Since Hamas’ October 7, 2023 incursion into Israel and the ensuing Israeli invasion of Gaza, international media has reported on exchanges of fire between the Israel Defense Forces and Lebanese Hezbollah militia in the Israel-Lebanon border area. Despite considerable political concern and speculation about the risk of the conflict spreading to Lebanon, Hezbollah’s limited losses – only 146 casualties since the beginning of the war – do not indicate an imminent risk of the Lebanese militia escalating the conflict, absent catastrophic incidents forcing Hezbollah’s patron, Iran, and Israel into a direct confrontation. Apart from the relatively low risk of Hezbollah provoking Israel into a war with Lebanon, reports on Hezbollah’s fatalities from Arabic- and Persian-language open sources provide some insight into the structure of Hezbollah’s military units.

According to Hezbollah’s public announcements concerning “martyrs of the Path to the Quds Operation” as the organization calls its skirmishes with Israel, Hezbollah suffered 146 fatalities between October 8, 2023 and January 8, 2024. Hezbollah’s average weekly attrition rate appears to have been low, and its highest daily loss was 13 fatalities on October 25, 2023. Separately, Hezbollah appears to have lost only one senior commander, Wissam Hassan al-Tawil, from Hezbollah’s elite Radwan forces, who was killed in a targeted assassination by an aerial drone in Nabatieh January 8. Hossein Yazbek, who was killed in South governorate January 4, may also have been an officer, but his exact rank and role are unknown.

Hezbollah Fatalities and Native Governorate October 7, 2023 – January 8, 2024

Of Lebanon’s nine governorates, only five were identified as the place of birth of Hezbollah’s 146 fatalities, which to a large extent reflects the country’s sectarian divide. Slightly more than half of the total fatalities – 75 – were natives of Nabatieh governorate, followed by South, Baalbek-Hermel, Beqaa, and Beirut governorates.

This is remarkable for two reasons:

First, with only five losses, the capital Beirut and its suburbs are at the bottom of the list. This may in part be due to the strong bonds between second- or even third-generation immigrants to the capital with their ancestral villages. Posthumously, they may be presented as natives of other governorates, and their funeral and burial services take place in their ancestral villages rather than in Beirut. In a few cases, this is explicitly explained in Hezbollah’s information campaigns concerning slain fighters, in which the official announcement distinguishes between the place of birth and residence of the person killed.

Second, Nabatieh, with an estimated population of 391,000 in 2022, has the smallest population among the five governorates of interest, yet it is the place of birth of more than half of the slain Hezbollah fighters. There is no simple explanation to this. Limited economic opportunities in Nabatieh may have led to overrepresentation of the governorate’s natives among Hezbollah fighters in general, which in turn is translated into overrepresentation of Nabatieh natives among the fatalities. But Nabatieh’s statistical overrepresentation may also be explained by proximity to the Israeli border, which is also true of South governorate with 26 losses, the second-largest number of fatalities among the five governorates. This is particularly true if those killed were reservists stationed in and serving in their hometown.

Among the 146 fatalities, the place of death of only 18 individuals is known. Among these, six were reportedly killed in Tyre, in South governorate on two consecutive days: October 8 and 9. Ten were killed in Syria, on two different dates: November 10 and December 8. Commander Tawil was killed in his native Nabatieh governorate January 8.

Active-duty fighters on the other hand, are most likely organized in units composed of servicemen from the entire country and are not necessarily stationed or serve in their hometown: Among the six killed in Tyre, two were Nabatieh natives, and the place of birth of one is unknown. The others were born in Beirut, South, and Beqaa governorates. Assuming that the six individuals who were killed in the same location around the same date served in the same unit, Hezbollah’s active-duty fighters are organized in mixed units with servicemen from the entire country.

A survey of Hezbollah fatalities in Syria leaves the same impression: On November 10, seven Hezbollah fighters were killed in Homs, Syria, and three Hezbollah fighters were reported killed in Quneitra, Syria December 8. Among those killed November 10, three were Nabatieh natives, while others were natives of Baalbek-Hermel, Beqaa, Beirut, and South governorates. Two Hezbollah fighters killed December 8 were natives of Nabatieh, and the third was a native of South governorate.

Apart from information about the composition of Hezbollah’s reservist and active-duty units, this information may also be an indication of the Lebanese militia’s preparations: Overrepresentation of reservists among the fatalities indicates Hezbollah has not deployed its active-duty forces along the Israel border. This in turn strengthens the perception of general disinclination of Hezbollah to start a war with Israel and spread the war in Gaza to Lebanon.

Hamas, Hezbollah, IRGC, Islamic Jihad, and Syrian Socialist Nationalist Party Fatalities in Northern Israel, Lebanon, and Syria October 7, 2023 – January 8, 2024