This publication is part of AGSIW’s U.S. Presidential Election series.
The U.S. presidential election pitting former President Donald J. Trump of the Republican Party against current Vice President Kamala Harris of the Democratic Party will be a nail-biter. Polls show an extremely close race in all the swing states, whose electoral votes will determine the winner in the convoluted Electoral College system the United States uses to elect its presidents. The outcome of the election will have only marginal immediate effects on U.S. policy toward the Gulf states and in the Middle East more generally. Both candidates are generally supportive of the Israeli war effort against Gaza and Lebanon, with some rhetorical differences. Neither has made Gulf policy a major element of their campaign. However, Trump and Harris do have some important differences on policy toward the region that could have a medium-term impact and on general economic policy that could affect overall world energy demand in the longer term.
Trump or Harris? No Immediate Change
Neither candidate promises immediate changes in U.S. policy in either the Gulf or Middle East more generally. While Harris has expressed more concern in her public statements for the safety of Palestinian civilians and for Palestinian national self-determination than Trump has, she has not deviated from the policy of the administration of President Joseph R. Biden Jr. of almost complete practical support for Israeli policy in the wake of the October 7, 2023 Hamas attack on Israel. Whether Harris’ position is deeply felt or simply a reflection of her loyal service as Biden’s vice president is an open question, but there is little indication that her core beliefs on the U.S. relationship with Israel are substantially different from Biden’s. She does represent a generational change in a Democratic Party whose younger cadres are less reflexively supportive of Israel and more open to arguments in favor of Palestinian rights. However, those sentiments tend to reside among Democrats younger still than Harris, who has been a conventional pro-Israeli Democrat in her career to this point. Harris has supported the Biden administration’s participation in the defense of Israel against Iranian missile attacks. Trump has implied that, if he were president, neither Iran nor Hamas would have dared to attack Israel, without explaining how his mere presence in the Oval Office would have deterred them.
Neither candidate has advocated for a reduction in the U.S. security commitment to the Gulf specifically or the Middle East in general. This is a dramatic change from the last three presidential transitions. Barack Obama, Trump, and Biden all came into office promising to reduce the U.S. military and diplomatic commitment to the Middle East and “pivot” U.S. resources to East Asia. Biden is the only one of them to take a major step in that direction, ending the U.S. military presence in Afghanistan roughly on the timetable agreed to by Trump (though Trump criticized Biden’s implementation of the withdrawal). However, none of them could avoid direct involvement in the region. Obama committed U.S. forces to the fight in Iraq and Syria against the Islamic State group while ensuring fairly robust burden-sharing on the effort with key allies and partners. Trump continued the anti-ISIS campaign and ratcheted up pressure on Iran through his “maximum pressure” policy. Biden worked to bring about the normalization of ties between Saudi Arabia and Israel, offered Riyadh a defense treaty as part of that effort, and has committed U.S. forces to the post-October 7 defense of Israel and to a naval campaign against Yemen’s Houthis.
Perhaps as a result of the intense U.S. focus on the region since the October 7 attack, neither Trump nor Harris has talked about a “pivot” away from the Middle East. While fears among the United States’ Gulf partners about Washington’s reliability remain, there is no indication that either candidate envisions a major change in the U.S. military posture in the Gulf. Also missing from the campaign rhetoric this time is disparagement of Saudi Arabia. Both Trump in 2016 and Biden in 2020 were critical of Saudi Arabia in their campaigns, with Biden going as far as labeling the country a “pariah.” In office, both came around to the importance of good relations with Riyadh – Trump more quickly than Biden. This time, both candidates appear to recognize the centrality of Saudi Arabia to the success of any diplomatic initiative in the region.
The Medium Term: Similarities on the Gulf States, Differences on Iran
Trump’s policies in the Gulf are easier to forecast, as he has a track record as president. While his rhetorical outbursts, social media obsessions, and fondness for keeping both friends and foes off guard give him a reputation for inconsistency, across the daily flux of life around Trump are a number of consistent positions. He has a very short-term, transactional view of foreign policy combined with a mercantilist notion of economics. Given the wealth of the Gulf states, he wants good relations with them and wants them to buy American, whether it be weapons, nuclear plants, or high-tech systems. Trump would probably adopt Biden’s initiative offering Saudi Arabia a security treaty and assistance in developing its nuclear infrastructure, though he would likely face almost solid Democratic opposition in the next Congress to these proposals. Trump sees China as the United States’ major competitor and would want the Gulf states to line up with Washington on any issue that pits it against Beijing. He views Iran as a major Middle East opponent and would likely be surrounded by aides and cabinet secretaries that reflect the hard-line Republican position on Iran. Trump, obsessed with his self-perceived skills as a deal-maker, will occasionally muse about what a “great deal” he could negotiate with Iran, but the people who would staff his administration would be committed to the previous Trump policy of “maximum pressure” on Tehran.
