In remarks during his annual speech at the shrine city of Mashhad on the occasion of the Persian New Year, which fell on March 21, Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei touched on the perception that Iran is increasingly alienated from the rest of the world. “The efforts and strengths of the Iranian nation resulted in us being able to join a number of important regional treaties. We weren’t isolated. Quite the contrary: We rose to prominence, and our relations with the regional governments and nations were empowered,” Khamenei said. “Strong relations with Africa and Latin America are part of our definite agenda and, God willing, we will pursue this plan,” he added.
But despite the tendency of Iranian officials to present Iran’s supposedly strong ties with African states as a replacement for its atrophying relations with the European Union and lack of diplomatic ties with the United States, Iran has failed to forge robust partnerships across Africa. Iranian officials frequently talk about Africa’s untapped potential for trade. At present, however, Iranian-African trade remains marginal. According to the Iran and Africa Business Club, the trade volume between Iran and African countries reached just over $1.2 billion from March 21, 2022 to February 19, 2023. The Foreign Ministry speculates that trade with Africa will exceed $2 billion in 2023, which is still quite limited.
Over this period, the top destination for Iran’s exports in Africa was South Africa, importing goods totaling $304 million. South Africa exported $13.7 million worth of goods to Iran, as well. With figures this low, Iran is not even included among South Africa’s top 25 trade partners. And Tehran has failed to court other African heavyweights.
Tehran’s footprint in the region pales in comparison to that of its neighbors. Saudi Arabia’s trade with South Africa exceeded $4.8 billion in 2021, and the kingdom is now seizing on $15 billion in deals signed with South Africa in 2022 to pursue long-term cooperation on renewable energy, industry, mining, tourism, and agriculture. Turkey reached over $34 billion in trade with African states in 2021 and has launched joint business councils with 45 countries on the continent.
With fewer than 20 embassies in Africa, Iran’s limited diplomatic presence underscores its lack of a vision for developing comprehensive relationships in Africa to compensate for its isolation elsewhere. In contrast, Turkey has embassies in 44 African countries, which it has used to develop strategic and diplomatic clout across the continent. Likewise, while Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has visited 30 African countries since taking power in 2003, former Iranian President Hassan Rouhani didn’t visit Africa during his eight years in office, and the same holds true for his successor, Ebrahim Raisi, almost two years into his presidency. In late April, the Iranian government announced plans for Raisi to visit several unnamed African countries later in the year, and some African heads of state and government have been invited to Tehran as well.
Tehran’s diplomatic absence is not the only reason it has been relegated to the role of a junior player on the world’s second-largest continent. Iran is also perceived as a malign actor by many governments in Africa – largely due to its efforts to export its favored version of political Islam – making them suspicious of Iran’s intentions and reluctant to embrace it as a trusted partner.
Morocco, a key player in the Muslim world and Africa’s sixth-largest economy, has been consistently antagonized by Iran, and the two countries’ relations have been checkered for years. In 2009, Rabat severed relations with Tehran after an advisor to Khamenei questioned Bahrain’s sovereignty while charging Iran with seeking to spread Shia Islam across Sunni-majority Morocco. After restoring relations five years later, Morocco cut diplomatic ties with Iran again in 2018, accusing it of using Hezbollah to support the Polisario independence movement.
Iran’s relations aren’t much better with Egypt, which doesn’t have an official embassy in Iran and maintains travel restrictions on Iranians. Egypt’s 1979 peace treaty with Israel has long displeased Iranian officials, who, despite the emergence of the Abraham Accords and related Israeli-Gulf security cooperation, still bitterly view the pact as a toehold for Israel to integrate itself into the Muslim world.
Sporadic efforts aimed at a thaw have been mounted with the reform movement’s emergence in Iran in the late 1990s, and former President Mohammad Khatami’s trip to Cairo in 2007 was a landmark visit that played a role in the two Muslim world powers working toward mending fences. Relations deteriorated under the hard-line President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, and no ground was broken under his successor, Rouhani. However, there have been discussions recently about the possibility of a detente and improved relations. For instance, the Iranian Foreign Ministry has publicly acknowledged Tehran’s interest in developing new bonds with Cairo and repairing a damaged relationship.
Despite the supreme leader’s New Year assertions, Iran’s efforts to strengthen its foreign relations in key regions, including Africa, have made little headway. The ruling elites’ putative commitment to engagement in Africa hasn’t produced concrete successes to validate their assertion that forging ties on the continent will allow Iran to overcome diplomatic and economic isolation. Countries in Africa indeed boast substantial capacities and resources that make them attractive economic and diplomatic partners, but without the theory of synergy translating into a detailed roadmap, no breakthrough should be expected for Iran’s overseas agenda.
