Since the creation of the Summit of South American-Arab Countries in 2005, an initiative driven by Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva to boost trade, the United Arab Emirates’ engagement in Latin America, particularly South America, has developed and expanded. This has been particularly apparent as economic diversification efforts in the Gulf have accelerated in recent years, motivating the UAE to seek increased international trade, investment, and strategic opportunities.

Trade between South America and the Arab states rose from $11 billion in 2008 to $30 billion in 2012. A decade later, trade between the Gulf Cooperation Council states and Latin America, standing at around $20 billion in 2020, was growing largely on the back of Gulf imports, which amounted to $9.6 billion in 2016 but rose to $17.2 billion in 2019 before falling back slightly to $15.4 billion in 2020. Brazil accounted for almost half of those exports, and UAE-Brazil non-oil trade alone reached $4.3 billion in 2022, and total trade volume between the UAE and Latin America reached $9 billion. Meanwhile, GCC states invested $4 billion in Latin America between 2016 and 2021, 77% of which came from the UAE. The UAE has ambitions to build trade hubs in the region, such as DP World’s port facilities in Callao, Peru, and to become a major import hub for iron ore, oil, and gold from South America. It also hopes to support and expand Emirati investments in local South American companies.

At the security level, some South and Central American states have provided direct military support to the UAE. For example, in 2015, the UAE reportedly deployed 450 mercenaries from Columbia to fight in Yemen. The UAE has also imported Colombian arms for use against the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant. More important to the UAE military-industrial complex have been deals with Brazilian arms companies, which represent higher value propositions in terms of technology transfers and joint ventures. There is an additional Emirati interest in enhancing food security. For example, the UAE government and over a dozen Emirati companies coordinate under a “food security alliance” established in 2015. They have invested in 19 countries, including some in South America. The UAE’s minister of state for international cooperation, Reem Al Hashimy, visited Venezuela and Guyana in June to discuss energy, investment, science and technology, and food security. 

Shared leadership outlooks directly affect the touchstones of Gulf-South America cooperation. For example, former Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro’s alignment with the Middle East policies of the administration of President Donald J. Trump – especially isolating Iran, containing violent Islamist groups, such as Hezbollah, and promoting ties among Israel and the Gulf states, meshed well with the UAE’s security priorities but were a departure from the policies of many of his predecessors. Bolsonaro’s term coincided with Interpol building a presence in 2019 in the tri-border area (between Brazil, Argentina, and Paraguay) – a hub for various illicit activities by Iranian-backed Hezbollah. Indeed, Interpol has been led by Emirati Major General Ahmed Naser Al-Raisi since 2021.

By working with Brazil, a regional power, the UAE is set to benefit from being the first mover among the Gulf states and gaining possible leverage in efforts to reach a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement with the Mercosur countries – the political and economic bloc comprised of Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay. Such agreements are important contributors to the UAE’s economic growth, and reaching one with the Mercosur countries would significantly deepen Emirati economic and political relations in South America. However, the talks have been overshadowed by Brazil’s focus on concluding a trade deal with the European Union. Such delays do not appear to have dented the UAE’s intent on building relations in the region, illustrated by the UAE’s continued pursuit of bilateral economic agreements with other regional states, such as Colombia. A Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement with Mercosur countries would be a logical follow on to the UAE’s closer political and economic alignment with Brazil and other members of the Global South, which it solidified by joining the BRICS grouping in August (Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Egypt were also invited) and by becoming a dialogue partner of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in May (along with Kuwait and Bahrain).

Increasing engagement through multilateral forums builds on close bilateral ties that have developed since Lula’s first official visit to the country in 2003. The relationship continues to be characterized by continued growth and potential, especially with Lula back in office. So far, the Russia-Ukraine war has only reinforced Brazil’s misgivings about the global order, which are matched by pushback from some Gulf states against U.S. pressure to strongly side with Ukraine. Further, Brazil and the Gulf states appear to have a similar perspective on the Israel-Hamas conflict. For instance, Lula called for an end to the “insanity of war” and said Israel’s response in Gaza has been “as grave” as the Hamas attack. However, there are risks that could undermine commercial relations built on a generally compatible global and regional outlook. South America continues to experience low economic growth, and further leadership changes in the region could reorientate relations to a more ideological rather than pragmatic approach. Following its recent mediation in the Israel-Hamas conflict, Qatar is being touted to mediate Venezuela and Guyana’s escalating border dispute having already served as a neutral space for U.S.-Venezuelan talks, perhaps giving Doha greater appeal and influence in both South American countries and reinvigorating an element of competition in Gulf engagement in the region.

As the UAE and Brazil end their 2023 terms as nonpermanent members of the U.N. Security Council, the two countries will likely continue to cooperate on substantive issues. For instance, the Brazilian Air Force’s Department of Aerospace Science and Technology is planning to cooperate with the UAE’s EDGE Group on developing defense systems and space technology. In the lead up to the UAE’s hosting of the U.N. Climate Change Conference, COP 28, the UAE and Brazil led a high-level ministerial dialogue on building water resilient food systems and signed an agreement on climate change. However, as the leadership of Mercosur will pass from Brazil to Paraguay in the first half of 2024, the window of opportunity to negotiate a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement may close due to the UAE’s less-developed ties with Paraguay. In response, the UAE will likely continue to emphasize a broadening of diplomatic and economic ties in South America to reach a free trade deal, further enhancing the potential for trade and investment to draw these states, and the two regions more broadly, even closer in the years to come.