Following the May 22 appointment of Rear Admiral Ali Akbar Ahmadian as Supreme National Security Council secretary, Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi issued a decree stating: “I’m expecting of you to adopt ‘innovative’ and ‘smart’ approaches … advancing societal, political, and economic security.” The decree further tasked Ahmadian with “synergizing the work of the intelligence, security, executive, and judicial organs of the state.” What do the Iranian president’s references to security and synergy mean, and how is Ahmadian likely to tackle these tasks? A survey of Raisi’s general usage of the terms can help decode the decree. And a survey of Ahmadian’s academic writings, lectures, and political speeches provides a small glimpse into the fundamental tenets of his thinking. Analyzing policy options available to Ahmadian, and the regime at large, to counter security threats may be the best way to predict his and the regime’s future behavior.

Decoding the Decree

Raisi’s usage of the words “societal, political, and economic security” is an expression of the regime’s traditional sources of legitimacy, which are eroding and exposing it to security risks, such as popular protest. The regime’s religious and popular legitimacy are declining along with the legitimacy derived from its performance as a service and resource provider. Under the Islamic Republic, Iranian society has become less religious, which undercuts the religious legitimacy of the regime, as documented by the Headquarters for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice. Due to electoral engineering, Iran has also become less representative and the regime suffers from weakened popular legitimacy as voters increasingly boycott elections due to the lack of real choice. Last, international sanctions and mismanagement, as acknowledged by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, have adversely affected the regime’s performance as a service and resource provider. These are the risks that Raisi is tasking Ahmadian to manage.

The president’s use of the word “synergy” on the other hand, refers to the Islamic Republic’s parallel state institutions with overlapping fields of responsibility. Parallel institutions, such as the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps or the now defunct neighborhood watch Committees of the Islamic Revolution, emerged in 1979 to protect the nascent regime against existing institutions, including the Imperial Army and Imperial Police. The revolutionaries were probably aware that parallel structures result in increased cost and suboptimal performance but sacrificed money, and to some extent efficacy of the institutions, to mitigate the risk of a coup or counterrevolution. Still facing these internal security risks to the regime, Raisi is now tasking Ahmadian with “synergizing” the work of redundant parallel state institutions in a manner that will reduce cost and increase efficacy.

Insight Into the Mind of Ahmadian

Ahmadian’s thinking on these subjects is to some extent reflected in the extremely small body of his public talks and academic work. He delivered two lectures at military seminars, published seven articles in Iranian academic journals during his tenure as IRGC Strategic Studies Center chief, and was interviewed or spoke in public 17 times.

Unsurprisingly, Ahmadian’s speeches and writings are thematically related to his responsibilities, which changed over time. In his capacity as IRGC navy deputy from 1988-97 and IRGC navy chief from 1997-2000, Ahmadian’s interviews were reflections of Iran’s disastrous encounters with the U.S. Navy during the latter part of the war with Iraq. Other repeated themes include Iran’s opposition to the U.S. Navy’s regional presence and announcements regarding war games aimed at improving the IRGC navy’s asymmetric warfare capabilities. As IRGC Joint Staff chief from 2000-07, Ahmadian’s speeches thematically shifted to asymmetric joint naval operations. His experiences, writings, and speeches on joint IRGC and regular military exercises likely helped him appreciate the difficulties of coordinating the work of rival military organizations.

Of potential relevance to Ahmadian’s position as SNSC secretary are his writings and speeches during his tenure as IRGC Strategic Studies Center chief since 2007. His predecessor, Brigadier General Mohammad Ali Jafari, assumed Iran was the target of a U.S.-sponsored “velvet revolution.” Therefore, Jafari argued the IRGC should primarily focus on future internal, rather than external, military threats to the Islamic Republic’s stability. Jafari’s concerns about internal threats were vindicated in the wake of countrywide protests in 2009, and Ahmadian’s work continued in the same vein.

In his August 2015 article “Threat Perception According to the Leaders of the Islamic Republic,” Ahmadian concluded that “soft threats,” such as cultural threats and the threat of cyber war, have replaced the “hard threat” of the United States using military force against Iran. A November 2015 article repeated most of the arguments but also called the domestic opposition and critics of the Islamic Republic “enemy infiltrators.” Quoting Khamenei, Ahmadian warned against those who “express the viewpoints of the enemy,” those who allegedly “share the wishes of the enemy,” and those who spread “pessimism and apathy among the people and officials.” A March 2016 article, which is a word-for-word repetition of the previous articles, concluded that concentration of decision-making authority with the supreme leader is the only way to foil sinister enemy plots.

Putting History Into Practice

As SNSC secretary, Ahmadian will doubtlessly try to put his experiences and writings on joint IRGC and regular military exercises to good use, but he will likely discover the complexities of aligning conflicting interests of Iran’s government bureaucracies. Sooner or later, he must make a choice between the IRGC and the diplomats of the Foreign Ministry, and his background highly suggests that he will side will his comrades from the IRGC. As for “synergizing” the work of parallel government institutions, Ahmadian is likely to impose the IRGC’s threat perception, and means to mitigate those threats, on rival institutions engaged in internal policing, such as the Law Enforcement Forces and Intelligence Ministry. In other words, Ahmadian is likely to represent the interests of the IRGC rather than act as an impartial coordinator synergizing the work of Iran’s parallel institutions.

As for the security risks referred to in Raisi’s decree, no degree of social engineering can help the regime make society more religious. The enforcement of religious policies will be increasingly up to the IRGC. For example, should the IRGC perceive it in its organizational interest to enforce the dress code for women as an instrument to terrorize the middle class, it will do so. Conversely, it may opt for relaxing enforcement to reduce tensions between the state and society. Whichever solution the IRGC proposes will be adopted by Ahmadian.

With regard to the weakened popular legitimacy of the regime, none of Ahmadian’s writings or speeches point to a desire for a more representative polity; unsurprisingly his views reflect those of a regime that appears to be further limiting political representation. And as for the legitimacy of the regime as a provider of services and resources, Ahmadian will side with the IRGC. Due to the United States’ withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, Iran never really benefitted from the nuclear agreement, and Ahmadian most likely shares the IRGC’s viewpoint that the society must accept hardships until Iran achieves its nuclear objectives.

The role of the Supreme National Security Council secretary in the Islamic Republic of Iran is comparable to that of the assistant to the president for national security affairs, commonly known as the national security advisor. In both systems, the secretary or advisor ideally acts as an honest broker between competing state bureaucracies and leaves the final decision making to the president. There is not much in Ahmadian’s career that suggests he will act as an honest broker between competing state bureaucracies in his capacity as SNSC secretary.