Saudi Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan, during a July 14 official visit to Turkey, stated that “he was the fourth Saudi minister to visit Turkey within a month.” A week prior, Defense Minister Khalid bin Salman visited Turkey, meeting Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and officials from the Defense Ministry and industry.

Saudi Arabia’s burgeoning political and defense cooperation with Turkey has attracted significant attention, especially following visits by these top Saudi officials, which have paved the way for the signing of key cooperation agreements. Turkish policymakers have hailed the pace of advancements in relations with Saudi Arabia, stating that 2024 could be a “golden year” in Turkish-Saudi economic ties. Beyond the aspirations of policymakers from both countries, evolving regional dynamics are providing critical support for the development of closer Turkish-Saudi relations.

Positioning Amid Evolving Geopolitical Order

In recent years, there has been substantial focus on the perceived decline of U.S. influence in the region, as it shifts focus to Asia, accompanied by assessments of the possible consequences for Washington’s traditional allies, including Ankara and Riyadh. Amid concerns over these evolving geopolitical dynamics and perceptions, as prominent Saudi analyst Aziz Alghashian echoes, Turkey’s rapprochement with Saudi Arabia is progressing as the two middle powers seek to diversify their partnerships in the region. Turkey and Saudi Arabia have responded to these changes in various ways, including by embracing their middle power status and seeking to enhance their global influence. Policymakers and analysts in both countries have concluded the two states’ middle power aspirations are better served, generally speaking, by supporting rather than seeking to undermine each other’s efforts.

This marks a significant turnaround in Turkish-Saudi relations, which had been very strained for nearly a decade due to the countries’ divergent views during the Arab Spring uprisings, views hardened on each side by ideological fixations that have taken a decade to moderate. However, the broader global geopolitical landscape, influenced by the Russia-Ukraine war, regional anger over the Israel-Hamas conflict, and various U.S. policies all played a key role in prompting Turkey and Saudi Arabia to reassess their relationship in fundamental ways.

Turkey, although a significant regional competitor for Saudi Arabia, was considered a partner by Saudi policymakers in the pre-Arab Spring era. Such perceptions were strengthened by early outreach to the Gulf Arab states after Erdogan became prime minister in 2003. Relations with Riyadh strengthened considerably in this period, despite a long history of competition for leadership of the Sunni Muslim world. The upswing in relations continued into the late 2000s. In 2008, Turkey was the first non-Gulf country to be designated a strategic ally of the Gulf Cooperation Council. During this time, Saudi leaders even raised the possibility of Turkey replacing the United States as the security guarantor for the kingdom. After Ankara began building a military base in Qatar in 2014, Turkey proposed establishing a similar base in Saudi Arabia. However, Riyadh rejected the offer in June 2017, amid rising tensions between the two countries exacerbated by the Gulf crisis with Qatar. With the 2021 Al-Ula resolution of the Saudi-led dispute with Qatar in the rearview mirror, evolving dynamics in the region are once again leading Saudi Arabia to consider Turkey a vital security partner.

Cooperation Agreements

Shifts in threat perception and security orientation have pushed Saudi Arabia and Turkey to consolidate their political and economic relations through security and defense collaboration. Although Saudi Arabia continues to remain largely dependent on Western weaponry, it has also recently sought to benefit from Turkey’s military expertise and power – underscored by the success of Turkish-made drones used in recent conflicts. In July 2023, Saudi Arabia agreed to buy Turkish drones from Baykar in the biggest defense contract in Turkey’s history. During the defense minister’s visit, Saudi Arabian Military Industries, or SAMI, signed three memorandums of understanding with Turkish companies – Baykar, Aselsan, and Fergani – to support the kingdom in its localization of the defense industry. SAMI will participate in the production of Baykar drones, with Riyadh aiming for more than 70% of production to be conducted in the kingdom. In his tenure as foreign minister, Faisal bin Farhan, perhaps as a result of his experience as a former SAMI board member, has continued to emphasize the necessary interplay between foreign policy and defense industry development.

During the foreign minister’s visit, Ankara and Riyadh signed an amended protocol for the minutes establishing the Saudi-Turkish Coordination Council, which was launched in 2016 with the goal of strengthening relations between the two countries. Faisal bin Farhan said the second coordination meeting would be held in Riyadh soon. In addition to these political commitments, Turkish and Saudi state-led research institutions have been working closely, as part of Track II diplomacy, to foster policy engagement at the leadership level, supported by engagement at the public, academic, and media levels.

Regional Initiatives

Turkey has recently turned its focus to restoring ties with Syria. During a press conference with his Saudi counterpart, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan said he was confident the kingdom would play a constructive role in that process. In May, Saudi Arabia appointed its first ambassador to Syria after more than a decade of severed ties. The move came after Syria, with pivotal Saudi support, was readmitted into the Arab League in May 2023, and Syrian President Bashar al-Assad was warmly welcomed at the Arab League summit held in Saudi Arabia. While Syria was previously an arena for Saudi Arabia and Turkey to compete for regional influence, Ankara now sees opportunities to partner with Riyadh on Syria, particularly regarding funding for postconflict reconstruction.

Beyond Syria, Saudi Arabia and Turkey also share concerns regarding the risk of full-blown conflict between Israel and Iranian-allied groups across the region, particularly Hezbollah in Lebanon. Riyadh and Ankara were part of the Gaza Contact Group working toward a cease-fire in Gaza and are pushing for a two-state solution between the Israelis and Palestinians more generally. Yet, the two regional powers have both domestic and regional pressures discouraging them from assuming a greater role in the ongoing war in Gaza.

Future Uncertainty

In the past, ideological challenges tested Turkish-Saudi relations. There is no guarantee that new conflicts or issues in the region won’t similarly prompt a new flare up of tensions between the two states. For now, however, Turkey and Saudi Arabia are capitalizing on their shared concerns regarding the region and focusing on deepening their political and security partnerships to bridge their past differences.