The four-month-old military conflict in Sudan seems poised for rapid descent into a broader, full-scale civil war if stalled diplomatic efforts are unable to get traction in the coming days and weeks. A U.S.- and Saudi-led mediation effort in Jeddah, currently on pause, is likely to kick back into gear shortly. Meanwhile, on the ground, Sudan’s capital, the epicenter of the fighting, has been catastrophically damaged and systematically looted, with an accompanying collapse in basic services, commerce, and banking. The fighting has spread to several provinces, including volatile Darfur, the scene of horrific atrocities and devastating loss of life in the 2003-05 Darfur conflict.

The current conflict pits Sudan’s army, led by de facto head of state Lt. Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, against the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces, led by Lt. Gen. Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo, popularly called Hemedti. The Rapid Support Forces is a formidable, battle-hardened ground force, although it lacks the air power and armor of the armed forces. Fighting between the two armed factions erupted in mid-April after their partnership in a post-coup transition government fell apart over anticipated steps that would have required the integration of the Rapid Support Forces into Sudan’s regular armed forces.

Rivals Seek Upper Hand While Sudan’s People Suffer the Fallout

The Rapid Support Forces presently has the upper hand in Khartoum, with its forces also surrounding the besieged army headquarters and leadership, including Burhan. The Rapid Support Forces is also strong in Darfur, which includes the tribal and power base of Hemedti (who is of Chadian Arab descent), centered in areas along the border with neighboring Chad. Sudan’s armed forces dominate much of the rest of the country, including strategic Port Sudan. Each side at present seems to believe, for different reasons, that time is on its side. The Rapid Support Forces is focused on its successful siege of army leadership and control of Khartoum, while the army is convinced its control in other parts of the country and the Rapid Support Forces’ narrow base of support will keep the Rapid Support Forces isolated and vulnerable if the conflict spreads.

In the meantime, Sudan’s people are suffering as the country’s institutions for basic service provision, trade, and finance have collapsed. Its elites have fled, thrusting the already impoverished country headlong into a humanitarian nightmare. The conflict has displaced some 4 million people, including nearly 890,000 who have fled to neighboring countries, and 24 million people (half of the country’s population) are in need of food and other basic relief.

The Risks Spelled Out

The risks if this conflict continues, or escalates, are enormous. For starters, there is the possibility of all-out civil war and state collapse if some kind of diplomatic intervention is unable to bend the current trajectory toward a mediated, peaceful outcome. There is also the risk of destabilizing neighboring countries, including Chad and South Sudan. Additionally, there is the likelihood of intervention by neighbors or others, through proxy forces and shipments of arms, in support of either of the warring factions or other warlords and tribal leaders in Sudan likely to jump into the conflict if the fighting isn’t tamped down. Egypt has close, long-standing ties to Sudan’s armed forces and deep concerns about an increasing terrorist threat on its southern border and the Rapid Support Forces’ close ties to Egypt’s regional rival, Ethiopia. While Egypt could invade, it is more likely to continue covert support, including sharing intelligence and tactical support or, possibly, arms. Thickening the strategic plot, Egypt’s long-time ally and financial backer, the United Arab Emirates, is a strong ally of the Rapid Support Forces, likely rendering any overt Egyptian intervention difficult. Recent media accounts report the UAE has been surreptitiously sending arms to the Rapid Support Forces, which the UAE has denied.

Stability in the Sahel and Horn of Africa could also be put at risk. While the Sudan conflict did not directly influence the late July coup in Niger, developments in the volatile Sahel region, Africa’s “coup belt,” are clearly reverberating. In the meantime, the Sahel, which Sudan borders on the east, has become the “global epicenter” of terrorism. The 2021 coup in Sudan and the violence it is provoking, and the five other military coups in the region since July 2021, have dealt a “significant blow” to counterterrorism efforts in the Sahel, according to counterterrorism experts.

Prospects for U.S.-Saudi Mediation

The U.S.- and Saudi-led mediation channel has had little to show for its efforts. It functioned from May to July with intermittent disruptions before running aground over cease-fire violations and is expected to resume again shortly. Some observers believe Washington and Riyadh should consider inviting the UAE and Egypt, key states with influence over the military rivals, to join the mediation initiative. Given the risk of competing, distracting mediation initiatives, U.S. and Saudi diplomats also have to weigh the advantages of including the African Union. To date, Sudan’s civilians have not been included, apparently at the insistence of warring parties, but that is also likely on the agenda to address, possibly in a parallel set of discussions.

Despite, or perhaps because of, the dire circumstances on the ground, diplomats have no choice but to try to move forward with mediation to try to contain the fighting in Sudan and prevent the worst scenarios analysts are warning about. Resumed diplomatic efforts are likely to draw significant attention as limited prospects for success alternate with predictions of failure. A number of other aspects of the crisis are also likely to attract continued attention. Observers will be carefully assessing which countries are intervening to shape the fighting on the ground. The question many will be asking is whether the conflict in Sudan risks reversing the general trend in the broader region for consolidation, retrenchment, and extrication from conflict. Observers are also likely to continue to contribute to the intense post-mortem on the United States’ failed democracy efforts in Sudan and more broadly, with partisans calling for building it back better and democracy’s skeptics engaging in schadenfreude-ian finger wagging to dismiss its relevance. And finally, given the Wagner Group’s active role in Sudan, Niger, and other countries of the Sahel, there are likely to be a few lines of inquiry about the extent to which Russia and its narrative and Wagner Group have stolen a march on the West, in the Global South.