Iran is directly supporting the Sudanese army as it seeks to take advantage of the civil war in Sudan to establish a permanent foothold in the Red Sea. The Red Sea is vital to the global economy, carrying 15% of global maritime trade and 12% of seaborne oil through the Suez Canal, which connects the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean. The Red Sea is important for global security. It hosts military and intelligence bases from the United States, China, the United Arab Emirates, Italy, France, Japan, Turkey, Israel, and Russia. Iran is eager to have a presence in the region and has chosen Sudan as its point of entry.
In previous attempts, Iran failed to secure a lasting foothold in the region. However, as Iranian and Russian military support is turning the tide of the Sudanese civil war in favor of the army, Iran is finding an opening to achieve its goal. Israel’s military actions against Hamas and Hezbollah have disrupted Iran’s proxies in the Middle East, nonetheless, Tehran is proceeding with similar efforts in Sudan. On February 17, Sudanese Foreign Minister Ali Youssif visited Tehran, where he met with Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, Supreme National Security Council Secretary Rear Admiral Ali Akbar Ahmadian, Speaker of Parliament Mohammad-Bagher Qalibaf, and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi. During the visit, Araghchi formally announced Iran’s support for the Sudanese government against the Rapid Support Forces and agreed to encourage Iranian companies to participate in Sudan’s reconstruction. The two parties also discussed technology exchange.
Tehran’s ultimate ambition is to have a direct naval presence in the Red Sea, allowing it to disrupt access to two of the world’s critical shipping chokepoints – the Red Sea and the Strait of Hormuz. This strengthens its deterrence by giving it the ability to inflict economic pain. While that presence has been a long-held ambition for Iran, the effectiveness of Israeli military action against its proxies in the Levant will make the prospect of influence in the Red Sea pressing as it looks to compensate for its losses. Moreover, the Red Sea is important to Israel – which went to war over it in 1967 when Egypt blockaded access to the Strait of Tiran.
Sudan is an ideal choice because, unlike Djibouti, Eritrea, and Somalia, it hosts no foreign naval bases apart from a small Russian presence. Additionally, the Sudanese coastline gives Iran a direct line to the Saudi port city of Jeddah.
Tehran has a history of outreach in Sudan and sub-Saharan Africa. By 2015, Al-Mustafa International University in Tehran – founded by Grand Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini with a missionary objective – had local branches in 30 African countries, with 5,000 enrolled African students, 2,000 of whom were in Tehran. Additionally, in the early 2000s, Iran built Shia mosques and cultural centers across Sudan to proselytize and increase the number of Sudanese Shias – in 2014 this caused backlash in the predominantly Sunni country, which culminated in shuttering the centers and the expulsion of Iran’s cultural attaché.
Iran remains unpopular with Arab publics across the region, with solid majorities disapproving of its role. The low penetration of Shia Islam in Sudan is a challenge to the Iranian regime. Although 91% of Sudan’s population is Muslim, only a small minority in Khartoum are Shias. In 2023, Mutasim Sayed Ahmad, a Sudanese researcher, addressing a Shia nongovernmental organization in Tehran articulated a pro-Iran perspective on religious and military aspects of the conflict in Sudan: “Shiites have been migrating due to the oppression of tyrant governments, and Sudan has been one of the destinations … The victory of the Islamic Revolution in Iran paved the way for Shia in Sudan … Sudan is now witnessing a political crisis, and the countries of Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Egypt are interfering in Sudan’s internal affairs.”
Iran is aware that Khartoum’s favor is fickle. Tehran once had flourishing ties with Sudan, where it had a direct hand in President Omar al-Bashir’s rise to power. However, despite its instrumental support to the Bashir regime, the Iranian ambassador to Sudan was unceremoniously expelled in January 2016 after a mob attack on the Saudi Embassy in Tehran in response to Saudi Arabia’s execution of Shia religious leader Nimr al-Nimr on charges of sedition. The Russian-Iranian arms manufacturing and supply nexus that emerged with the war in Ukraine makes Iranian overtures difficult to resist as the Sudanese civil war stagnates, and Tehran and Moscow are willing to provide the Sudanese military with decisive capabilities, including missiles and drones. In October 2023, after an eight-year estrangement, Iran and the Sudanese government agreed to exchange ambassadors.
Facing battlefield setbacks, Sudan’s military began accepting aid from any willing benefactor. The remnants of Bashir’s Islamist loyalists have aligned themselves with Lt. Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, the head of Sudan’s armed forces and leader of the Sudanese government.
Burhan’s opposition – the Rapid Support Forces, led by Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti – evolved out of the Janjaweed militias, which Bashir used to commit atrocities in Darfur in the early 2000s. Until recently, the Rapid Support Forces controlled most major cities in Sudan. In recent months, the tide may be turning, as Sudan’s armed forces have taken the city of Wad Medani and Khartoum’s “sister city,” Omdurman, and broken the Rapid Support Forces’ yearslong siege on army headquarters.
Until these reversals, the Rapid Support Forces had most of the battlefield momentum. In response to the Rapid Support Forces’ earlier successes, the Sudanese army had moved its base from Khartoum to Port Sudan on the Red Sea. Iran offered the Sudanese army support through arms, materials, and drones to ingratiate itself with Burhan and the government. Satellite imagery shows Iranian Mohajer-6 drones under the control of Burhan’s forces – the same drones Iran supplied to Russia for use in the Ukraine war.
Iran asked the Sudanese government to allow it to build a naval base on the Red Sea, but the request was denied. Since then, Iran has scaled down the request. It offered Sudan direct military support against the Rapid Support Forces in exchange for allowing Iran to install a naval presence in Port Sudan. Media reports, however, claim Burhan rejected the deal. Sudan is also in talks with Russia to acquire Su-30 and Su-35 fighters in exchange for a larger Russian naval presence.
Iranian and Russian support to Burhan enables the Sudanese army to sustain its war effort. Russia has supplied the army with fuel, weapons, and jet components, while Iran supplied arms and drones. Taking advantage of the Sudanese army’s desperation in 2023 when it was losing the conflict, Russia secured Burhan’s permission to build a Red Sea refueling station and base for 300 Russian soldiers in exchange for support. Russia hopes the Sudanese army will win the conflict, guaranteeing Moscow’s ability to maintain a presence in the Red Sea, close to U.S. air and naval assets in the Gulf. Sudan’s foreign minister recently announced that the deal had been finalized. Iranian and Russian support to Burhan has been critical in helping the Sudanese army regain momentum – it is on the verge of fully retaking Khartoum from the Rapid Support Forces.
Iran has already demonstrated its ability to disrupt the Red Sea. The attacks on shipping from the Houthis, an Iranian proxy, forced shipping companies to divert trade to the Cape of Good Hope, increasing the shipping duration by 10-14 days. Iran recognized the effectiveness of disrupting trade to cause pain to its adversaries and is working on supplying the Houthis with advanced Russian missiles, allowing for more accurate strikes against ships. As Iranian influence expands in the Red Sea, the United States, Israel, and the UAE are closely watching developments between Iran and Sudan.
If the Iranians can entrench themselves in the Red Sea through permanent naval installations, they may be difficult to dislodge. Tehran has learned from its past experiences with Sudan and will have developed contingencies to protect its investment. Burhan’s actions suggest he is wary of Iranian influence. However, as Russian and Iranian support in the civil war against the Rapid Support Forces continues to be decisive, Iran may have the chance it needs to establish a foothold in the Red Sea.
