, it also outlines a foreign policy that is the polar opposite of Erdogan’s, which many consider a cause of Turkey’s ongoing economic crisis.

Although Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party has always had an assertive foreign policy, it relied primarily on diplomatic, economic, and cultural power until the mid-2010s. Turkey-Gulf relations experienced a golden age during Erdogan’s first decade in power, with Turkey becoming the first non-Gulf Cooperation Council state to be designated a GCC strategic partner.

However, with the eruption of the Arab Spring uprisings in 2011 – which Ankara saw as an opportunity to expand its influence and reshape the region – Turkey’s foreign policy became more complex as it confronted several regional and global powers. With the Middle East undergoing rapid change, Turkey didn’t want to be left behind other regional players and believed, incorrectly, that the revolutionary movements would quickly triumph.

Turkey was not alone in its quest for regional influence. Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar also took active roles in the region after the uprisings broke out. While Qatar and Turkey supported the uprisings, Saudi Arabia and the UAE positioned themselves in defense of the status quo. As the opposing blocs competed across the region, the Gulf rift – which began when Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt initiated a boycott of Qatar – sparked a public feud between Turkey and Saudi Arabia and the UAE that continued until they reached a rapprochement in 2022.

Continuation or Change Under Erdogan?

While Turkey’s Gulf relations have fluctuated between cooperation and confrontation over Erdogan’s two decades in power, the recent Turkey-Gulf detente offers some clues about how Erdogan would approach the Gulf if reelected.

The current period of reconciliation and relative peace in the Middle East emerged because regional powers grew unwilling to bear the costs of pursuing aggressive policies. After waging a decadelong regional cold war that benefited no one, all parties opted for reconciliation. Therefore, if Erdogan remains in power, Turkey will likely increase its economic and, notably, defense industry cooperation with the Gulf states. Qatar and Kuwait have deepened their security cooperation with Turkey in recent years and are poised to take it even further. Moreover, after the UAE-Turkey reconciliation, Abu Dhabi quickly expanded its security ties with Ankara by buying Turkish drones. Turkey-Gulf security cooperation could even spread to Saudi Arabia, which has been working to diversify its security partnerships. In December 2022, Saudi Arabia’s assistant minister of defense led a delegation to Turkey and held talks with senior Turkish officials on defense cooperation.

What to Expect From Kilicdaroglu

On the campaign trail, Kilicdaroglu has repeatedly criticized the Erdogan government’s close relationship with Qatar and suggested that he would downgrade ties with Doha. Kilicdaroglu vowed, for instance, to retake a tank factory that the government leased to a Turkish-Qatari joint venture. After Qatar purchased a 10% stake in Istanbul’s stock exchange, Kilicdaroglu again criticized Erdogan’s approach to Qatar. Although these attacks may have been motivated primarily by domestic political concerns, Turkish-Qatari relations will likely deteriorate if Kilicdaroglu wins, though likely not as much as his heated rhetoric might suggest.

Under a Kilicdaroglu government, Turkey’s relations with the UAE and Saudi Arabia would likely continue along their current positive trajectory as the main target for Kilicdaroglu’s rhetoric remains Qatar’s investments.

The Outlook for Turkey’s Gulf Policy

Although Riyadh and Abu Dhabi began the normalization process with Erdogan’s government, they have remained neutral during the campaign and are preparing to pursue economic opportunities in Turkey regardless of who wins hoping that the Turkish economy will stabilize after the elections.

However, realpolitik considerations and regional developments – particularly the Middle East’s ongoing realignment – may prevent a radical shift in Turkish foreign policy under either Erdogan or Kilicdaroglu. Nevertheless, an array of issues – from the Syrian conflict and migration to relations with Western powers and the Russia-Ukraine war – will pose significant challenges for Turkey’s next president and shape Ankara’s relations with Gulf powers.