This piece is part of a series about Iranian-backed Shia foreign fighters and their potential impact on regional security dynamics.

Military organizations and the use of force shape the outcome of wars, but wars themselves also shape military organizations: Just as the war with Iraq from 1980 to 1988 transformed the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps from a group of ragtag militias into Iran’s pre-eminent military force, the war in Syria is transforming the IRGC, in its entirety, into an expeditionary force. Evidence of a growing number of combat fatalities in Syria of IRGC ground forces rather than members of the extraterritorial operations-focused IRGC Quds Force attests to this development.

Taking into consideration the deepening influence of the IRGC in the political structures of the Islamic Republic, this metamorphosis will most likely also bring expeditionary warfare to the forefront in Tehran’s strategic thinking. The United States and its Middle Eastern allies must therefore brace themselves for a more activist Iran as Syria veterans of the IRGC are gradually promoted to higher positions within or outside of the Revolutionary Guards.

A survey of the funeral services held in Iran for members of the IRGC and Iranian army killed in combat in Syria indicates a growing IRGC ground force presence in Syria. Among the 561 Iranians identified, at least 55 served in the Quds Force, and some of the 331 individuals whose service affiliation was not identifiable may also have served in the Quds Force. This is hardly surprising, since the Quds Force is a special operations unit tasked with operating outside Iran’s borders, a monopoly it has enjoyed since the 1986 purge of the IRGC in the wake of the Iran-Contra Affair. It is therefore all the more surprising that 148 Iranians killed in combat in Syria were identified as having served in the IRGC ground forces.

Iranians Killed in Combat in Syria by Military Branch, January 2012 – November 2018

So why did the IRGC leadership decide to deploy its ground forces in Syria? The initial losses of the IRGC’s fatalities in Syria provide some insight into this major shift: The first three IRGC personnel killed in Syria, Major Moharram Tork, Private Ali Asgari Taqanaki, and Brigadier General Hassan Shateri (also known as Hesam Khoshnevis), were all Quds Force members. Further analysis of branch affiliation of the deceased and time of death in combat indicates the Quds Force bore the brunt of the fatalities in the initial phase of the war in Syria. Since the Quds Force is a relatively small unit within the IRGC, those losses likely compelled the IRGC leadership to deploy regular ground forces to Syria to lessen the pressure on the Quds Force.

It is also likely that the magnitude of the Quds Force losses, and the prospect for the Russian air force’s military engagements in Syria and major IRGC and allied militia offensives, helped persuade Major General Qassim Suleimani, IRGC Quds Force chief commander, to give up his monopoly over the command of military operations abroad.

Russian air support and major IRGC-led offensives on the ground indeed resulted in victories but also significantly higher fatalities: IRGC ground forces appear to have suffered their first double digit loss in October 2015. This indicates that the IRGC leadership, rather than sacrificing more elite Quds Force personnel, had begun deploying the IRGC ground forces to Syria in anticipation of the offensives.

Iranians Killed in Combat in Syria by Military Branch, January 2012 – November 2018

Trained in fighting domestic unrest, but increasingly also classic warfare, the bulk of the IRGC ground forces were probably not the best choice for irregular warfare against well-armed rebel forces in Syria, but the war in Syria provided a powerful training ground, preparing them for future operations abroad. Thus, what started as a practical necessity by October 2015 could potentially change the IRGC in its entirety into an expeditionary force.

Under normal circumstances, such IRGC ground force encroachment upon the Quds Force’s purview would have provoked fierce interdepartmental rivalries and an organizational backlash from the Quds Force. However, transformation of the IRGC as a whole into a Quds Force is making the Quds Force commanders the de facto masters of the IRGC.

Metamorphosis of the IRGC could also change the strategic thinking and future behavior of the Islamic Republic: As Syria veterans are promoted within the ranks of the IRGC, it is likely to embrace a less cautious and more activist line in an attempt to duplicate what it perceives as its “success” in Syria. Such a development bodes ill for the United States and its allies in the Middle East, who will likely encounter a more confrontational Islamic Republic in the future.