On February 19, the European Union launched a new maritime security operation, EU Naval Force Operation Aspides, in response to escalating Houthi attacks on Western warships and merchant vessels in the Red Sea basin and northwestern Indian Ocean. The name Aspides, which means “shields” in Greek, denotes the operation’s underlying defensive nature. The EU naval mission, carried out under its Common Security and Defense Policy, underscores how ensuring maritime security and maintaining the stability of global supply chains are front and center in the EU’s defense and trade strategic calculus.

The Houthi Threat

Since October 19, 2023, Yemen’s Houthis have carried out dozens of attacks on maritime shipping routes connecting the Indo-Pacific and Mediterranean, severely impacting the smooth flow of seaborne trade and causing disruptions to global energy and goods supply chains. Although the Iran-backed militia initially claimed its attacks aimed to target exclusively Israel-bound vessels in retaliation for Israel’s war in Gaza, the targets struck have had minimal or no connection to Israel.

As Houthi attacks have grown in number and sophistication, leading global shipping companies, including several European shipping giants, have diverted vessels to South Africa’s Cape of Good Hope route. However, rerouting through Africa’s southernmost tip measurably increases transportation costs, adds 14 to 25 days to the voyage toward European ports, and increases the risk of vessel traffic congestion in African ports.

The crisis is having a far-reaching impact on the global economy, more than doubling average Shanghai-Europe container spot rates.

Why Aspides?

In December 2023, with the Houthi attacks showing no sign of stopping, the United States launched a multinational naval coalition, Operation Prosperity Guardian, to secure maritime routes in and around the Red Sea. As hostile actions continued unabated, Washington raised the military stakes by recalibrating its policy response to a “deter and degrade” approach predicated on limited coalition airstrikes against Houthi military targets. Although the U.S.-led campaign has successfully struck several Houthi targets, it has yet to achieve its core aim: halting the Houthi attacks on shipping.

Alarmed by the ripple effects that the crisis could have on their economic prosperity, some EU member states initially endorsed Operation Prosperity Guardian, with Greece dispatching a frigate to the Red Sea and the Netherlands and Denmark sending staff officers. However, some early European supporters pulled off from the U.S.-led task force as soon as the EU established its own security mechanism: Operation Aspides. A key reason prompting Brussels to design a qualitatively different response, stressing restraint while ensuring strong defensive guarantees, was the concern that the intensification of U.S.-led airstrikes in Yemen could trigger a broader regional war.

According to High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Joseph Borrell, Operation Aspides is grounded on a purely defensive posture. Building on United Nations Security Council Resolution 2722, which calls for the full cessation of Houthi attacks and stresses vessels’ right to self-defense against imminent threats, the operation’s mandate revolves around a core of three de-escalatory tasks. First, it provides close protection to merchant vessels transiting the Bab el-Mandeb and Strait of Hormuz chokepoints. Second, it improves maritime situational awareness in and around the Red Sea by providing military and civilian ships with an accurate understanding of activities occurring in the maritime domain that could impact security, safety, the economy, or the environment. Third, it engages in defensive kinetic actions against varied threats to freedom of navigation.

Naval Muscle

Operation Aspides’ headquarters is in Larissa, Greece, led by Commodore Vasileios Gryparis as the operation commander, while Italy has appointed Rear Admiral Stefano Costantino as the force commander. Since May 2020, Greece has been at the forefront of Operation Irini (“peace” in Greek), the EU mission implementing the U.N. arms embargo on Libya. And Rome has a consolidated track record of forward naval deployments in regional waters, with its warships frequently contributing to European maritime missions in the northwestern Indian Ocean. Tellingly, Constantino served as force commander of the European Maritime Awareness in the Strait of Hormuz mission between June 2022 and January 2023, showcasing familiarity with the region’s operational environment.

Operation Aspides’ fleet fits the mission’s focus on anti-aircraft warfare. The French frigate Alsace, Italian destroyer Caio Duilio, German frigate Hessen, and Greek frigate Hydra are all equipped with advanced weapons systems, including short- and long-range surface-to-air missiles as well as close-in weapon systems making them highly versatile warships capable of countering the broad array of threats posed by the Houthis. They also have strong early detection capabilities and helicopters, enhancing their capacity for air and surface surveillance operations.

In the first month of activity, the four-warship flotilla has delivered meaningful results on the full spectrum of naval defense duties envisioned in its three-pillar mandate, escorting 35 commercial ships and downing over a dozen hostile drones. Operation Aspides has also conducted valuable naval diplomacy activities to enhance maritime situation awareness, such as meeting with like-minded security partners, including Japan’s counterpiracy task force and Djibouti’s government, and going on board commercial ships.

Since the EU Red Sea campaign’s onset, all four EU security escort vessels have engaged in self-defense operations against Houthi air and surface threats, defending against seven total attacks. The involvement of European warships in combat episodes, albeit in self-defense, marks a significant evolution of the historical EU naval posture.

Although surface-to-air missiles remain the weapon of choice to counter air threats, alternative close-range air defense solutions have also proved effective in ensuring the security of vessels. The destroyer Caio Duilio brought down a drone with its gun armament, while French and German helicopters have resorted to machine gun fire to knock out hostile Houthi drones. Along with close-in weapon systems, gun-armed helicopters are a cost-effective option to shoot down immediate threats. Still, that the frigate Alsace resorted to the surface-to-air missiles to down three ballistic missiles underscores that gun engagement is not an all-weather defensive solution.

