In an attempt to achieve diversified, knowledge-based economies, Gulf Cooperation Council states have sought to systematically increase the visibility and participation of their citizens in the labor force. Long-term GCC residents, however, many of whom are not nationals but were born and raised in the region, are commonly overlooked by stakeholders and experts alike. This discounts the reality of these workers caught between precarious residency laws and strict citizenship laws; they must contend with the fact that they may need to suddenly depart if their visa is annulled or expires. If GCC governments consider changing their residency laws and integrating some intergenerational migrants into a reformed residency scheme that does not equate to GCC citizenship and its privileges, it could create more buy-in and increase retention of talent and skill sets GCC countries need. The most notable benefit for this intergenerational migrant class would be a secured residency status that protects against abrupt departure. Creating more residence security for this intergenerational human capital could be integral to improving objective achievement strategies and mitigating some socioeconomic challenges.
Such a residency reform would, perhaps surprisingly, help Gulf countries address their citizens’ overdependence on quotas for hiring locals that is causing distortions in the labor market. Several Gulf Arab states have launched strategies aimed at encouraging recruitment of citizens by the public and private sectors (e.g., Qatarization, Emiratization, Saudization). Qatar National Vision 2030 has set a goal of at least 50% of Qataris occupying the workforce by 2030. In the United Arab Emirates, a new Emiratization law requires private sector companies to increase hiring Emiratis by 2% each year. Failure to meet this requirement will result in financial penalties. While the incentive behind the quota-driven policies is to reduce dependency on foreign labor over time, intensifying these strategies and accelerating citizen recruitment would continue to convince many GCC nationals that a high-paying job is a right conferred by nationality. Furthermore, Santiago Garcia-Couto, a professor of economics at Georgetown University’s Qatar campus, contends that such policies could create tension between the government and private sector companies. “Forcing these companies to hire nationals will exacerbate the problem, because they have their own rules and standards.” He continued that this process “takes time” in a developing economy and “requires cultural change.”
Intergenerational migrant residency reform could also help GCC countries with productivity challenges they are facing. According to a 2019 report by the International Monetary Fund, in Saudi Arabia, citizen productivity levels remain significantly lower than in other developing economies. The report also mentions that citizens’ salaries are inconsistent with their productivity levels. While this phenomenon can in part be attributable to the quality of education in the GCC states, it also has to do with citizens’ dependence on their respective governments as their main income provider. Long-term residents, however, many of whom belong to Arab and Asian families who have spent a few decades in the region, do not have access to the same benefits granted to citizens. To meet migrants’ needs while also ensuring residency reforms strengthen economies of GCC countries (and don’t create new entitlements, with an added pressure for new spending), a reformed system should draw a hard line that separates between privileges accessed by residents and GCC citizens. This way, governments in the region would have less cause to worry that workers from these Asian and Arab families would develop similar dependencies as GCC citizens. Such reforms could also help diminish skilled migrants’ “transnational behavior” that is causing an unwanted flight of skilled migrants to countries with better residency status and job security and more openness for migrants to advance to senior levels.
Anecdotal evidence helps illustrate some of the key dynamics in play. Majed, a 32-year-old Jordanian citizen, lived in the Gulf but left in pursuit of a better life in the United States. He now works in a managerial position at a leading multinational tech firm. His grandfather established the family legacy when he migrated to Qatar in the 1940s. As someone who was born and raised there, Majed tried his best to stay. However, he felt his Jordanian passport was becoming detrimental to his professional mobility in the country. Such realization “shakes you,” Majed expressed, since he considered Qatar his home. He said that, at a certain point, he felt like he would have greater opportunity to find stability elsewhere – “a country that won’t put an artificial ceiling on my accomplishments or judge my abilities based on my passport.”
Majed’s story echoes the sentiments of numerous multigenerational Gulf-born residents. They are commonly alienated by a system that broadly labels all noncitizens in the region as transient. While this is true for many expatriates, who intend to return to their country of origin or continue to seek career opportunities elsewhere, countless Gulf-born individuals feel loyal to the country in which they were born and raised. However, according to Nadeen Dakkak, a third-generation Kuwait-born migrant, “many second-generation migrants acquire a ‘transnational behavior’ as a result of their detachment from their countries of origin and the inflexible Gulf migration policies, which force them to be constantly prepared to move elsewhere.” Dakkak defines transnational behavior as a “survival mechanism,” which results from restrictions imposed on these migrants’ access to civic engagement in the Gulf and the readiness to leave the region due to the uncertainty of their residency status.
Since migrants’ residencies hinge on their sponsors, reforming residency laws for intergenerational individuals would not only bring stability in their lives but could also spur economic improvements in the labor force. According to Mira Al-Hussein, a sociologist and postdoctoral researcher at Oxford University, developing a permanent residency system involving income tax and pensions would bear fruit for the government and migrants. The state could financially profit from their labor, while migrants could live permanently in the region without the uncertainty of abrupt departure.
Furthermore, improved labor productivity and performance may result from a stable residency status. Numerous studies highlight the importance of job security in the employee-organization relationship. In a study that examines the link between job security and organizational output among 189 Jordanians, employees who were dissatisfied with their jobs or had concerns about institutional justice were found to be less productive. Majed expressed that even success does not guarantee job security, which made him constantly wonder when his time at the company would be over. “There will always be the question of ‘does this person deserve this salary?’ and ‘should a citizen be in their position?’”
If the talent pool in the national body broadens to include intergenerational migrants and long-term residents, hiring more expensive, short- and intermediate-term workers from Western countries may become limited to critical positions in some sectors. The GCC states are well known for routinely employing foreigners, particularly Westerners, to fill gaps in various professions. Not only does this limit opportunities for local talent to emerge and grow, but it also comes at a high cost, an issue the Gulf public frequently discusses. Results from a 2017 Gulf Business survey indicate that Western expatriates are paid the highest in the region, much more even than nationals. Additionally, according to Garcia-Couto, permanent residents are more likely to be economically active and invest in different areas in the country they live in than short-term expatriate workers from the West. Increasing local investment energizes the economy, helping more businesses and jobs to emerge.
In addition, the GCC states aspire to create a competitive job market in which candidates are primarily hired based on merit. Given the total number of nationals is strikingly low in these economies, and the public sector is overburdened, a secured residency status, which entails labor protection rights, may spur a domestic job-seeking competition. This could even help treat preexisting issues, including the decline in male educational performance and attainment in the region. A more competitive market might encourage more men to complete their education. Moreover, World Bank research suggests competition can boost overall productivity at the firm level as well as the quality of future job creation.
Integrating intergenerational migrants is likely to improve key aspects of GCC economies. Contrary to transient expatriates, many long-term migrants consider the country in which they were born home, despite precarious residency laws. Developing strategies that would improve the status of long-term migrants would broaden the talent pool, potentially reducing the value of quota-driven strategies and encouraging investment. Furthermore, as more locals are recognized for their qualifications, job seeking and the work environment will become more competitive. More important, granting people permanent status and stability is likely to boost overall labor productivity levels, which is critical for all GCC countries. While there is no guarantee that implementing such residency reforms would not generate a degree of backlash similar to Gulf citizens’ periodic resistance to large numbers of Western expatriates, the general view is that the long-term stays and significant degrees of integration and investment of these residents would attenuate any such reaction over the long haul.
