The rise of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant heralded the ascent of another nonstate armed group that has become entangled in Iraq’s political scene and economy. Unable to rely on its security apparatus to fight ISIL, the government accepted the mobilization of militias. The Popular Mobilization Forces is an umbrella of 50 militias with different ideological leanings and an incoherent leadership. Although estimates vary regarding the number of PMF fighters, the sheer size is impressive. At the beginning of the fight to liberate Iraqi territory from ISIL, it was estimated that the number of PMF fighters reached as high as 250,000. The PMF was initially celebrated for its heroism in pushing ISIL from Iraqi territory, however, many PMF factions, especially those close to Iran, have tainted the reputation of the organization through corrupt practices and the use of violence against Iraqis, and it has come to be known more for its corruption and repression. In Iraq’s current political deadlock, the Fatah Coalition and its aligned PMF militias hinder any attempts to change the political system concerned any adjustment to the status quo will jeopardize their interests.

In 2014, ISIL swept Iraq. The Iraqi army collapsed, ceding swaths of territory to ISIL forces. The PMF was created with the aim of facing this new threat and was comprised mainly of Shia volunteers. The PMF became popular across some parts of Iraqi society because of its notable success in countering ISIL forces. However, the PMF was implicated in numerous human rights abuses, including running illegal prisons, abductions, torture, and extrajudicial killings. For instance, Human Rights Watch documented the killing of more than a hundred Sunni men between March and July 2014 and has linked these killings to Asaib Ahl al-Haq, an Iranian-allied Shia militia under the umbrella of the PMF. Amnesty International also documented abductions and killings by Shia militias in Kirkuk, Baghdad, and Samarra in 2014.

Yet, the PMF maintained its popularity. A 2015 poll showed that 99% of Iraq’s Shia population supported using the PMF to fight ISIL. And, although Haider al-Abadi, then Iraq’s prime minister, asserted “there must be a clear separation between political and armed groups,” because of its popularity, he was not able to prevent the PMF from participating in the 2018 parliamentary elections. Nearly all the pro-Iran groups within the PMF politically coalesced into the Fatah Coalition, which took 48 seats in Iraq’s 329-member Parliament, allowing it to play a substantial role in the formation of the government.

Though nominally under the control of the commander of the armed forces, the PMF has maintained its independence. Moreover, the inability of the Iraqi government to rein in the PMF has allowed it to engage in unrestrained economic activities. For example, the PMF has created checkpoints across much of Iraq without governmental approval. The income generated from these checkpoints varies greatly depending on location, but the PMF has reportedly received nearly $300,000 daily from checkpoints in the Iraqi town of Jalawla alone. Groups such as the Badr Brigade and Asaib Ahl al-Haq collected from $100 to $500 per truck, and, to maximize revenue, the PMF developed a system at one checkpoint allowing cars to skip the line of trucks by paying an additional $20. Some reports indicate that the trip between Baghdad and northern Iraq used to take five hours but, because of the large number of checkpoints, had increased to seven days, and trucks could get backed up for miles.

The PMF has also illegally taken control of border crossings. In 2021, Iraq’s finance minister said that the Iraqi government should be making $7 billion per year from customs, but the Finance Ministry receives only 10% to 12% of this because of a network of corrupt militias, businessmen, and political parties. Additionally, the PMF took control of 72 oil fields in an area south of Mosul previously controlled by ISIL. PMF groups have also demanded up to $3,000 per month as “protection money” from large restaurants. If owners fail to pay, they risk having their establishments blown up.

Because of the political incompetence and widespread corruption in the Iraqi government, the resentment of Iraqis reached a boiling point in 2019, especially in Shia-majority areas where the PMF was popular. The protesters targeted not only governmental buildings but offices linked to the PMF, suggesting that it was being held responsible for deteriorating living conditions. Many Iraqis’ view of the PMF changed from seeing it as a protector of the country, or a segment of it, to a repressive force. The demonstrations created a predicament that led to the creation of a crisis cell, including Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps as well as several Iraqi militias from the PMF. These forces attacked demonstrators; according to official numbers, 165 were killed and 6,100 injured – though other estimates put the number of those killed at 400. The Iraqi security forces failed to prevent attacks against demonstrators even when there were clear signs that some of the prominent protesters or outspoken critics were being targeted and at risk of being killed. Elements of the PMF proved their willingness to use violence to preserve the PMF’s political status and the resulting economic benefits. However, sapped by the long-standing corruption and graft charges and the escalating violence targeting protesters in 2019 and afterward, the PMF fell out of favor with the Iraqi public, and the Fatah Coalition won only 17 seats in the October 2021 parliamentary elections.

In the current political crisis in Iraq, Fatah and the PMF have been vehemently against Shia cleric Muqtada al-Sadr’s proclaimed reform agenda, fearing it would translate into the PMF’s marginalization or even political extinction. A diminished role in government would deprive Fatah and the PMF of political influence and economic hold over the state’s coffers. For instance, Fatah would be excluded from the “special grades” scheme that allows political parties to divide the appointment of civil servants and through them government contracts. Moreover, the budget of the PMF could be downsized; even worse, the group could lose its special status embedding it within the government payroll. Any Sadr-led reform agenda would also mean taming the PMF’s lucrative illicit economic activities. While some outside observers might take a Sadr reform agenda at face value, the PMF and its leaders and patrons (both in Baghdad and Tehran) would view it more cynically as the targeted actions of a former rival, bent on political score settling and power grabbing.

The message that Sadr has helped crystalize, although he is not a disinterested observer, is that the PMF, specifically the Iran-allied militias within it, metamorphosed from presumably a national force to a hydra with its reach in both the economic and political spheres in Iraq with few signs of its power shrinking despite its unpopularity. That is due largely to its resort to force, with impunity, to preserve its power and influence and silence its critics. PMF leaders have repeatedly made clear that their autonomy will not be challenged. That dynamic signals that as the PMF’s political influence continues to decrease, it may increasingly turn to repressive measures to maintain its power and influence