Deciphering the EU’s Naval Policy

While Operation Aspides has rapidly militarized the EU’s role in the Red Sea, it aligns with Europe’s broader naval and diplomatic engagement off the Arabian Peninsula.

Since 2008, the EU has maintained a standing naval presence in the northwestern Indian Ocean through Operation Atalanta, a maritime initiative to counter Somali criminal networks at sea. The improved piracy situation off the Somali coast underscores the mission’s meaningful deterrent impact and the EU’s credentials as a reliable maritime security actor.

The forward deployment of European naval forces in the northwestern Indian Ocean is part of a comprehensive maritime security vision that Brussels has crafted in recent years to ensure consistency and coherence in its regional naval policy.

In February 2022, the Council of the EU implemented the Coordinated Maritime Presence concept in the northwestern Indian Ocean. It aims to bolster maritime security engagement by ensuring a permanent presence of EU naval assets in a maritime area of interest and facilitating operational interactions among them, promoting cooperation with regional partners, and strengthening the EU’s profile as a maritime security guarantor.

Contrary to Operation Atalanta, another operation, European Maritime Awareness in the Strait of Hormuz, was developed outside the EU’s Common Security and Defense Policy framework. Launched in January 2020 as a European response to heightening U.S.-Iran tensions at sea and the surge in Tehran’s hostile actions against merchant ships around the Strait of Hormuz, the operation is an ad hoc minilateral naval coalition to promote maritime situation awareness led by France and supported by eight other European countries. With an approach rooted in dialogue and de-escalation, it has sought to preserve positive engagement with Iran and build a safe regional navigation environment by conducting escorts of commercial vessels, reassurance calls, and day-to-day interactions with shipping industry stakeholders.

Intending to enhance ties with the Gulf Cooperation Council and its member states, in May 2022, the European Commission unveiled “Strategic Partnership with the Gulf,” a programmatic roadmap aimed at strengthening EU-GCC synergies on policy areas of mutual interest. Improved cooperation to promote safe navigation is a key component of the roadmap’s security pillar. Since then, maritime security has featured prominently in high-level EU-GCC institutional engagements, including the first EU-GCC Regional Security Dialogue.

Finally, in March 2023, the European Commission released its updated Maritime Security Strategy. The document acknowledges the need to strengthen synergies among European naval initiatives and recognizes that the EU’s efforts to advance its strategic interests and economic prosperity rest on its capacity to secure the Gulf of Aden and Strait of Hormuz from hybrid threats, such acts of sabotage and gray-zone warfare activities by malicious actors.

A Partial Success Story

Nearly two months into Operation Aspides, the EU’s new naval arm has undoubtedly delivered some desired results. Still, the maritime coalition’s capacity to provide sustained, reliable security guarantees faces operational and political challenges.

Operational Challenges

First, the EU flotilla may face challenges in conducting sustained force protection duties, especially in a high-intensity combat scenario in which it is frequently targeted by multilayered attacks featuring ballistic and cruise missiles on top of drones. A potential uptick in Houthi missile and drone swarms is likely to rapidly deplete ammunition stockpiles. The paucity of EU naval assets ready for rapid deployment and the complexity of rearming warships far from home ports strain the EU command’s coordination activities.

Second, militarizing the waters in and around the Red Sea does not guarantee an all-round effective defense of maritime commercial routes as demonstrated by the recent sinking of the United Kingdom-owned Rubymar cargo ship and the killing of three seafarers on board the Greek-operated True Confidence vessel that was hit by a Houthi missile. With an area of operation spanning several thousand nautical miles and only four warships at its disposal, Operation Aspides will likely be limited to ship accompaniments across regional chokepoints.

Third, as several naval coalitions with separate chains of command operate in a contested environment, confusion may arise over the identification and neutralization of potential hostile contacts. The Hessen destroyer’s inadvertent targeting of a U.S. drone in March highlights the underlying risk of friendly fire and also raises worrisome questions about the overall reliability of interceptors.

Political Challenges

On the political front, Operation Aspides remains vulnerable to the complex interplay between the often competitive behavior of individual EU member states and the political agenda pursued by Brussels. Although no member vetoed the creation of the naval mission, different perceptions within the EU bloc about the best tools to counter the Houthi threat might undermine the EU’s efforts to build effective naval muscle in the long run. The fact that some EU member states with proven naval capabilities have so far refrained from offering military contributions to the operation speaks volumes about this risk. Tellingly, Spain remains hesitant to divert naval assets from its long-standing contribution to Operation Atalanta, while the Netherlands and Denmark have preferred to deploy warships under Prosperity Guardian’s command.

Second, Brussels needs to properly communicate the naval mission’s end game to like-minded actors in the region. Fearful of Houthi retaliation on domestic high-value targets and jeopardizing the timid detente with Iran, the EU’s traditional security partners in the Arabian Peninsula, such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, have sought to stand clear from any political association with foreign naval coalitions. Still, the Gulf states have much to gain from a restoration of freedom of navigation, as the success of ongoing economic reforms and ambitious “vision” plans largely rely on a stable regional maritime environment. To this end, the EU needs to convince regional partners about the de-escalatory character of its military presence while meaningfully appeasing their specific threat concerns.

Although Operation Aspides is unlikely to restore deterrence and disrupt all Houthi attacks on commercial shipping, it demonstrates that the EU has the naval capabilities and political will to pursue its geostrategic interests independently from U.S.-led military engagements. However, as the Houthis are set to be a force to contend with as long as Israel’s war on Gaza drags on, and possibly after, Brussels will have to address Operation Aspides’ shortcomings if it wants to meaningfully enhance its credentials as a reliable global maritime security guarantor.