Viewing China as the United States’ most important global challenge has become one of the few issues on which there is bipartisan consensus, so a Harris administration would also want to keep the Gulf states on the U.S. side economically and diplomatically in the emerging China-U.S. cold war. The China factor is one of the most important animating elements in the Biden administration’s willingness to offer Saudi Arabia a new level of U.S. security commitment. Since Harris would likely staff much of her foreign policy team with Biden veterans, she would likely take a similar approach to bilateral relations with the Gulf states. Whether Harris would be as willing to offer the Saudis the set of specific agreements that Biden has remains to be seen, but she does not seem to be approaching the Oval Office with the same anti-Saudi predilections of some other leading Democrats.
Where a Harris administration would differ most clearly from a second Trump administration is on Iran. Given Iran’s attacks on Israel in April and October, there would be no immediate Harris outreach to Tehran. However, a nuclear agreement with Iran has been a cornerstone of Middle East policy for the last two Democratic presidents. Obama was able to negotiate the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action nuclear deal with Iran; Biden sought a return to that agreement but was unable to pull it off. The Democratic foreign policy establishment sees an agreement that moves Iran back from potential weaponization as a major win for U.S. security interests in the region and has been highly critical of Trump’s withdrawal from the JCPOA. Given the public statements of Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian signaling a desire to return to nuclear negotiations, it is highly likely that sometime during a Harris presidency bilateral Iranian-U.S. talks on nuclear issues would resume, assuming the current Israel -Iran escalation does not push things in a direction that forecloses this possibility.
The Longer Term: Energy Demand and the Global Economy
On the surface, Trump and Harris seem to have very different approaches to energy issues. Trump withdrew the United States from the Paris climate accords and promises to do so again; Obama negotiated the Paris accords and Biden rejoined them. Harris would undoubtedly maintain the formal U.S. commitments under the Paris accords. However, on practical questions of energy production, there would be no difference between a Trump and Harris administration. Trump repeats the mantra of “drill, baby, drill,” while Harris talks about the need to deal with climate change, but both would continue to encourage the significant growth in U.S. oil and gas production. Their differences would be centered more on the extent to which the United States should encourage and subsidize cleaner energy alternatives.
The more important energy implications of this election are in world economic growth, and thus world energy demand. Trump has advocated for a radical shift in the post-World War II U.S. stance of encouraging global trade and, thus, global economic growth. It is true that the Biden administration has maintained most of the previous Trump tariffs and limitations on trade with China and has adopted a more interventionist policy of supporting U.S. manufacturing. A Harris administration would likely continue those specific initiatives. However, neither Biden nor Harris has ever supported the kinds of massive tariff increases that Trump has talked about during the campaign. If he can implement this dramatic shift toward protectionist policies, which is an open question, Trump would likely kick off a global trade war that could drastically reduce the overall levels of global trade. Such a scenario could lead to reduced economic growth around the world, which could substantially lower global energy demand. Such a shift in the global economic picture could have extremely deleterious consequences for the economies of the Gulf states.
Indirect and Long-Term Consequences
The short-term effects of the U.S. presidential election for policy toward the Middle East and the Gulf region specifically are likely to be minimal. Neither a Trump nor Harris administration will substantially shift the current approach of the Biden administration. The bipartisan consensus about China will push either candidate, once in office, toward sustaining cooperative relations with the Gulf states. The biggest difference between the two candidates, and their parties more generally, on the Middle East is policy toward Iran. Trump would likely return to the “maximum pressure” policies he pursued during his earlier term. Harris, following the line of the last two Democratic presidents, would seek a renewal of nuclear negotiations with Iran. Perhaps the most consequential effect of the election on the Gulf states would be indirect and long term. The kind of global trade war that Trump’s proposed tariff policies would kick off could have massive negative consequences for global economic growth and energy demand, affecting all the Gulf energy exporters.
